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“Alone we can do so little; together we can do so much” 
 
Helen Keller 
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General Abstract 
Group interviewing, the topic of investigation in this thesis, has been neglected within 
the deception detection literature. Chapter 1 introduces the topic, and emphasises the 
importance of studying collective interviewing (whereby pairs are interviewed 
simultaneously) in a deception context. Chapter 2 explores the nature of deceit 
occurring within pairs in a police-style interview setting. Truth-telling pairs had lunch 
together, whilst lying pairs committed a mock crime. All pairs then had to convince an 
interviewer they were having lunch together. The interview protocol involved 
repeated questioning, but no significant differences were found between truth-telling 
pairs and lying pairs in terms of repetitions, omission errors, commission errors, 
contradictions, and dominance. The lack of significant findings are discussed with 
regards to the interview protocol employed. Chapter 3 describes two experiments. The 
first used an immigration-style interview context, and imposed cognitive load by 
implementing a forced turn-taking technique. Truth-telling pairs were real couples, 
whereas lying pairs were friends. All pairs were required to convince an interviewer 
they were a bona fide couple. Results showed that when forced to turn-take, truth-
telling pairs continued on from one another, whereas lying pairs waited and repeated 
previously said information before continuing. The second experiment, a lie detection 
study, revealed that the three turn-taking cues improved people’s ability to accurately 
detect deceit. Chapter 4 is based on the first experiment mentioned in Chapter 3, but 
applies transactive memory theory to explore whether signs of truthfulness emerge 
through joint recall. Results showed that truth-telling pairs posed questions and 
provided cues to one another, handed over remembering responsibility, and finished 
each other’s sentences more than lying pairs. Chapter 5 discusses a study which 
applied the verifiability approach to alibi witness scenarios. Truth-telling pairs 
completed a mission together, whereas lying pairs were separated so that one 
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completed the mission whilst the other committed a mock crime. All pairs then had to 
convince an investigator, first individually then collectively, that they completed the 
mission together. Results revealed that truth-telling pairs provided more checkable 
details demonstrating they were together, whereas lying pairs provided more 
uncheckable details. Additionally, the collective statements prompted only the truth-
telling pairs to provide more checkable details demonstrating they were together. A 
comparison of the individual and collective statements for memory consistency and 
distortion showed that liars repeated more uncheckable details whilst truth-tellers 
omitted and committed more checkable details. Chapter 6 summarises the main 
findings obtained in this thesis, discusses the theoretical and practical implications, 
and suggests ideas for future research. 
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Chapter 1:  
General Introduction to Thesis 
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1.1 Introduction 
1.1.1 Importance of studying deception 
Deception has been studied within various disciplines besides psychology, and 
this makes creating a definition of deception particularly challenging. However, for 
the purpose of this thesis, deception is viewed as “a deliberate attempt to mislead 
others” (DePaulo et al., 2003, pp. 74).  
An understanding of deception and its detection is particularly important in 
criminal investigations as police need appropriate fact-finding interview styles to be 
able to differentiate truth-telling suspects from lying suspects. Although some guilty 
suspects will confess to their involvement in an offence, many will deny, minimise or 
distort the truth (Gozna, 2008). Accuracy rates for practitioner lie catchers in 
empirical research are generally low, ranging from 45% to 60% (Bond & DePaulo, 
2006; Vrij, 2008a). These low accuracy rates are perhaps to be expected given the 
challenging nature of detecting deceit. For example, there are only subtle differences 
between truth-tellers and liars, and liars frequently use countermeasures to appear 
credible. Also, lie catchers often make common errors such as examining the wrong 
cues or placing emphasis on nonverbal cues (see Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010 for a 
review of the challenges and errors associated with detecting deceit). The ability to 
reliably detect deception during suspect interviews contributes significantly to the 
progress of criminal investigations, including the prevention of miscarriages of justice 
(Gudjonsson, 2003). Therefore, it is important to develop interview protocols that can 
assist professionals involved with citizen security to focus on the different 
psychological indicators of truth-tellers and liars, with the aim of eliciting and 
magnifying the verbal and nonverbal cues to deception. Examples are: ‘Imposing 
cognitive load’,  which exploits the fact that lying is more cognitively taxing than 
truth-telling (Vrij, Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2008); asking ‘unanticipated spatial and 
Chapter 1 
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temporal questions’ that negate benefit of planning for the interview (Vrij et al., 
2009); and the ‘strategic use of evidence’ (SUE), which exploits the different 
strategies used by guilty and innocent suspects and involves the police holding back 
incriminating evidence until the suspect has given their initial statement (Hartwig, 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2007).  
1.1.2 Gap in the deception literature: Collective interviewing 
Deception research has primarily focused on the interviewing of single 
suspects despite the fact that crimes are frequently committed by pairs of, or multiple, 
offenders (M
c
Gloin & Piquero, 2009; Van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009).  
Traditionally, police detectives separate suspects as soon as possible prior to 
interviewing to reduce opportunity for planning of responses, and to increase the 
suspects’ stress and anxiety (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). To reflect this practice, 
several studies that have considered pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars have 
involved interviewing the group members individually (e.g. Granhag, Strömwall & 
Jonsson, 2003; Strömwall, Granhag & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij et al., 2009). Consequently, 
there is the potential for police to manage numerous statements from several suspects 
at any one time. When lie catchers have access to multiple statements, they tend to 
focus on verbal consistency between statements (Strömwall et al., 2003). Although 
verbal cues are more diagnostic of deceit than nonverbal cues (Vrij, 2008b), research 
has identified that simply comparing the individual verbal statements of pairs of liars 
is problematic. This is because statements from lying pairs, although more vague, can 
appear as consistent as statements from truth-telling pairs due to the provision of an 
alibi and the pre-planning of their responses whereby they stick to their rehearsed 
story (Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 2003; Vrij, Mann, Leal & Granhag, 
2010). Truth-tellers, however, add different elements to their truthful story across time 
Chapter 1 
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as they have not pre-planned what to say and memory is inherently reconstructive in 
nature (Bartlett, 1932; Granhag & Strömwall, 1999).  
Although laboratory studies examining individual interviewing are modelled 
on typical police interview practices, there are several field settings to which 
collective interviewing, that is, the interviewing of multiple suspects simultaneously, 
would be better suited. Examples for when collective interviewing could be used 
include, when there are multiple suspects but only one interviewer available, such as 
during police stop and searches, at road border controls where cars containing several 
people are checked, at security checkpoints (e.g., airports), or during house to house 
enquires. These tend to be intelligence-gathering contexts where the focus is on 
preventing actions that may cause harm, rather than catching individuals who have 
already caused harm and, in settings such as these, it would be more timely and 
convenient to interview the group members simultaneously in order to gather initial 
intelligence.  
Group interviewing provides a different dynamic and potentially useful insight 
into detecting deception within groups. That is, it will determine deception at a social 
level as well as at an individual level, enabling new cues to deceit to be identified 
from the group that cannot be explored in individuals (e.g. cues stemming from 
suspects communicating and interacting with one another). Additionally, group 
interviewing compliments memory research which focuses on collaborative learning 
and remembering, allowing for alternative theories and concepts to be applied to 
deception that cannot be applied when interviewing individuals, e.g. transactive 
memory (Wegner, 1987), collective memory (Barnier & Sutton, 2008), and 
dominance (Rogers-Millar & Millar, 1979).  
Collective interviewing is already part of some existing procedures. For 
example, in the UK, immigration officers use collective interviewing when attempting 
Chapter 1 
5 
 
to uncover sham marriages. Also, in the UK, police detectives interview people in 
groups when making house to house enquiries. In Canada, customs officers carry out 
collective interviews at airports because groups are deemed to have a ‘similar agenda’ 
(i.e. the group are travelling together and so it is assumed that they are travelling to the 
same destination for the same purpose as each other); thus if only one person in the 
group is examined, this could result in a wasted effort or a missed opportunity. 
Additionally, if each group member is examined individually then this will not be 
time-efficient.  
Despite this, the issue of collective interviewing has yet to be systematically 
studied under controlled laboratory conditions, and therefore this PhD thesis will 
examine collective interviewing as a technique to improve the detection of deception.  
1.2 Thesis Outline 
The central aim of this PhD thesis is to explore collective interviewing as a 
technique to improve the detection of deception in forensic settings that would benefit 
from group interviewing. This PhD thesis constitutes four studies in total described 
across four chapters. Each experiment takes a different approach to the application of 
collective interviewing whilst also applying different psychological theories. It is 
important to note that there is some repetition throughout the thesis. This is because 
each chapter has been written so that it is independent of all other chapters and so can 
be read and understood individually. This means there is also a reference section at the 
end of each chapter.  
 
Chapter 2: Collective Interviewing to Detect Deceit: The Effects of Memory and 
Dominance during Repeated Questioning 
This chapter begins by explaining collective interviewing and detailing three 
recent collective interviewing studies, which each demonstrated the utility of applying 
Chapter 1 
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a collective interviewing approach for eliciting new cues to deceit. Subsequently, the 
chapter links reconstructive memory (Bartlett, 1932) and the prevalence of dominance 
within groups (Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005) to deception detection. Finally, an 
experiment was conducted in which a collective interviewing technique was used on 
pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in a police-style interview setting. The main 
findings were that (i) truth-telling pairs gave more general details and more spatial 
details than lying pairs; (ii) when number of general details or number of spatial 
details was controlled for, no significant differences emerged between pairs of truth-
tellers and pairs of liars in terms of repetitions, omission errors, commission errors, or 
contradictions; and (iii) dominance did not significantly differentiate between pairs of 
truth-tellers and pairs of liars when responding to both the general and spatial 
questions. The fact that this study revealed no effects, which have not previously been 
identified in other studies, suggests that the interview protocol used in this experiment 
was not appropriately eliciting the necessary differences between pairs of truth-tellers 
and pairs of liars. Nevertheless, this does not mean the interview protocol will never 
work, and therefore the interview protocol was improved upon by implementing new 
and different interview settings and techniques into the experiments in Chapters 3, 4 
and 5. 
 
Chapter 3: Experiments 2a and 2b: Collective Interviewing: Eliciting Cues to 
Deceit using a Turn-Taking Approach 
 In this chapter, two experiments are reported which were designed to exploit 
the potential strategies that lying pairs might use, making the task of lying together as 
a pair more difficult. An immigration-style interview was used whereby real (truth-
telling) and pretend (lying) couples were interviewed together in their pairs with the 
task of convincing an interviewer they were a bona fide couple. Experiment 2a 
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implemented a forced turn-taking technique into the interview schedule. Forced turn-
taking is a technique whereby the interviewer states which of the two interviewees is 
to answer the question and then intervenes every 20 seconds by stopping whichever of 
the interviewees is responding and asking the other interviewee in the pair to continue 
from the point at which their partner was stopped. This imposes cognitive load by 
disrupting the natural recall of information and forcing unwanted interactions between 
the pair, making the task of lying even more challenging. Consequently, new cues to 
deceit as a result of this forced turn-taking manipulation were predicted. The main 
findings were that when forced to turn-take by the interviewer, truth-telling pairs were 
significantly more able to continue on from one another, whereas lying pairs were 
significantly more likely to wait and repeat what their partner last said before 
continuing. 
Subsequently, Experiment 2b was conducted. This was a lie detection study to 
determine whether informing laypeople of the three turn-taking cues (continuations, 
repetitions, waiting) improved their ability to accurately detect deceit. The main 
findings were that the three turn-taking cues were useful and easy for laypeople to 
spot and furthermore, improved their ability to accurately detect deceit considerably. 
In fact, this study obtained some of the highest lie detection accuracy rates in the 
research literature. Both experiments 2a and 2b have been published together in one 
manuscript in the peer-reviewed journal, Psychology, Public Policy and Law.  
 
Chapter 4: Collective Interviewing: A Transactive Memory Approach Towards 
Identifying Signs of Truthfulness 
 This chapter was based on ‘Collective Interviewing: Eliciting Cues to Deceit 
using a Turn-Taking Approach’, the study discussed in Chapter 3. However, different 
dependent variables were measured. In this chapter, the theory of transactive memory 
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(Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1987) was applied to an immigration-style collective 
interview to explore whether signs of truthfulness emerge when measuring joint 
memory recall. The theory of transactive memory was developed to explain how 
couples share cognition and ‘think together’ (Wegner, 1987). Consequently, this 
theory was particularly applicable to the type of setting used within this experiment 
because real (truth-telling) and pretend (lying) couples were the participants being 
interviewed together. Signs of truthfulness as opposed to cues to deceit were the focus 
because the cues measured were believed to occur more in truth-telling couples than 
in lying couples. In support of transactive memory theory, the main findings were that 
truth-telling couples posed questions to one another, provided cues to one another, 
handed over remembering responsibility, and finished each other’s sentences 
significantly more than lying pairs. This experiment has been published in the Journal 
of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition.  
 
Chapter 5: Applying the Verifiability Approach and the Social Phenomenon of 
Memory to the Detection of Deception in Alibi Witness Situations 
 This chapter applies the verifiability approach and the social phenomenon of 
human memory to the detection of deception in alibi witness scenarios where pairs of 
participants, consisting of a suspect and an alibi witness, completed both individual 
statements and a collective statement. The verifiability approach (Nahari, Vrij & 
Fisher, 2014) proposes that truth-tellers provide more details in their statements that 
can be checked to prove their innocence, compared to liars who provide details, but 
only details that cannot be checked in order to prevent their lies from being uncovered 
by the investigator. Pairs either completed a mission together (truth-tellers) or 
separately (liars) but were instructed to convince an investigator that they were 
together on their mission. The main findings were that compared to lying pairs, truth-
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telling pairs automatically provided more checkable details that demonstrated they 
were together, whereas lying pairs provided significantly more uncheckable details. 
The collective statement prompted truth-telling pairs only to provide significantly 
more checkable details that demonstrated they were together in comparison to their 
individual statements. Additionally, and as a result of the repeated questioning, 
memory consistency (e.g. repetitions and contradictions) and memory distortion (e.g. 
omission errors and commission errors) were measured between the individual and 
collective statements, with an emphasis on reconstructive memory (Bartlett, 1932) and 
the ‘repeat versus reconstruct’ hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). The main 
findings were that liars repeated significantly more uncheckable details from the 
individual to the collective statements, whereas truth-tellers omitted and committed 
more checkable details that demonstrated they had undertaken the mission together. 
 
Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 Finally, the concluding chapter discusses the main findings of this PhD thesis 
as well as presenting theoretical implications, practical implications, and some 
suggestions for future research. 
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2.1 Abstract 
The interviewing of more than one suspect at the same time has been somewhat 
neglected within the deception detection literature. The present study explores the 
nature of deceit occurring within pairs, investigating the types of social cues that may 
emerge. Truth-telling pairs were friends who ate lunch together at a local restaurant, 
whereas lying pairs were friends who committed a mock crime together. The task for 
all pairs was to convince an interviewer that they were having lunch together at the 
time the crime was committed. The interview protocol involved repeated questioning, 
and whilst truth-telling pairs provided significantly more details overall than lying 
pairs, when number of details was controlled for it was found that there were no 
significant differences between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in terms of 
repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and contradictions. Additionally, there 
was no effect of dominance. Implications and ideas for future research are discussed. 
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2.2 Introduction 
Collective interviewing refers to the interviewing of multiple suspects 
simultaneously, as opposed to individual interviewing which refers to interviewing 
each suspect separately. This collective approach is a unique proposition to the 
interviewing of suspects during criminal investigations, and therefore a new line of 
research within the deception detection literature.  This is because, regardless of the 
number of individuals believed to be involved in the crime, traditionally police 
detectives separate suspects as soon as possible prior to interrogation to reduce 
opportunity for planning of responses, and to increase the suspects’ stress and anxiety 
(Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). As a result of this real-life practice, deception research 
has focused on developing interview protocols that increase the discrepancies between 
individual truth-tellers and individual liars, ignoring the effects of group deceit. 
Crimes commonly involve pairs or groups of offenders (M
c
Gloin & Piquero, 2009; 
Van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009), and although interviewing suspects separately is 
modelled on typical police interview practices, there are several settings whereby 
interviewing multiple suspects together would be better suited. Examples for when 
collective interviewing could be used include, when there are multiple suspects but 
only one interviewer available, such as during police stop and searches, at road border 
controls where cars containing several people are checked, or at security checkpoints 
(e.g., airports). These settings tend to involve gathering intelligence to prevent harm 
rather than gathering evidence to charge someone who has already caused harm. 
Therefore, as a means of gathering intelligence, it would be more timely and 
convenient to interview group members simultaneously. Furthermore, group 
interviewing provides a different dynamic and potentially useful insight into detecting 
deception within groups, as it will capture deception at a social level as well as at an 
individual level; thus enabling the identification of cues to deceit that are present in 
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groups, but which cannot be explored in individuals (e.g., cues stemming from 
suspects communicating and interacting with one another). The detection of deception 
within groups is an area of research that has been overlooked, and therefore the 
current study will apply a collective interviewing approach as a technique to improve 
the detection of deception with an interview protocol that involves repeated 
questioning.   
Recently, three studies have illustrated the clear potential for using collective 
interviewing in lie detection. Vrij et al. (2012) examined verbal communication cues 
in pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars. Pairs were friends because this reflects real-
life situations in which criminals know each other. The procedure involved 21 pairs of 
truth-tellers going for lunch in a nearby restaurant. During this time 22 pairs of liars 
were asked to steal £10 from an office. On returning to the laboratory, the truth-tellers 
were informed about the stolen money and told that they were going to be interviewed 
as suspects about their whereabouts at the time the money was taken, and that they 
should just tell the truth about their time in the restaurant. In contrast, the liars were 
told that they were going to be interviewed about their activities but that they were not 
to admit to having taken the money. Instead, they were instructed to prepare an alibi 
about having gone to a nearby restaurant together for lunch, and to tell that story to the 
interviewer. All pairs were given as much time as they needed to prepare for the 
interview and were not informed that they would be interviewed together. Vrij et al. 
(2012) found that pairs of truth-tellers interrupted and corrected each other more than 
pairs of liars, as well as adding more information to each other’s accounts in 
comparison to pairs of liars.  
Jundi et al. (2013) used the same procedure as Vrij et al. (2012) but then 
examined participants’ eye contact as a nonverbal communication cue. They found 
that pairs of liars tended to make more eye contact with the interviewer than pairs of 
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truth-tellers, whereas pairs of truth-tellers looked more at each other than pairs of 
liars. Driskell, Salas and Driskell (2012) investigated the social indicators of deception 
in pairs of liars and pairs of truth-tellers. They used 26 pairs of police officers or fire-
fighters who had served together as partners. Pairs of truth-tellers were asked to 
describe a recent event that they had jointly participated in. Pairs of liars were 
instructed to fabricate a story on the spot that did not actually take place, but that 
involved them doing something together and was as realistic as possible. All 
participants had a moment to decide what event they would discuss. Driskell et al. 
found that pairs of truth-tellers illustrated more synchrony in behaviour and exhibited 
more interactions (e.g. mutual eye gaze and verbal transitions) than pairs of liars.  
Unlike Vrij et al. (2012) and Jundi et al. (2013), Driskell et al. (2012) did not 
use a formal and time-consuming police-style interview. Instead they used a brief 
investigative interview, similar to that which might occur during initial screening at a 
check-point or street corner, thus demonstrating the real-life application of the 
collective interviewing approach. Furthermore, Driskell et al. used real-life events that 
were relevant to the participants, increasing their motivation to perform. One 
weakness of Driskell et al.’s study is that, unlike the studies by Vrij et al. and Jundi et 
al., the ground truth could not be established. This makes it difficult to measure 
whether the liars definitely lied and the truth-tellers definitely told the truth. However, 
determining ground truth and performing a task as participants did in the studies by 
Vrij et al. and Jundi et al. results in an artificial task that reduces the ecological 
validity of the study.  Despite the minor procedural issues, these three studies show 
that a collective approach can generate discrepancies between pairs of truth-tellers and 
pairs of liars that can aid in the detection of deception, with a lack of communication 
cues and interaction cues (e.g., corrections, interruptions, eye contact with each other) 
being particularly indicative of deceit. The studies suggest that detecting deception in 
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a social context is imperative to enhance our understanding of lie detection, thus 
further studies using a collective interviewing approach will have both theoretical and 
practical value. 
2.2.1 Strategies employed by truth-tellers and liars 
Research into the differing strategies employed by truth-tellers and liars during 
interviews gives insight into the types of deception cues that may arise when 
interviewing pairs of suspects together, and shows that these cues are likely to vary 
from those cues present when suspects are interviewed individually. When pairs of 
truth-tellers are asked to recall a shared event, they exhibit interactions that cannot 
occur when interviewed individually, and these interactions will occur more 
frequently in truth-telling pairs than in lying pairs (Vrij et al., 2012). This is because 
pairs of truth-tellers will communicate with each other during the interview (e.g., by 
posing questions to one another) and will share their experiences through the joint 
recall of events. Conversely, liars will be inclined merely to recall what they planned 
to say, exhibiting fewer interactions as they recall their fabricated story. Truth-tellers 
believe that the truth will shine through (‘illusion of transparency’; Gilovich, Savitsky 
& Medvec, 1998) and therefore do not prepare their answers but rely purely on 
memory, preferring a ‘tell it all’ strategy that aims to provide a detailed description of 
what actually occurred. However, liars prefer a ‘keep it simple’ strategy to avoid 
raising suspicion, which results in their statements being less detailed but because they 
have pre-planned them, just as consistent as statements from truth-telling pairs 
(Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 2003; Strömwall, Granhag & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij, 
Mann, Leal & Granhag, 2010).  
2.2.2 Memory 
The concept of collective interviewing coincides with the memory research 
which focuses on collective memory. Collective memory examines the social nature 
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of memory treating past experiences and events as memories shared with others 
(Barnier & Sutton, 2008; Hirst & Manier, 2008; Rajaram, 2011). The research 
suggests that group collaboration can aid memory through cross-cueing (where 
members of the group provide cues to one another that increase recall) and error-
pruning (where feedback from other members of the group create discussions that 
make people realise their recall errors) (Rajaram, 2011; Ross, Blatz & Schryer, 2008). 
However, human memory is also highly susceptible to misinformation from a variety 
of sources, particularly other people (Loftus, 2005) and consequently group 
collaboration can result in ‘memory conformity’ (Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003), 
which reduces the accuracy of memory recall.  
Reconstructive memory theory (Bartlett, 1932) states that memory is subject to 
distortions, such as omission errors (the leaving out of information) and commission 
errors (the adding in of new information) due to its reconstructive nature. Therefore, 
truthful suspects will not recall a story word for word (unless instructed to do so; 
Gauld & Stephenson, 1967), but will instead recreate the details of the story. This 
theory of reconstructive memory underlies the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis’ 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), which proposes that whilst liars will attempt to repeat 
what they have previously said, truth-tellers will try to reconstruct what they actually 
experienced. When the different strategies used by truth-tellers and liars are 
considered and memory research is taken into account, it is not surprising that the 
consistency of truth-telling pairs is equal to, or even weaker, than the consistency of 
lying pairs (e.g. Granhag et al., 2003). When truth-tellers are asked to repeat details, 
their memory restructures the event so they gain, lose, and change information over 
time (Baddeley, 1990), thus reducing consistency. This is something that liars do not 
do as they are merely repeating what they originally prepared, thus promoting 
consistency. In addition, the ‘reminiscence effect’ shows that repeated questioning can 
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result in the recall of previously unrecalled items (Payne, 1987), and this effect has 
been found to be stronger for truthful statements than for deceptive statements 
(Granhag et al., 2003). Therefore, in contradiction to the stereotypical belief that 
consistency implies truthfulness (see ‘consistency heuristic’ literature; Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2000), it is clear that lie-detectors need to be cautious when interpreting 
consistent statements as truthful and inconsistent statements as mendacious and 
therefore incriminating.  
2.2.3 Dominance 
When we consider interviewing collectively, it is important to mention 
dominance and its effect within groups. Dominance is defined as a dyadic variable in 
which one individual’s affirmation of control is met by compliance from another 
individual (Rogers-Millar & Millar, 1979). It is both context-dependent and 
relationship-dependent, with dominance being an important aspect of all relationships, 
particularly close relationships in which people have to depend upon one another to 
achieve their goals (Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005). There are different dimensions of 
dominance, but it is essentially a quantitatively orientated concept in which more 
speech is a measurement of who is dominating the conversation (Linell, Gustavsson & 
Juvonen, 1988). A study by Hung et al. (2007) provided a framework for detecting 
deception in group meetings and found that speaking length was associated with 
dominance, with 85% of dominant people being classified correctly based on number 
of words spoken. This suggests that dominance could be quantified using collective 
interviews to see whether there is a veracity effect on dominance.  
2.2.4 Hypotheses 
The current study used a collective interviewing approach to investigate 
deception occurring within pairs. Repetitions, omission errors, commission errors, 
contradictions and dominance were explored as possible cues to deceit, and with the 
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exception of dominance, these cues were explored both within each single participant 
and across the pairs of participants as they were interviewed simultaneously. Based on 
previous memory and deception research it is evident that truth-tellers will provide 
more details than liars (Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010; Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, 
whilst pairs of truth-tellers will interact more and jointly share the recall of events, 
‘true’ memory is reconstructive in nature, therefore it was predicted that truth-telling 
pairs would correct, change and add in new information, and also leave out 
information over time (Baddeley, 1990; Bartlett, 1932; Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). 
Therefore, even when controlling for number of details, it was predicted that truth-
telling pairs would exhibit more memory distortions, such as omission errors and 
commission errors, and would contradict themselves and each other more than lying 
pairs (Hypothesis 2). Conversely, pairs of liars should have colluded with one another 
and merely be repeating what they originally said in order to prevent themselves from 
raising suspicion and appearing incriminating (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999; Granhag 
et al., 2003; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2010). As a result, it was predicted that lying pairs 
would repeat themselves and each other more than truth-telling pairs (Hypothesis 3). 
The final prediction is not so straightforward because the link between dominance and 
veracity is unclear. However, it is believed that lying pairs should be more inclined to 
interrupt each other less, agree with each other more, and have fewer interactions (Vrij 
et al., 2012), resulting in one participant in the pair dominating the interview and 
speaking more often than the other participant who will have to follow their partners 
lead. Therefore, it was predicted that lying pairs would have a more dominant 
character within the pair, whereas truth-telling pairs would illustrate more equal 
dominance within the pair (Hypothesis 4).  
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2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants 
A total of 90 participants (45 pairs: 23 truth-telling pairs and 22 lying pairs) 
from a UK university took part in the current study. However, two truth-telling pairs 
were excluded because they did not follow the study instructions correctly (i.e. they 
did not attend the chosen restaurant). The mean age of the remaining 86 participants 
was 22.04 years (SD = 6.38), 25 were male and 61 were female.   
2.3.2 Design  
The current study used a between-subjects design with Veracity (truth versus 
lie) as the only factor and repetitions (themselves or the other participant in their 
pair), omission errors (themselves or the other participant in their pair), commission 
errors (themselves or the other participant in their pair), and contradictions 
(themselves or the other participant in their pair) as the dependent variables. 
Dominance was also measured as a possible indicator of Veracity. The current study 
was designed to investigate whether the dependent variables were predictive of 
whether the pairs were truth-tellers or liars; thus whether these variables are accurate 
cues to deceit.  
2.3.3 Procedure 
  The current study used data previously collected by Vrij et al. (2012), in which 
21 pairs of truth-tellers and 22 pairs of liars were recruited under the guise of a social 
communication experiment. This procedure imitated Vrij et al. (2009). Pairs were 
friends because this reflects real-life criminal networks, and they were randomly 
allocated to either the lying or truth-telling condition. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, pairs of truth-tellers were told that the study 
was delayed by 45-minutes and that, as compensation, they could have lunch in a 
nearby restaurant. A confederate escorted each pair to a predetermined restaurant and 
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collected them 45-minutes later. When the truth-tellers arrived back at the laboratory 
they were told that money had been stolen whilst they were at lunch, and that, as 
suspects, they would be questioned about their activities in the restaurant. Upon 
arrival at the laboratory, pairs of liars were asked to take £10 from an office and to 
return to the laboratory to be interviewed about their activities. The pairs of liars were 
instructed to prepare an alibi, which involved them telling the interviewer that they 
were having lunch together in a nearby restaurant at the time the money was stolen. 
Both the pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars were given as much time as they 
wanted to prepare themselves for their interviews but were not informed that they 
would be interviewed together. 
To motivate participants to perform well during the experiment, they were told 
that if they were believed by the interviewer they would each receive £10. However, if 
they were not believed they would receive no money and would be required to write a 
statement detailing their whereabouts during the time the money was stolen. To ensure 
that the experiment was ethical and equal, all participants were paid £10, and were 
told at the end of the experiment that the interviewer believed they were telling the 
truth.  
Once the pairs of truth-tellers or liars indicated they were ready, they were 
taken to a forensic interview suite in which they were interviewed together and 
informed that they would be video- and audio-recorded. The interviewer was blind to 
the veracity of the pairs. The interviewer asked questions about each pair’s time in the 
restaurant using a standardised interview protocol taken from Vrij et al. (2009). This 
interview protocol distinguished between general questions (e.g. ‘Can you tell me in 
as much detail as possible what you did while you were in the restaurant?’), spatial 
questions (e.g. ‘In relation to the front door and where you sat, where were the closest 
diners?’), and temporal questions (e.g. ‘How long did it take between the staff taking 
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your order and receiving your food?’). The interviewer never stated who in the pair 
had to answer each question, therefore the pair could choose which member 
responded and each member of the pair could say as little or as much as they wanted.  
2.3.4 Manipulation checks 
 Manipulation checks were carried out by Vrij et al. (2012). Following the 
interview each participant completed a post-interview questionnaire separately. 
Participants were asked to what extent they had felt motivated to appear convincing 
during the interview. Answers were given on 7-point Likert scales ranging from [1] not 
at all to [7] very much. The majority of participants (88%) indicated that they were 
motivated to perform well during the interview (score of 5 or higher on the 7-point 
Likert scale). Liars were significantly more motivated (M = 6.27, SD = .90) than truth-
tellers (M = 5.31, SD = 1.60), F(1, 84) = 11.49, p = .001, ηp
2
 = .12, d = .74. Overall, 
both truth-tellers and liars reported to have been highly motivated to perform well 
during the interview. 
Whilst the procedure and manipulation checks of this study were carried out 
by Vrij et al. (2012), it is important to note that, for the purpose of the present 
experiment, I developed a coding scheme to measure new variables that had not 
previously been measured by Vrij et al. (2012) (i.e., repetitions, omission errors, 
commission errors, contradictions, and dominance). I then coded the transcripts for all 
variables (as did one other person for reliability purposes), did the necessarily 
calculations, ran the analyses, and wrote up the findings myself (see all future sections 
in this chapter).   
2.3.5 Coding: Memory variables 
For the purpose of the present experiment, the interview transcripts were coded 
by two raters who were blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs. The 
interview questions were then separated into general questions and spatial questions. 
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General questions were those that required the participants to give a broad description 
(e.g. ‘Can you tell me in as much detail as possible what you did while you were in 
the restaurant?’), and spatial questions were those that required the participants to 
describe a layout or space between objects (e.g. ‘In relation to the front door and 
where you sat, where were the closest diners?’). This enabled general details, such as 
“I went to the bar and ordered two cokes”; and spatial details, such as “the lady was 
sat to the right of us, close to the window” to be calculated separately for all cues 
(repetitions, omission errors, commission errors, contradictions, and dominance; see 
below). 
Once all questions had been asked during the first part of the interview, 
specific questions were repeated in exactly the same format in the second part of the 
interview. This allowed for the total number of details to the initial questions (first 
part of the interview) and the total number of details to the replicate questions (second 
part of the interview) to be calculated. The frequency of repetitions and contradictions 
were then calculated by both raters. Repetitions were defined as the amount of 
information said again by a participant from the initial questions to the replicate 
questions. Contradictions were defined as information given by a participant in the 
second part of the interview that directly conflicted with what had been said in the 
first part of the interview. Repetitions and contradictions were divided into four 
categories; repeating or contradicting information they themselves originally said; and 
repeating or contradicting information their partner originally said. 
The first 15 transcripts were coded and comparisons made between the outputs 
from both raters to increase accuracy and ensure both raters understood the coding 
system. The remaining 30 transcripts were coded separately. Inter-rater reliability 
scores (Pearson correlations) for the 30 transcripts were generally high for both 
general details (total: r = .99; repetitions: r = .92; contradictions: r = .63) and spatial 
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details (total: r = .98; repetitions: r = .92; contradictions: r = .85). The agreement 
between the two raters was therefore acceptable and the coding system deemed 
reliable. New variables were then computed using the coded data (see Appendix 2.1). 
First, the average scores of the two coders’ total number of initial details, total number 
of replicate details, and total number of repetitions were calculated. Following this, an 
agreed contradictions variable was created by comparing each coder’s total 
contradictions rather than using the average contradictions. This was because there 
were very few contradictions. If the agreed total was on the boundary then .5 was 
used. For example, if one rater had one contradiction and the other had two 
contradictions, but an agreement could not be made then 1.5 was used. 
New variables were also calculated for omission errors and commission errors. 
These were calculated using the total number of initial and replicate details and the 
repetition variables (see Appendix 2.1). Omission errors were defined as information 
lost by participants between the initial and replicate questions. Commission errors 
were defined as information added by participants between the initial and replicate 
questions. Omission errors and commission errors were divided into four categories; 
losing or adding information from/to what they themselves originally said; and losing 
or adding information from/to what their partner originally said.  
Repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and contradictions were 
computed using frequencies (i.e. number of details). These data were analysed using a 
one-factor between subjects MANCOVA with number of details as a covariate. 
Repetitions, omission errors and commission errors were then calculated again using 
proportions of each cue as a function of the number of details (see Appendix 2.2 for 
how the proportions were computed for each variable). These proportion data were 
then analysed using a one-factor between subjects MANOVA. All analyses needed to 
take into account the significant difference between truth-tellers and liars in terms of 
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the number of details they gave. Therefore, although they are very similar analyses, 
MANCOVAs with number of details as a covariate and MANOVAs using proportions 
of each cue to the number of details were conducted and all findings reported in the 
results section (See Section 2.4). 
2.3.6 Coding: Dominance 
Dominance was computed and measured in three different ways in order to 
explore every aspect therein. Dominance variables were calculated separately for 
participants sitting on the left during the interview and participants sitting on the right 
during the interview as well as for the initial and replicate details (see Appendix 2.3).  
The first way of measuring dominance used an independent samples t-test 
examining dominance change and how far away from equal dominance the pairs of 
truth-tellers and pairs of liars were. The proportion of information given by both the 
left and right participants during the initial and replicate questions were calculated 
separately for each participant in the pair to measure dominance equality, with 0.5 
representing equal dominance. This proportion of information was calculated by 
dividing the number of details each individual participant gave by the total number of 
details given by both the participants in the pair. Following this, each participant’s 
proportion value was subtracted from 0.5 to give a value that represented how far off 
equal dominance each participant was. Negative values represent above equal 
dominance and positive values represent below equal dominance. Dominance change 
was then measured for both the left and right participants by subtracting their repeated 
dominance scores from their initial dominance scores. Finally, to obtain an overall 
dominance change score for each pair, the dominance score of the left participant was 
multiplied by the dominance score of the right participant ignoring the 
positive/negative sign of their individual values. For example: If the left participant 
gave 14.50 details and the right participant gave 31.50 details to the initial questions, 
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then the proportion of information given to the initial questions by the left participant 
was .32 (14.50/(14.50+31.50)) and for the right participant was .68 
(31.50/(14.50+31.50)). If these are subtracted from 0.5 then the distance from equal 
dominance for the left participant in the initial questions is .18, and the right 
participant is -.18. Subsequently, if the left participant gave 19 details and the right 
participant gave 18 details to the replicate questions, then the proportion of 
information given to the replicate questions by the left participant was .51 
(19/(19+18)) and for the right participant was .49 (18/(19+18)). If these are subtracted 
from 0.5 then the distance from equal dominance for the left participant in the 
replicate questions is -.01, and the right participant is .01. Dominance change for the 
left participant was then .32 minus .51 which equals -.19, and for the right participant 
was .68 minus .49 which equals .19. The overall dominance change for the pair was 
therefore -.19 multiplied by .19 which equalled -.036, but the negative sign was 
ignored.  
The second way of measuring dominance used an independent samples t-test 
to compare the total dominance change between the most dominant speakers in the 
initial and replicate questions, and to investigate whether change in dominance 
significantly differed between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars. The proportion 
of information scores given during both the initial and replicate questions by the left 
and right participants were used to compute dominance change, with higher 
proportion values representing the most dominant character answering those 
questions. The proportion scores for the most dominant characters in the pair during 
the initial and replicate questions were added together if the dominant character 
changed from the initial to replicate questions, but were subtracted from one another if 
the dominant character remained the same from the initial to replicate questions. This 
gave the difference in dominance between the most dominant speakers from the initial 
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to replicate questions. Zero represented no dominance change. Larger values 
represented greater dominance change from the initial to replicate questions. For 
example: If the proportion of information given by the left participant was .32 for the 
initial questions and .51 for the replicate questions, and the proportion of information 
given by the right participant was .68 for the initial questions and .49 for the replicate 
questions; then the right participant was the most dominant character when the initial 
questions were answered, and the left participant became the most dominant character 
when the replicate questions were answered. Consequently, .51 was added to .68 to 
give a dominance change of 1.19. If however, the proportion of information given by 
the left participant was .37 for the initial questions and .43 for the replicate questions, 
and the proportion of information given by the right participant was .63 for the initial 
questions and .57 for the replicate questions; then the right participant was the most 
dominant character throughout answering both the initial and replicate questions. This 
meant that .57 was subtracted from .63 to give a dominance change of .06. 
The third way of measuring dominance used a 2 x 2 chi-square test of 
independence to explore whether there was a relationship between the two categorical 
variables: Veracity (truth vs. lie) and Dominance change (yes vs. no). The second 
method above was used to categorise dominance change, which was coded based on 
who in the pair answered the questions first and whether or not this swapped between 
the left and right participants from the initial questions to the replicate questions (see 
Appendix 2.3 for how the dominance variables were computed). 
2.4 Results 
The results section is divided into general questions (see Section 2.4.1) and 
spatial questions (see Section 2.4.2). Within each of these sections is firstly a 
MANOVA comparing the number of details given to the initial and replicate questions 
by truth-tellers and liars (see Sections 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.2.1). Following this are 
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MANCOVA analyses of the frequency data and MANOVA analyses of the proportion 
data. These investigate whether liars and truth-tellers are significantly different in 
terms of repetitions (themselves or the other participant in the pair), omission errors 
(themselves or the other participant in the pair), commission errors (themselves or the 
other participant in the pair) and contradictions (themselves or the other participant 
in the pair), when number of details is controlled for (see Sections 2.4.1.2 and 
2.4.2.2). Finally, there are analyses investigating the link between Veracity and 
dominance (see Sections 2.4.1.3 and 2.4.2.3). The final part of the results section (see 
Section 2.4.3) contains the analyses conducted on the data when the deception cues 
were not divided into themselves and the other participant in the pair, and the number 
of details was controlled for. 
2.4.1 General questions 
2.4.1.1 Number of general details given by truth-tellers and liars to the 
initial and replicate questions. A one-factor between subjects MANOVA was 
conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the only factor, and number of details 
given to the initial interview questions and number of details given to the replicate 
interview questions as the dependent variables. The MANOVA revealed a significant 
multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .80, F(2, 40) = 5.11, p = .011, ηp
2
 = 
.20. In addition, significant univariate main effects for Veracity were obtained for the 
total number of general details given by pairs of participants to the initial interview 
questions, F(1, 41) = 10.46, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .20 (see Table 2.1). Truth-tellers gave 
significantly more general details to the initial interview questions (M = 57.36, SD = 
35.76) compared to liars (M = 30.36, SD = 15.61). No significant univariate main 
effects for Veracity were obtained for the total number of general details given by 
pairs of participants to the replicate interview questions, F(1, 41) = 3.50, p = .069, ηp
2 
= .08.  
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2.4.1.2 Analyses of repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and 
contradictions when controlling for number of general details. As a result of the 
number of general details being significantly different between truth-tellers and liars 
to the initial interview questions (see Section 2.4.1.1), number of details was 
controlled for in the following analyses. Two different approaches were used to test 
whether pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars were significantly different in terms of 
repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and contradictions.  
First, a one-factor between subjects MANCOVA was conducted with Veracity 
(truth versus lie) as the independent variable; repetitions (themselves or the other 
participant in their pair), omission errors (themselves or the other participant in their 
pair), commission errors (themselves or the other participant in their pair) and 
contradictions (themselves or the other participant in their pair) as the dependent 
variables; and the total number of general details as the covariate. The MANCOVA 
revealed no significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .76, F(7, 34) 
= 1.52, p = .195 ηp
2 
= .24. In addition, no significant univariate main effects for 
Veracity were obtained for any of the dependent variables (see Table 2.1).   
Second, the proportion of repetitions, omission errors and commission errors 
was computed in relation to the number of details. A one-factor between subjects 
MANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the only factor and 
proportion of repetitions (themselves or the other participant in their pair), omission 
errors (themselves or the other participant in their pair), and commission errors 
(themselves or the other participant in their pair) as the dependent variables.  The 
MANOVA did not reveal a significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ 
= .96, F(5, 37) = .35, p = .882, ηp
2
 = .05. In addition, no significant univariate main 
effects were obtained for any of the dependent variables (see Table 2.2).  
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The analyses above illustrate that when number of general details was 
controlled for, Veracity (whether a member of a truth-telling pair or a lying pair) has 
no significant effect on repetitions, omission errors, commission errors, or 
contradictions. This means that repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and 
contradictions (when based on general details) are not accurate cues to deceit when 
using a collective interviewing approach in the context of this study. Therefore, these 
cues should not be used to differentiate pairs of truth-tellers from pairs of liars.
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Table 2.1 
MANOVA and MANCOVA results for each of the dependent variables for general details.  
 Truth (N = 21) 
Mean (SD) 
Lie (N = 22) 
Mean (SD) 
F  F (total number  
of details as 
covariate) 
p ηp
2 
d 
Number of details given  
to initial questions 
57.36 (35.76) 30.36 (15.61) 10.46  .002* .20 .98 
Number of details given  
to replicate questions 
24.33 (12.76) 17.23 (12.16) 3.47  .069 .08 .57 
Repeat: Themselves 
 
10.24 (5.37) 5.34 (3.36)  3.30 .077 .08 1.10 
Repeat: Other participant  
in pair 
5.79 (3.81) 3.66 (2.67)  .24 .628 .01 .65 
Omission errors:  
Themselves 
47.12 (33.22) 25.00 (13.28)  .01 .924 <.01 .87 
Omission errors: Other 
participant in pair 
51.57 (34.11) 26.66 (14.51)  .41 .525 .01 .95 
Commission errors: 
Themselves 
14.10 (8.78) 11.89 (10.11)  3.72 .061 .09 .23 
Commission errors: Other 
participant in pair 
18.55 (10.66) 13.57 (11.25)  1.22 .276 .03 .45 
Contradict: Themselves 
 
.67 (1.15) .14 (.35)  1.81 .186 .04 .62 
Contradict: Other  
participant in pair 
.48 (.68) .23 (.53)  .17 .679 <.01 .41 
*p < .005 
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Table 2.2  
MANOVA results for each of the proportion dependent variables for general details. 
 Truth (N = 21) 
Mean (SD) 
Lie (N = 22) 
Mean (SD) 
F  p ηp
2 
d 
Number of details given  
to initial questions 
57.36 (35.76) 30.36 (15.61) 10.46 .002* .20 .98 
Number of details given  
to replicate questions 
24.33 (12.76) 17.23 (12.16) 3.47 .069 .08 .57 
Repeat: Themselves 
 
19.51 (10.08) 18.24 (9.01) .19 .666 .01 .13 
Repeat: Other participant  
in pair 
12.00 (10.52) 13.05 (9.28) .12 .730 <.01 .11 
Omission errors:  
Themselves 
80.49 (10.08) 79.48 (10.39) .10 .749 <.01 .10 
Omission errors: Other 
participant in pair 
88.00 (10.52) 84.68 (13.45) .81 .374 .02 .27 
Commission errors: 
Themselves 
54.71 (18.94) 61.39 (21.96) 1.14 .293 .03 .33 
Commission errors: Other 
participant in pair 
69.63 (14.89) 67.32 (18.44) .20 .654 .01 .14 
*p < .005 
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2.4.1.3 Dominance. An independent samples t-test was conducted to see if 
there was a significant difference between Veracity (truth vs. lie) and dominance 
equality. Veracity was the independent variable. Dominance was the dependent 
variable and was measured based on how far away the pairs were from equal 
dominance on the general questions. Dominance equality did not significantly differ 
between pairs of truth-tellers (M = .06, SD = .10) and pairs of liars (M = .12, SD = 
.17), t(41) = -1.51, p = .139. 
A further independent samples t-test was conducted to see if there was a 
significant difference in total dominance change between pairs of truth-tellers and 
pairs of liars from the initial to replicate general questions. Veracity (truth vs. lie) was 
the independent variable and dominance change the dependent variable. Dominance 
change did not significantly differ between pairs of truth-tellers (M = .47, SD = .58) 
and pairs of liars (M = .74, SD = .66), t(41) = -1.40, p = .168. 
A 2 x 2 chi-square test of independence was conducted on the data to 
investigate whether there was a significant association between Veracity (truth vs. lie) 
and whether there was change in dominance between the left and right participants 
from the initial to replicate general questions (yes vs. no). Veracity was the 
independent variable and dominance change the dependent variable. The test showed 
that there was no significant association between Veracity and the occurrence of 
dominance change, χ2 (1) = 1.31, p = .252. 
2.4.2 Spatial questions 
2.4.2.1 Number of spatial details given by truth-tellers and liars to the 
initial and replicate questions. A one-factor between subjects MANOVA was 
conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the only factor, and number of details 
given to the initial interview questions and number of details given to the replicate 
interview questions as the dependent variables. The MANOVA revealed a significant 
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multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .86, F(2, 40) = 3.30, p = .047, ηp
2
 = 
.14. In addition, significant univariate main effects for Veracity were obtained for the 
total number of spatial details given by pairs of participants to the initial interview 
questions, F(1, 41) = 4.42, p = .042, ηp
2 
= .10; and for the total number of spatial 
details given by pairs of participants to the replicate interview questions, F(1, 41) = 
6.56, p = .014, ηp
2 
= .14 (see Table 2.3). Truth-tellers gave significantly more spatial 
details to the initial questions (M = 18.19, SD = 12.30) and to the replicate questions 
(M = 12.17, SD = 8.01) in comparison to liars (M = 11.64, SD = 7.74 and M = 7.23, 
SD = 4.12, respectively).  
2.4.2.2 Analyses of repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and 
contradictions when controlling for number of spatial details. As a result of the 
number of spatial details being significantly different between truth-tellers and liars to 
the initial and replicate interview questions (see Section 2.4.2.1), number of details 
was controlled for in the following analyses. Two different approaches were 
conducted to test whether pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars were significantly 
different in terms of repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and 
contradictions.  
First, a one-factor between subjects MANCOVA was conducted with Veracity 
(truth versus lie) as the independent variable; repetitions (themselves or the other 
participant in their pair), omission errors (themselves or the other participant in their 
pair), commission errors (themselves or the other participant in their pair) and 
contradictions (themselves or the other participant in their pair) as the dependent 
variables; and the total number of spatial details as the covariate. The MANCOVA 
revealed no significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .84, F(5, 36) 
= 1.34, p = .269, ηp
2
 = .16. In addition, no significant univariate main effects for 
Veracity were obtained for any of the dependent variables (see Table 2.3).
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Table 2.3  
MANOVA and MANCOVA results for each of the dependent variables for spatial details. 
 Truth (N = 21) 
Mean (SD) 
Lie (N = 22) 
Mean (SD) 
F  F (total number  
of details as 
covariate) 
p ηp
2 
d 
Number of details given  
to initial questions 
18.19 (12.30) 11.64 (7.74) 4.42  .042* .10 .64 
Number of details given  
to replicate questions 
12.17 (8.00) 7.23 (4.12) 6.56  .014* .14 .78 
Repeat: Themselves 
 
6.19 (5.59) 4.23 (3.22)  1.28 .265 .03 .43 
Repeat: Other participant  
in pair 
1.60 (1.78) 1.45 (1.68)  .23 .633 .01 .09 
Omission errors:  
Themselves 
12.00 (8.05) 7.41 (6.70)  .01 .929 <.01 .62 
Omission errors: Other 
participant in pair 
16.60 (12.19) 10.18 (7.06)  .19 .666 .01 .65 
Commission errors: 
Themselves 
5.98 (4.72) 3.00 (2.47)  2.36 .132 .06 .79 
Commission errors: Other 
participant in pair 
10.57 (7.51) 5.77 (4.10)  .89 .351 .02 .79 
Contradict: Themselves 
 
.19 (.40) .14 (.35)  .39 .537 .01 .13 
Contradict: Other  
participant in pair 
.14 (.36) .05 (.21)  1.68 .202 .04 .31 
*p < .05
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Second, the proportion of repetitions, omission errors and commission errors 
was computed in relation to the number of details. A one-factor between subjects 
MANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the only factor and 
proportion of repetitions (themselves or the other participant in their pair), omission 
errors (themselves or the other participant in their pair), and commission errors 
(themselves or the other participant in their pair) as the dependent variables.  The 
MANOVA did not reveal a significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ 
= .98, F(4, 38) = .18, p = .947, ηp
2
 = .02. In addition, no significant univariate main 
effects were obtained for any of the dependent variables (see Table 2.4).  
The analyses above show that when number of spatial details was controlled 
for, Veracity (whether a member of a truth-telling pair or a lying pair) has no 
significant effect on repetitions, omission errors, commission errors, or contradictions. 
This means that repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and contradictions 
(when based on spatial details) are not accurate cues to deceit when using a collective 
interviewing approach in the context of this study. Therefore, these cues should not be 
used to differentiate pairs of truth-tellers from pairs of liars. 
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Table 2.4 
MANOVA results for each of the proportion dependent variables for spatial details. 
 Truth (N = 21) 
Mean (SD) 
Lie (N = 22) 
Mean (SD) 
F  P ηp
2 
d 
Number of details given  
to initial questions 
18.19 (12.30) 11.64 (7.74) 4.42 .042* .10 .64 
Number of details given  
to replicate questions 
12.17 (8.00) 7.23 (4.12) 6.56 .014* .14 .78 
Repeat: Themselves 
 
29.30 (15.50) 27.61 (15.52) .13 .723 <.01 .11 
Repeat: Other participant  
in pair 
9.78 (14.32) 12.37 (12.92) .39 .537 .01 .19 
Omission errors:  
Themselves 
70.70 (15.50) 72.39 (15.52) .13 .723 <.01 .11 
Omission errors: Other 
participant in pair 
90.22 (14.32) 87.63 (12.92) .39 .537 .01 .19 
Commission errors: 
Themselves 
56.36 (21.27) 61.22 (24.23) .49 .489 .01 .21 
Commission errors: Other 
participant in pair 
82.09 (18.22) 80.32 (19.49) .09 .761 <.01 .09 
*p<.05 
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2.4.2.3 Dominance. An independent samples t-test was conducted to see if 
there was a significant difference between Veracity (truth vs. lie) and dominance 
equality. Veracity was the independent variable. Dominance was the dependent 
variable and was measured based on how far away the pairs were from equal 
dominance on the spatial questions. Dominance equality did not significantly differ 
between pairs of truth-tellers (M = .10, SD = .13) and pairs of liars (M = .10, SD = 
.24), t(41) = .03, p = .974. 
A further independent samples t-test was conducted to see if there was a 
significant difference in total dominance change between pairs of truth-tellers and 
pairs of liars from the initial to replicate spatial questions. Veracity (truth vs. lie) was 
the independent variable and dominance change the dependent variable. Dominance 
change did not significantly differ between pairs of truth-tellers (M = .59, SD = .61) 
and pairs of liars (M = .44, SD = .61), t(41) = .82, p = .416. 
 A 2 x 2 chi-square test of independence was conducted on the data to 
investigate whether there was a significant association between Veracity (truth vs. lie) 
and whether there was change in dominance between the left and right participants 
from the initial to replicate spatial questions (yes vs. no). Veracity was the 
independent variable and dominance change the dependent variable. The test showed 
that there was no significant association between Veracity and the occurrence of 
dominance change, χ2 (1) = .60, p = .438. 
2.4.3 Total number of repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and 
contradictions 
Further analyses were conducted to explore whether the dependent variables 
were significantly different between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars, when they 
were not divided into themselves and the other participant in their pair, and the 
number of details was controlled for. 
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2.4.3.1 General details. A one-factor between-subjects MANCOVA was 
conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the independent variable; total 
repetitions, total omission errors, total commission errors and total contradictions as 
the dependent variables; and the total number of general details as the covariate. The 
MANCOVA revealed no significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = 
.80, F(4, 37) = 2.36, p = .071, ηp
2
 = .20. In addition, no significant univariate main 
effects for Veracity were obtained for any of the dependent variable totals (see Table 
2.5 in Section 2.5).   
2.4.3.2 Spatial details. A one-factor between-subjects MANCOVA was 
conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the independent variable; total 
repetitions, total omission errors, total commission errors and total contradictions as 
the dependent variables; and the total number of spatial details as the covariate. The 
MANCOVA revealed no significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = 
.85, F(3, 38) = 2.22, p = .102, ηp
2
 = .15. In addition, no significant univariate main 
effects for Veracity were obtained for any of the dependent variable totals (see Table 
2.5 in Section 2.5).   
2.5 Discussion 
The aim of the current study was to examine whether repetitions, omission 
errors, commission errors, contradictions and/or dominance are cues to deceit in pairs 
when using a collective interviewing approach whereby pairs are interviewed 
simultaneously.  
Overall, truth-telling pairs gave more general details and more spatial details 
than lying pairs, which supports Hypothesis 1 and previous deception research (e.g. 
Vrij, Granhag, et al., 2010). This is not surprising given that truth-tellers find it easier 
to provide information because they have actually experienced what they are recalling 
and therefore do not fear that the extra details will incriminate them. In addition, when 
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number of general details or number of spatial details was controlled for, no 
significant differences emerged between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in 
terms of repetitions, omission errors, commission errors, and contradictions. 
Consequently, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were rejected. These findings conflict with 
memory theories, which state that memory is reconstructive in nature and influenced 
by the presence of other people, suggesting truth-tellers should lose, change and gain 
more information than liars when asked to repeat specific details (Baddeley, 1990; 
Bartlett, 1932; Gabbert et al., 2003; Loftus, 2005). Furthermore, the findings are 
contrary to previous deception literature, particularly the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct’ 
hypothesis studies (e.g. Granhag & Strömwall, 1999; Granhag et al., 2003) and the 
recent collective interviewing study by Vrij et al. (2012), which propose that truth-
telling pairs make more errors than lying pairs, and lying pairs make more repetitions 
than truth-telling pairs.  
The rejection of Hypotheses 2 and 3 was not expected. The fact that the 
current study revealed no effects suggests that the interview protocol used in the study 
was not appropriately eliciting the necessary differences between pairs of truth-tellers 
and pairs of liars. The interview protocol was developed around questions known to 
successfully differentiate individual truth-tellers from individual liars; perhaps such 
questions are less applicable to elicit cues to deceit in a collective interviewing setting 
when pairs are being interviewed. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the interview 
protocol will never work. Perhaps it will work if a different interview style is 
introduced.  An interesting manipulation to implement into the interview is ‘turn-
taking’. Turn-taking means that the interviewer will state which of the two 
participants is to commence answering the question. The interviewer will then 
intervene by stopping whichever participant is responding and asking the other 
participant in the pair to continue from the point at which their partner was stopped. 
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Lying is mentally taxing (Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981), and previous 
deception research with single suspects has shown that ‘imposing cognitive load’ 
elicits and magnifies the verbal and nonverbal cues to deception (Vrij, Fisher, Mann & 
Leal, 2008). Turn-taking should be more cognitively demanding for lying pairs than 
for truth-telling pairs because they are required to concentrate on what they are saying 
as well as what their partner is saying. Furthermore, this technique goes beyond the 
liars’ preparations, and if the question is unanticipated and one person in the pair is 
forced to fabricate, the other individual in the pair is then forced to continue with that 
fabrication. This is challenging and requires the individuals to have good 
improvisation skills, especially when trying to make the story appear honest and 
coherent. Turn-taking should therefore increase the discrepancies between pairs that 
enable the identification of deceit. 
The fourth hypothesis predicted that lying pairs will have a more dominant 
character within the pair, whereas truth-telling pairs will illustrate more equal 
dominance within the pair. Dominance did not significantly differentiate between 
pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars when responding to either the general or the 
spatial questions; therefore Hypothesis 4 was rejected. These non-significant findings 
may be a consequence of dominance remaining stable regardless of whether you are a 
truth-teller or a liar. Dominance is an important aspect of all relationships (Dunbar & 
Burgoon, 2005); thus it may be present in both truth-telling and lying groups resulting 
in it having no veracity effect. Furthermore, interactional dominance suggests 
dominance can be measured via communicative actions and responses, with the most 
dominant individual being the one who directs and controls other individual’s actions 
to a greater extent (Linell, Gustavsson & Juvonen, 1988). Consequently, dominance 
requires interaction between the group members. Recent deception research has 
revealed that truth-telling pairs interact more with one another than lying pairs (e.g. 
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Driskell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012); hence it may well be that the interactions 
between the truth-telling pairs results in them actually having a more dominant 
individual within the pair. It may well be that dominance was not measured in the 
most appropriate way during this study because dominance based on how the pairs 
were interacting together was not measured. It could thus be measured via nonverbal 
behaviour (e.g. eye contact, facial expressions, posture or gestures) (e.g. Burgoon & 
Le Poire, 1999). This is something that warrants further investigation. 
Suspects are typically interviewed individually. Participants in the current 
study were not informed that they would be interviewed together; therefore it is 
possible that the pairs of participants prepared for the interview and developed 
strategies based on the belief they would be interviewed separately. It would be of 
interest to further explore whether informing participants they would be interviewed 
together prior to them preparing for the interview will lead to them employing 
different strategies. It is predicted that being informed about being interviewed 
collectively will make lying pairs develop socially shared deceptive strategies that 
focus not only on the fabricated story and ‘keeping it simple’ but also on how they 
should behave in order to appear convincing, e.g. sitting still and looking at the 
interviewer. It is unlikely, however, that it will occur to them to discuss how they 
should communicate and interact together, making these social cues important to 
measure when interviewing collectively.  
Please note that it is not suggested here that collective interviewing should 
replace individual interviewing. Hence, there was no individual interviewing 
condition implemented into the current study. Instead, it is suggested that it be 
employed as a ‘new’ or ‘additional’ approach to individual interviewing. Therefore, 
the collective interview could be used in isolation whereby, if the group raises 
suspicion in a collective interview, the police take the required actions they would 
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normally take after interviewing individuals who raise suspicion (e.g., calling for 
assistance, collecting further evidence). Alternatively, collective interviewing could 
act as an initial screening process to determine whether suspects then need to be 
interviewed individually. Collective interviewing is not just limited to pairs; it could 
also be applied when interviewing more than two suspects. 
A police-style interview setting was used in this study because it has 
previously been used successfully to detect deception in individuals (Vrij et al., 2009). 
However, ecological validity is lacking insofar as the setting is not necessarily 
applicable to a collective interviewing technique. Police interviews are formal, time 
consuming and tend to focus on past activities, whereas collective interviewing would 
be more applicable to field interviews, which are informal and more likely to focus on 
intentions. A further study warrants an environment in which collective interviewing 
is more relevant, for example; police stop and search, insurance claims, border 
control, or immigration interviews where couples are applying for one to obtain 
British Citizenship. It is important to explore new ways of detecting deceit outside the 
police interview setting due to increasing threats to security. 
None of the cues explored in the current study (i.e. repetitions, omission errors, 
commission errors and contradictions) significantly differentiated between pairs of 
truth-tellers and pairs of liars. In spite of this, previous collective interviewing studies 
have shown that certain verbal cues can be indicative of deception in pairs (see Table 
2.5). Interruptions, corrections, the adding in of information, verbal transitions, posing 
questions to one another, and the use of assent words have all been found to 
significantly differentiate pairs of truth-tellers from pairs of liars (Driskell et al., 2012; 
Vrij et al., 2012) and therefore these verbal cues should be the focus of future 
deception research that uses a collective interviewing approach. 
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Table 2.5 
Summary table illustrating the results of verbal cues in predicating deceit across three different ‘collective interviewing’ studies. 
Deception cue Vrij et al. (2012) Driskell et al. (2012) Current study 
 Mean  
(SD)   
 F  
(Significance) 
Mean  
(SD)   
 F  
(Significance) 
Mean  
(SD)   
 F  
(Significance) 
 Truth  
(N = 21) 
Lie          Cohen’s d  
(N = 22) 
Truth  
(N = 20) 
Lie           Cohen’s d 
(N = 22) 
Truth  
(N = 21) 
Lie            Cohen’s d 
(N = 22) 
Interruptions 8.57 
(8.45) 
2.73 
(2.96) 
9.34 
(.004)*** 
.92 
      
Corrections 1.48 
(1.75) 
.14 
(.35) 
12.39  
(.001)*** 
1.06 
      
Additional information 30.86 
(13.80) 
18.32 
(12.70) 
9.63 
(.003)*** 
.95 
      
Verbal transitions    7.19 
(4.79) 
.84 
(1.01) 
28.09 
(<.001)**** 
1.83 
   
Posing questions    .64 
(.65) 
.25 
(.36) 
10.91 
(.003)*** 
.74 
   
First person plural usage    3.52 
(1.94) 
3.18 
(1.91) 
.44 
(.513) 
.18 
   
Use of words related to 
social processes 
   12.51 
(4.90) 
10.20 
(2.12) 
2.96 
(.098) 
.61 
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*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005; ****p < .001 
Use of assent words (e.g. 
“yes” or “agree”) 
   .77 
(.63) 
.27 
(.41) 
11.05 
(.003)*** 
.94 
   
General repetitions       16.02 
(7.74) 
9.00 
(5.35) 
2.55 
(.118) 
1.06 
General omission errors       98.69 
(67.13) 
51.66 
(27.67) 
.13 
(.718) 
.92 
General commission errors       32.64 
(18.83) 
25.45 
(21.20) 
2.42 
(.128) 
0.36 
General contradictions       1.14 
(1.68) 
.36 
(.66) 
1.24 
(.272) 
.61 
Spatial repetitions       7.79 
(5.96) 
5.68 
(3.39) 
2.99 
(.091) 
.44 
Spatial omission errors       28.60 
(19.84) 
17.59 
(13.21) 
.03 
(.872) 
.65 
Spatial commission errors       16.55 
(11.13) 
8.77 
(5.57) 
2.18 
(.148) 
.88 
Spatial contradictions       .33 
(.58) 
.18 
(.50) 
1.31 
(.260) 
.28 
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2.5.1 Conclusion 
Whilst the current study revealed no significant results, previous studies have 
shown the potential for using a collective interviewing approach in the area of lie 
detection (e.g. Driskell et al., 2012; Jundi et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 2012). The current 
study illustrates the need for an intervention to be implemented into the collective 
interview if lie catchers are to magnify the discrepancies between pairs of truth-tellers 
and pairs of liars, as well as exploit the strategies used by lying pairs. This 
intervention should correspond with previous lie detection research, go beyond liars’ 
preparations, and make the task of lying more challenging for deceptive pairs. Further 
studies exploring collective interviewing as a lie detection technique would be 
beneficial. 
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3.1 Abstract 
Group interviewing provides useful insight into the social indicators of deception. The 
present study investigated turn-taking as a technique for enhancing novel cues to 
deceit. ‘Turn-taking’ is a technique whereby the interviewer states which of the two 
interviewees is to answer the question and then intervenes every 20 seconds by 
stopping whichever of the interviewees is responding and asking the other interviewee 
in the pair to continue from the point at which their partner was stopped. In the present 
experiment, truth-tellers were real couples who had been in relationship for at least 
one year and cohabiting. Lying pairs were friends who pretended to be in a 
relationship for at least one year and cohabiting. All ‘couples’ were interviewed 
together in their pairs about their real or fictitious relationship. It was found that when 
forced to turn-take, truth-telling pairs were significantly more able to continue on 
from one another, whereas lying pairs were significantly more likely to repeat what 
their partner last said before continuing. Additionally, lying pairs waited before 
speaking after being told to turn-take significantly more than truth-telling pairs. A 
subsequent lie detection study revealed that these three turn-taking cues improved 
people’s ability to accurately detect deceit considerably. Implications for simultaneous 
interviewing are discussed.  
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3.2 Introduction 
Deception research has primarily focused on interviewing single suspects 
despite the fact that crimes are frequently committed by pairs or multiple offenders 
(M
c
Gloin & Piquero, 2009; Van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009). One reason for 
interviewing suspects individually is that police detectives traditionally separate 
suspects as soon as possible prior to interrogation to reduce opportunity for the 
planning of responses (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Consequently, several studies 
that have considered pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars have involved interviewing 
group members individually (e.g. Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson, 2003; Strömwall, 
Granhag & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2009). Despite individual interviewing 
generally reflecting real-life police interviewing contexts, there are several field 
settings in which collective interviewing (interviewing of two or more individuals 
together at the same time) would be more suited. For example, when there are 
multiple suspects but only one interviewer available, such as during police stop and 
searches, at road border controls where cars containing several people are checked, or 
at security checkpoints (e.g. airports). In such settings it would make logical sense to 
interview people together about joint activities, because it would be a more timely and 
convenient means of gathering intelligence.  
Each year more than 200 million people cross the UK Border, and each year 
the UK Border Agency checks over 100 million people arriving at UK airports and 
considers around 3.5 million applicants to visit, live, work and study in the UK (Home 
Office UK Border Agency, 2011–2015). Securing border control and controlling 
migration is important not only in the UK, but also worldwide, for identifying threats 
from organised crime, terrorism, smuggling, trafficking, and illegal immigration, each 
of which frequently involves groups of individuals (Home Office UK Border Agency, 
2010). Sometimes collective interviewing is part of an existing procedure for security 
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reasons. For example, in Canada, customs officers carry out collective interviews at 
airports because groups are deemed to have a ‘similar agenda’ (i.e. the group are 
travelling together and so it is assumed that they are travelling to the same destination 
for the same purpose as each other), and thus if only one person in the group is 
examined, this could result in a wasted effort or a missed opportunity (A. Leach, 
Canadian former customs officer, personal communication, 12
th
 November 2013).  
In addition, in the UK, the situation occurs whereby one member of a couple is 
British and the other needs to seek British Citizenship in order to be with their partner. 
In order to marry and achieve citizenship couples are expected, at one potential stage, 
to be interviewed simultaneously. It is estimated that around 35,000 marriages in the 
UK every year involve a non-European Economic Area (non-EEA) national. The 
Home Office (2013) estimates that between 4,000 and 10,000 applications to stay in 
the UK are made on the basis of sham marriages (marriages of convenience whereby 
the couple are not genuine). An example of a sham marriage is one individual getting 
married to gain entry into the UK, whilst the other individual in the couple is getting 
married for a financial reward. Sham marriages are on the increase, and they 
frequently involve individual facilitators or organised crime groups that increase the 
profits for criminal activity (Home Office, 2013). If a sham marriage is uncovered it 
often leads to imprisonment with the non-EEA national being arrested and deported 
from the UK (Home Office, 2013). Due to the increasing problems and risks 
associated with immigration, the present study explored the application of collective 
interviewing in an ‘obtaining citizenship’ interview setting. The study was divided 
into two experiments, the first experiment identified three unique cues that emerge 
when a turn-taking manipulation is implemented into a collective interview, and the 
second experiment explored whether observers can recognise these cues to 
discriminate between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars. 
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3.2.1 Collective interviewing 
Collective interviewing is different from individual interviewing. Collective 
interviewing can help determine deception at a social level rather than just at an 
individual level, and can enable the identification of cues to deceit that are present in 
groups, which cannot be explored in individuals, for example, cues stemming from 
suspects communicating and interacting with one another.  
Recently, four studies have illustrated the clear potential for using collective 
interviewing to elicit cues to deceit. Vrij et al. (2012) found that pairs of truth-tellers 
interrupted and corrected each other more than pairs of liars, as well as adding more 
information to each other’s accounts in comparison to pairs of liars. Jundi, Vrij, Mann, 
et al. (2013) found that pairs of liars made more eye contact with the interviewer than 
pairs of truth-tellers, whereas pairs of truth-tellers looked more at each other than pairs 
of liars. Driskell, Salas and Driskell (2012) found that pairs of truth-tellers illustrated 
more synchrony in behaviour and exhibited more interactions (e.g. mutual eye gaze 
and verbal transitions) than pairs of liars, and Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann and Hillman 
(2013) found that, compared to lying pairs, truth-telling pairs posed more questions to 
one another during a timeline task.  
These four studies show that a collective approach can generate discrepancies 
between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars that can aid in the detection of 
deception, with communication cues and interaction cues (e.g. corrections, 
interruptions, eye contact, verbal transitions) being particularly indicative of deceit. 
Corrections, interruptions and verbal transitions are unique to collective interviewing 
and cannot be measured when individuals are interviewed. Eye contact with the 
interviewer, of course, can be measured in individuals. However, whereas eye contact 
is not a diagnostic cue to deceit in individuals (DePaulo et al., 2003) it is a diagnostic 
cue to deceit when pairs of interviewees are interviewed (Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al., 
Chapter 3 
58 
 
2013). A possible reason why, in collective interviews, truth-tellers display less eye 
contact with interviewers than liars is that in collective interviews truth-tellers 
communicate more with each other than liars, and when people communicate with 
each other they tend to look at each other (Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al., 2013). In sum, 
collective interviewing is different from interviewing individuals; thus, cues that are 
not diagnostic of deceit when individuals are interviewed may become diagnostic of 
deceit when dyads or groups are interviewed. 
3.2.2 Memory: Collaborative and transactive  
A collective interview approach coincides with the memory research which 
focuses on collaborative learning and remembering. Collaborative memory refers to 
how people collectively recall information alongside others (Rajaram & Pereira-
Pasarin, 2010), and can be applied to deception research, particularly the strategies 
that truth-tellers and liars employ. When pairs of truth-tellers are asked to recall a 
shared event, they exhibit interactions that cannot be unveiled when interviewed 
individually and these interactions tend to occur more frequently for the truth-telling 
pairs than for the lying pairs. Truth-tellers prefer a ‘tell it all’ strategy that aims to 
provide a detailed description of what actually occurred (Granhag et al., 2003; 
Strömwall et al., 2003; Vrij, Mann, Leal & Granhag, 2010). Pairs of truth-tellers will 
collectively recall information by sharing their experiences and communicating with 
one another (e.g. by posing questions to one another or correcting each other’s 
accounts; Jundi, Vrij, Hope, et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 2012).  
Liars’ dominant strategy is to prepare answers to possible questions and to 
keep their stories simple (Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 2003; Vrij, Granhag 
& Porter, 2010). Therefore, lying pairs tend to exhibit fewer interactions as they 
merely recall their fabricated story (Driskell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012). In addition, 
when answering unexpected questions to which they have not prepared an answer, 
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lying pairs need to rely on their individual cognitive ability to create a story that 
makes sense and matches with what their partner is saying (Wegner, 1987).  This 
latter activity can be mentally taxing and this cognitive load can be further increased 
by forcing turn-taking.  
3.2.3 Imposing cognitive load through forced turn-taking 
Previous deception research with individual liars and individual truth-tellers 
has attempted to introduce new interview strategies that focus on the different 
psychological states experienced by liars and truth-tellers. One of the strategies 
identified is ‘imposing cognitive load’, which has been found to elicit and magnify 
verbal and nonverbal cues to deception making the differences between liars and 
truth-tellers more pronounced (Vrij, Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2008). Lying is often more 
mentally taxing than truth-telling (Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981), and 
perhaps particularly in interview settings, in part because lying includes more tasks 
than truth-telling. Liars focus on their storytelling, but also on making a convincing 
impression and scrutinising the interviewer to check whether they believe them 
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996). Truth-tellers merely focus on their storytelling (Buller & 
Burgoon, 1996). Consequently, liars have fewer cognitive resources left over to cope 
when mentally taxing interventions are implemented into the interview schedule (Vrij 
et al., 2008).  
When recalling information as a pair or group, the group members interact 
with each other resulting in a naturally occurring turn-taking pattern (Sacks, Schegloff 
& Jefferson, 1974). This pattern emerges when one person speaks then stops, and then 
another person continues then stops, and the sequence is repeated with the other 
person then taking over again. This cyclical sequence back and forth between 
members of the group only finishes once all members have nothing else left to say. 
Turn-taking automatically shapes the communication and reporting of information 
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amongst the group members, and consists of two essential characteristics; (i) 
frequency, which refers to the amount of times turn-taking occurs; and (ii) control of 
contribution, which refers to the amount of control each individual has over what to 
say and how much to say (Woodburn, Arnott, Newell & Procter, 1991). The present 
experiment exploited this naturally occurring turn-taking speech pattern by 
introducing a mentally taxing intervention whereby the interviewer forced turn-taking 
between the pairs within the collective interview. Forced turn-taking meant that the 
interviewer stopped whichever member of the pair was recalling, and asked the other 
member in the pair to continue from the point at which their partner was stopped. The 
interviewer did this repeatedly between the members until the pair had finished 
answering the interview question.  
Forced turn-taking instigates social interactions between pairs of interviewees 
and should be more cognitively demanding for lying pairs than for truth-telling pairs 
for several reasons. First, pair members are required to concentrate on what they are 
saying as well as what their partner is saying; the latter may be mentally difficult 
when the partner is telling a fabricated story. Second, forced turn-taking takes away 
pair members’ ability to choose who answers each of the questions, removing the 
effects of any dominant characters who tend to speak more frequently (Hung et al., 
2007), an effect that is often present within close relationships (Dunbar & Burgoon, 
2005). In lying pairs, it means that the pair member who is most eloquent or most 
comfortable with lying loses the ability to control the interview. Third, interrupting 
somebody’s turn has been found to violate the natural flow of recall and inhibit the 
ability of the individual to continue with their turn (Coates, 2004). Finally, forced 
turn-taking removes any retrieval strategy adopted by the pairs (Basden, Basden, 
Bryner & Thomas III, 1997). If the question is unanticipated and one person in the 
pair is forced to fabricate, the other individual in the pair is then forced to continue 
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with that fabrication; hence, it requires the members of the pair to have rapid thinking 
and good improvisation skills (Vrij, Granhag & Mann, 2009). If one or both of the 
pair lacks such skills, they will have difficulty continuing on from one another, 
requiring them to create more time to think before providing new information. 
Therefore, cues reflecting increased cognitive demand such as repetitions and waiting 
will be valuable in deception detection.   
Lying pairs are already using more cognitive resources than truth-telling pairs, 
and the forced turn-taking technique will place a higher level of cognitive load onto 
each member of the pair. Consequently, forced turn-taking will be more demanding 
for lying pairs than truth-telling pairs which will result in cues to deceit emerging, 
some of which have not yet been identified in deception research; continuations and 
repetitions. Speech onset delays (waiting) are also likely to emerge when forced turn-
taking is implemented.  
3.2.4 Deception cue: Number of details 
Deception research with individuals has found that individual truth-tellers 
provide significantly more details when recalling events than individual liars (DePaulo 
et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag, et al., 2010). As a result, it is worthwhile to 
consider whether number of details remains a significant cue to deceit when more than 
one individual is interviewed together at the same time, and also when the turn-taking 
technique is implemented. There is no theoretical reason evident as to why number of 
details will not be a cue to deceit in collective interviews. As is the case in individual 
interviews, in collective interviews, truth-tellers should find it easier to provide details 
and should not fear that the extra detail will incriminate them. Overall, it is suggested 
that turn-taking will act as a stimulant to say more and so all pairs (truth-tellers and 
liars) will feel they need to provide extra information when the interviewer asks them 
to swap and continue with the story. This is a similar notion to that postulated by Leal, 
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Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham and Fisher (2013) who found that when a very detailed 
model statement was played to participants prior to them giving their own statements, 
the number of details within the statements from both truth-tellers and liars increased. 
It is believed that differences between truth-tellers and liars in the amount of details 
which are likely to arise in the non-turn-taking questions should also theoretically 
arise in the forced turn-taking questions.  
3.2.5 Experiment 2a: Hypotheses 
The overall aim of the present experiment is to investigate whether important 
cues to deceit can be identified to enhance the detection of deception in ‘couples’ (i.e. 
pairs) by forcing turn-taking (as a way of increasing cognitive load) into the interview 
schedule. It is hypothesised that forced turn-taking will impose cognitive load and 
thus be more difficult for lying pairs compared to truth-telling pairs. Consequently, 
truth-telling pairs will be significantly more able than lying pairs to instantly continue 
on from one another when forced to turn-take; whereas lying pairs, perhaps to buy 
time to consider what to say, will be significantly more likely than truth-telling pairs 
to repeat what their partner last said before continuing when forced to turn-take 
(Hypothesis 1). Additionally, as a result of cognitive load, it is hypothesised that lying 
pairs will be significantly more likely than truth-telling pairs to wait (i.e. pause) when 
forced to turn-take by the interviewer (Hypothesis 2). It is also hypothesised that the 
turn-taking interview questions will elicit more details than the non-turn-taking 
interview questions from the truth-telling and lying pairs together (Hypothesis 3). 
Based on the frequent research that shows that individual truth-tellers provide 
significantly more details when recalling information than individual liars (Vrij, 
Granhag, et al., 2010), it is also predicted that the total number of details provided will 
remain significantly greater for pairs of truth-tellers than pairs of liars regardless of 
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whether or not the interview question involves the forced turn-taking technique 
(Hypothesis 4).  
3.3 Experiment 2a: Method 
3.3.1 Participants 
A total of 92 participants (45 males and 47 females) from the University of 
Portsmouth took part in this study. Their mean age was 22.64 years (SD = 5.90). A t-
test revealed that age significantly differed between truth-telling pairs (M = 24.77 
years, SD = 7.02) and lying pairs (M = 20.32 years, SD = 3.04), t(65.23) = 4.01, p < 
.001, d = .95; however, when age was used as a covariate in all the proceeding 
analyses it did not change any of the experimental findings reported in the Results 
section (see Section 3.4). Truth-telling pairs (N = 24) were real couples who had been 
in a relationship for at least one year and cohabiting. Lying pairs (N = 22) were friends 
who were told only to take part as a pretend couple if they had never been intimate 
with one another and did not live together. The lying pairs had to be of the same 
sexual orientation; thus of the opposite sex to one another if they were both 
heterosexual and of the same sex if they were both homosexual. Of all 46 pairs who 
participated in this study, 45 were heterosexual and one was homosexual. The one 
homosexual pair was a female lying couple. 
3.3.2 Design 
This study used a mixed design with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the between-
subjects factor and Turn-taking (absent versus present) as the within-subjects factor. 
Which three of the six questions were used as turn-taking questions differed for each 
pair and was controlled for so that the truth-telling group and the lying group were 
matched on turn-taking combinations. This counterbalancing technique removed any 
effects of question order from influencing the findings; thus, any significant 
differences found between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars would be a result of 
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the forced turn-taking manipulation itself, not the order in which the turn-taking 
questions occurred. 
3.3.3 Procedure 
Upon arrival at the Psychology Department, all pairs were asked to go for 
coffee (paid for by the researchers) for approximately 30 minutes. They were 
instructed to prepare, during coffee, for the interview and talk about their ‘real’ or 
‘pretend’ relationship, discussing (i) how they met, (ii) how they spend time together, 
and (iii) where they live (the interview then focused on these issues). They were also 
informed that they would be interviewed together at the same time. Therefore, if 
differences between truth-tellers and liars were to emerge, this would not be because 
the collective interview setting took the pairs by surprise. Once the pairs returned to 
the department and stated they were ready to be interviewed, they individually 
completed pre-interview questionnaires. The pre-interview questionnaire asked 
participants to rate on 7-point Likert scales the sufficiency (ranging from [1] 
insufficient to [7] sufficient), quality (ranging from [1] very poor to [7] very good), 
and usefulness (ranging from [1] pointless to [7] useful) of their preparation 
discussion. It also asked the participants to rate how much they discussed with their 
partner what to say during the interview (ranging from [1] not at all to [7] thoroughly).  
A collective interview in which pairs were interviewed together then took 
place. The interview was audio- and video-recorded. All interviews involved one 
interviewer who was blind to the veracity of the couple. The interview schedule 
comprised six interview questions (see Table 3.1) and included the turn-taking 
manipulation, which took place during three questions. 
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Table 3.1 
A list of each of the six interview questions used in this experiment. 
Interview questions 
1. ‘Can you describe in as much detail as possible how and when you first met. Please 
give as much information as you can about your first interaction, the location you 
were at, and so on’. 
2. ‘Can you describe in as much detail as possible your first date and when this was. 
Think about the location and the sights and sounds you experienced’. 
3. ‘Describe your home’. 
4. ‘Please draw the exterior of your bedroom on this piece of A3 paper... Now describe 
in as much detail as you can your bedroom starting from the left-hand wall and 
moving all the way around the outline. Please describe everything including 
furnishings, décor, etc.’ 
5. ‘Describe a recent memorable day that you spent together hour by hour (this must not 
be your wedding day if you are married)’.  
6. ‘Can you describe in as much detail as possible your last holiday or trip away 
together? Please give as much information as you can about the location, what you 
did, the sights you experienced, and so on’.   
 
Forced turn-taking worked as follows: The interviewer stated which of the two 
participants was to answer the question (each participant was asked to start answering 
a question, and for the third turn-taking question the pair could choose who started 
answering), and then intervened every 20 seconds by stopping whichever of the 
participants was responding and asking the other participant in the pair to continue 
from the point at which their partner was stopped.  This continued until the pair had 
finished answering the question. Therefore, although each participant only had 20 
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seconds (the time-frame which was decided based upon two previous pilot studies) for 
each turn in which to provide details, they could have as many turns as they wanted, 
and could continue providing detail until they indicated they could no longer take a 
turn and had no more information to give in response to the interview question. Each 
of the questions in Table 3.1 were possible forced turn-taking questions, and which 
three questions were used for forced turn-taking and which three were not was 
counterbalanced for each pair (hence turn-taking was a within-subjects manipulation). 
The three questions that did not involve the forced turn-taking manipulation instead 
promoted spontaneous speech and natural turn-taking. The task for all couples was to 
convince the interviewer that they were a bona fide couple who had been in a 
relationship for at least one year and were now living together. Thus, real couples just 
had to tell the truth, whilst pretend couples had to describe a fabricated relationship.  
To motivate participants to perform well during the experiment, they were told 
that if they were believed by the interviewer they would each receive £5. However, if 
they were not believed they would receive no money and would be required to write a 
statement about their relationship with the other individual in their pair.  
Following participation, a post-interview questionnaire was completed 
individually and at this stage all participants were instructed to be truthful about their 
experience of the interview and the strategies they had used. In this questionnaire, 
participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale from [1] not at all motivated 
to [7] extremely motivated, the extent to which they felt motivated to appear 
convincing during the interview. They were also asked to rate their confidence that 
they would receive £5 and their confidence about whether or not they would have to 
write a statement (both on 7-point Likert scales from [1] not at all likely to [7] very 
likely).  
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Truth-tellers were asked an additional open question about how long, in 
number of months, they had been in a romantic relationship with their interview 
partner. This relationship length variable was used in correlation analyses along with 
each of the turn-taking dependent variables as a means of examining whether or not 
relationship length was associated with any of the dependent variables, and therefore 
confounding the effect of Veracity.   
Conversely, liars were given an additional post-interview questionnaire to 
explore whether they actually met the inclusion criteria and had not been in a previous 
intimate relationship with their interview partner. The first part of this questionnaire 
asked an open question about how long, in number of months, the liars had been 
friends with one another. It then measured on four different 7-point Likert scales how 
they rated their friendship with their interview partner. This included questions about 
friendliness (ranging from [1] strangers to [7] best friends), intimacy (ranging from [1] 
distant to [7] intimate), importance (ranging from [1] unimportant to [7] important) 
and trustfulness (ranging from [1] distrusting to [7] trusting). Each individual that 
made up the lying pair gave their own rating for each of the four questions. The 
ratings from the four questions were then added together to give a total friendship-
closeness rating for each individual within each pair. The average rating for each pair 
was obtained providing an overall friendship-closeness score for each lying pair. The 
friendship length and the friendship-closeness variables were inputted into correlation 
analyses along with each of the turn-taking dependent variables to determine whether 
friendship length or friendship-closeness were associated with any of the dependent 
variables, and therefore confounding the effect of Veracity.  
To ensure that the experiment was ethical and equal for all participants, the 
experimenter told all participants at the end of the experiment (following the post-
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interview questionnaires) that the interviewer believed they were telling the truth, and 
so all participants were paid £5.  
3.3.4 Coding 
The interviews were each transcribed, and the interview transcripts coded by a 
rater who was blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs. Each of the six 
questions were coded separately.  
The dependent variables; (i) number of swaps instigated by interviewer, (ii) 
continuations when swapping, (iii) repetitions when swapping, and (iv) waiting before 
continuing or repeating after swapping were coded only for the three interview 
questions in which the turn-taking manipulation was implemented. Number of swaps 
instigated by interviewer was the number of times the interviewer forced turn-taking 
between the pair. Continuations when swapping and repetitions when swapping 
measured the smoothness in which the pair were able to swap when forced to turn-
take by the interviewer. If the pair were able to instantly (i.e. without pausing or 
repeating previous information) continue on from one another when the interviewer 
forced swapping, then this was counted as a continuation when swapping and the pair 
was given a score of 1 (the absence of a continuation was given a score of 0). If, when 
being forced to turn-take, the member of the pair taking over first repeated any of the 
information that their partner last said before continuing with the story, then this was 
counted as a repetition when swapping and the pair was given a score of 1 (the 
absence of a repetition was given a score of 0).  
Waiting before continuing or repeating after swapping was an objective 
measure based on whether each member of the pair immediately continued or repeated 
after swapping, or paused (e.g. ‘err’, ‘umm’, ‘erm’, or a gap of non-speech for three 
seconds or longer) before continuing or repeating after swapping. This was a 
dichotomous variable, that is, if the participant paused or stuttered when forced to take 
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over from their partner, then this was counted as waiting and a score of 1 was given (if 
there was no waiting, a score of 0 was given). The frequency of each of these turn-
taking variables was computed for each pair. 
To take into account the number of swaps instigated by the interviewer, the 
turn-taking dependent variables; (i) total number of continuations when swapping, (ii) 
total number of repetitions when swapping, and (iii) total number of times members of 
the pair waited before continuing or repeating after swapping, were divided by the 
total number of swaps for each pair during the forced turn-taking questions. This 
created three new dependent variables that were inputted into the analyses; (i) average 
number of continuations per swap, (ii) average number of repetitions per swap, and 
(iii) average number of times participants waited before continuing or repeating per 
swap.   
Verbal cues were coded using the total number of details provided for both the 
turn-taking and non-turn-taking interview questions. This meant that three different 
frequencies could be computed; (i) total number of details for all six interview 
questions, (ii) total number of details for the three turn-taking questions only, and (iii) 
total number of details for the three non-turn-taking questions only. A detail was 
coded only if it was new information that had never been said previously by either 
member of the pair.  
 A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs, 
coded 16 of the 46 transcripts for each of the dependent variables; (i) total number of 
swaps instigated by interviewer, (ii) total number of continuations when swapping, 
(iii) total number of repetitions when swapping, (iv) total waiting before continuing or 
repeating after swapping, and (v) total number of details. Intra-class correlation 
coefficients (ICCs) were then calculated between the two individual raters for each of 
the five dependent variables. The inter-rater reliability between the two coders was 
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very good with each of the ICCs demonstrating good agreement between the two 
raters (swaps instigated by interviewer: ICC = 1.00; continuations when swapping: 
ICC = .94; repetitions when swapping: ICC = .83; waiting before continuing or 
repeating after swapping: ICC = .86; number of details: ICC = .95).  
3.4 Experiment 2a: Results 
3.4.1 Pre-interview questionnaire 
Four one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine if there was a significant 
difference between truth-tellers and liars in terms of how they rated their preparation 
discussion prior to being interviewed. There was no significant difference between 
truth-tellers and liars in terms of how they rated their preparation discussion in terms 
of sufficiency (F(1, 90) = .01, p = .918, ηp
2
 < .01, d = .03), and being good (F(1, 90) = 
.96, p = .330, ηp
2
 = .01, d = .20). However, liars rated the preparation discussion as 
more useful (M = 5.89, SD = .97, 95% CI [5.41, 6.36]) than truth-tellers (M = 4.15, SD 
= 1.99, 95% CI [3.69, 4.60]), F(1, 90) = 27.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .24, d = 1.11. Liars also 
stated that they discussed with their partner about what to say during the interview 
significantly more thoroughly (M = 5.45, SD = .90, 95% CI [5.06, 5.89]) than truth-
tellers (M = 3.86, SD = 1.62, 95% CI [3.47, 4.24]), F(1, 90) = 33.30, p < .001, ηp
2 
= 
.27, d = 1.21. 
3.4.2 Post-interview questionnaire: Motivation, manipulation checks, collective 
interviewing and forced turn-taking 
The vast majority of participants indicated that they were motivated to appear 
convincing during the interview, with 80.3% of the sample scoring 5 or higher on the 
7-point Likert scale. Liars were significantly more motivated (M = 6.09, SD = .86, 
95% CI [5.60, 6.58]) than truth-tellers (M = 4.85, SD = 2.10, 95% CI [4.39, 5.32]) to 
appear convincing, F(1, 90) = 13.19, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .13, d = .77.  In terms of 
confidence, truth-tellers reported that they were more confident (M = 6.04, SD = 1.37, 
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95% CI [5.61, 6.48]) than liars (M = 4.48, SD = 1.68, 95% CI [4.02, 4.93]) that they 
would receive £5, F(1, 90) = 24.21, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .21, d = 1.02. Truth-tellers also 
believed they were less likely (M = 2.71, SD = 1.73, 95% CI [2.26, 3.16]) than liars 
(M = 4.36, SD = 1.40, 95% CI [3.89, 4.84]) that they would have to write a statement, 
F(1, 90) = 25.26, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .22, d = 1.05. 
3.4.3 Hypotheses testing: Turn-taking variables 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted examining the difference between truth-
tellers and liars in terms of the total number of swaps instigated by the interviewer 
during the turn-taking questions. There was no significant difference between truth-
tellers (M = 8.83, SD = 8.00, 95% CI [5.94, 11.73]) and liars (M = 9.05, SD = 5.78, 
95% CI [6.03, 12.07]) with regard to the total number of swaps, F(1, 44) = .01, p = 
.919, ηp
2
 < .01, d = .03.  
A one-factor between-subjects MANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth 
versus lie) as the only factor and average number of continuations per swap, average 
number of repetitions per swap, and average number of times participants waited 
before continuing or repeating per swap as the dependent variables. The MANOVA 
revealed a significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .29, F(3, 42) = 
34.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .71. Additionally, significant univariate main effects for 
Veracity were obtained for the average number of continuations per swap, F(1, 44) = 
10.42, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .19, d = .96; average number of repetitions per swap, F(1, 44) = 
56.95, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .56, d = 2.19; and average number of times participants waited 
before continuing or repeating per swap, F(1, 44) = 24.82, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .36, d = 
1.49. Truth-tellers were able to continue their story significantly more often than liars 
when instructed to swap by the interviewer (M = .70, SD = .35, 95% CI [.58, .82] and 
M = .43, SD = .19, 95% CI [.31, .55], respectively), whereas liars were significantly 
more likely to repeat what their partner last said then continue when instructed to 
Chapter 3 
72 
 
swap by the interviewer (M = .52, SD = .21, 95% CI [.45, .60]), in comparison to 
truth-tellers (M = .13, SD = .14, 95% CI [.06, .21]). This supports Hypothesis 1. 
Furthermore, when asked to swap by the interviewer liars waited before speaking 
significantly more often than truth-tellers (M = .71, SD = .24, 95% CI [.60, .82] and M 
= .33, SD = .27, 95% CI [.22, .43], respectively), supporting Hypothesis 2.  
Three discriminant analyses were conducted on each of the three significant 
turn-taking variables separately to investigate the nature of their relationship with 
Veracity. The discriminant analyses revealed that all three turn-taking variables were 
individually significant predictors of Veracity when number of swaps was once again 
taken into consideration (see Table 3.2). The cross-validated classification results 
revealed high accuracy rates (around the 80% mark) for all three variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
C
h
ap
ter 3 
7
3 
Table 3.2 
Classification results for each of the turn-taking variables when taking total number of swaps into account. 
Turn-taking variable Chi-square Wilks’ lambda  
(significance) 
Total percentage 
of cases correctly 
classified 
Percentage of truth-
tellers correctly 
classified 
Percentage of 
liars correctly 
classified 
Continuations per swap 9.23 .81 (.002) 76.1% 79.2% 72.7% 
Repetitions per swap 36.12 .44 (<.001) 84.8% 91.7% 77.3% 
Waiting per swap 19.46 .64 (<.001) 82.6% 79.2% 86.4% 
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3.4.4 Verbal cues: Total number of details  
A mixed-design ANOVA was conducted with the Turn-taking manipulation as 
the within-subjects factor, comprising two levels; total number of details within the 
three turn-taking questions for each pair and total number of details within the three 
non-turn-taking questions for each pair. Veracity was the between-subjects factor. 
Turn-taking had a significant effect on the total number of details provided by each 
pair, F(1, 44) = 7.99, p = .007, ηp
2
 = .15, d = .42, with all pairs together providing 
significantly more details to the turn-taking questions (M = 209.54, SD = 103.73, 95% 
CI [178.74, 240.35]) compared to the non-turn-taking questions (M = 168.02, SD = 
94.31, 95% CI [140.01, 196.03]). This supports Hypothesis 3. Veracity also had a 
significant effect on the total number of details provided by each pair, F(1, 44) = 4.05, 
p = .050, ηp
2
 = .08, d = .60, with pairs of truth-tellers (M = 424.75, SD = 183.02, 95% 
CI [356.44, 493.06]) providing significantly more details overall than pairs of liars (M 
= 326.09, SD = 145.20, 95% CI [254.74, 397.44]). The Turn-taking X Veracity 
interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 44) = .21, p = .651, ηp
2
 = .01
1
.  
3.4.5 Truth-telling pairs’ relationship status 
Pearson’s correlation analyses were conducted to test the association between 
relationship length and each of the turn-taking dependent variables. The correlations 
revealed that there were no significant associations between relationship length (M = 
41.92, SD = 44.74), and total number of swaps, r(22) = -.10, p = .638; average number 
of continuations per swap, r(22) = .23, p = .280; average number of repetitions per 
swap, r(22) = -.11, p = .612; or average number of times participants waited before 
                                                             
1
 Despite the interaction effect not being significant, a significant difference was 
found between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in terms of how many details 
they provided in the non-turn-taking questions, F(1, 44) = 4.36, p = .043, ηp
2
 = .09, d 
= .62, but not in terms of how many details they provided in the turn-taking questions, 
F(1, 44) = 1.98, p = .167, ηp
2
 = .04, d = .42. Hypothesis 4 cannot be supported.  
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continuing or repeating per swap, r(22) = .24, p = .252. Hence, no links were found 
between relationship length and turn-taking. 
3.4.6 Lying pairs’ friendship status 
Analyses from the liars’ self-reports about how friendly they actually were as a 
pair indicated that most the lying pairs reported being friendlier than was desired for 
the inclusion criteria of this study. That is, they were recruited as a pair only if they 
stated they were friends who were of the same sexual orientation, who had never been 
intimate, never been in a romantic relationship, and never lived together. However, 
liars obtained a mean of 5.73 (SD = .95, 95% CI [5.44, 6.02]) for friendliness on a 
Likert scale of 1 (strangers) to 7 (best friends); a mean of 4.91 (SD = 1.25, 95% CI 
[4.53, 5.29])  for intimacy on a Likert scale of 1 (distant) to 7 (intimate); a mean of 
5.91 (SD = 1.07, 95% CI [5.58, 6.24]) for the importance of their friendship with their 
interview partner on a Likert scale of 1 (unimportant) to 7 (important); and a mean of 
6.07 (SD = 1.21, 95% CI [5.70, 6.44])  for how trusting they were of their partner on a 
Likert scale of 1 (distrusting) to 7 (trusting). Despite this, the results were still 
significant, demonstrating that even when good friends lie together, cues to deceit still 
emerge in a collective interview situation. This strengthens the effect Veracity had on 
each of the dependent variables. Furthermore, Pearson’s correlation analyses were 
conducted to test the association between friendship-closeness and each of the turn-
taking dependent variables. The correlations revealed that there were no significant 
associations between friendship-closeness (M = 22.61, SD = 3.27), and total number 
of swaps, r(20) = -.30, p = .169; average number of continuations per swap, r(20) = -
.17, p = .438; average number of repetitions per swap, r(20) = .21, p = .352; and 
average number of times participants waited before continuing or repeating per swap, 
r(20) = -.04, p = .859.  
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Pearson’s correlation analyses were also conducted to test the association 
between friendship length and each of the turn-taking dependent variables. The 
correlations revealed that there were no significant associations between friendship 
length (M = 14.39, SD = 14.30), and total number of swaps, r(20) = -.07, p = .754; 
average number of continuations per swap, r(20) = -.02, p = .941; average number of 
repetitions per swap, r(20) = -.04, p = .851; and average number of times participants 
waited before continuing or repeating per swap, r(20) = .05, p = .813. These analyses 
suggest that neither friendship-closeness nor friendship length were related to turn-
taking.  
3.5 Experiment 2a: Discussion 
3.5.1 Hypotheses 1 and 2: Turn-taking variables 
Truth-telling pairs were able to continue their story significantly more often 
than lying pairs when forced to swap by the interviewer, whereas lying pairs were 
significantly more likely than truth-telling pairs to repeat what their partner last said 
when forced to swap by the interviewer (Hypothesis 1). Additionally, lying pairs were 
significantly more likely than truth-telling pairs to wait before speaking when the 
interviewer forced turn-taking (Hypothesis 2). Forced turn-taking eliminates the 
interviewees’ control, removes any retrieval strategies the pair are using (Basden et 
al., 1997), and disrupts the natural flow of recall, inhibiting the individuals’ ability to 
spontaneously continue when forced to swap (Coates, 2004). The ability to continue 
on from one another when forced to turn-take is easier for truth-tellers because they 
both actually experienced the event and know what one another are reporting. They 
are using their memory to collectively recall a shared event (Rajaram & Pereira-
Pasarin, 2010). Conversely, liars face difficulty in this forced turn-taking and buy 
themselves time by waiting before speaking and by repeating what their interview 
partner last said.  
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The combination of waiting and repetition, displayed by liars, further 
demonstrates how difficult the forced turn-taking task was for them. It provides 
insight into liars’ meta-cognition about making a credible impression. Liars are 
probably aware that waiting too long before answering makes a suspicious impression 
on observers (Global Deception Team, 2006; Strömwall, Granhag & Hartwig, 2004; 
Vrij, Akehurst & Knight, 2006), and they therefore decide not to wait too long. 
However, since they still do not know what to say they buy further time by repeating 
what the other person has said.  
3.5.2 Hypotheses 3 and 4: Number of details and turn-taking 
The pairs of participants provided significantly more details to the turn-taking 
questions than the non-turn-taking questions (Hypothesis 3). The increased number of 
details from the turn-taking interview questions is likely to be because the pairs felt 
they needed to provide extra information when the interviewer forced them to swap 
and continue with the story. This turn-taking technique thus acted as a hidden 
stimulation to say more. This is similar to Leal et al. (2013) who found that presenting 
a very detailed model statement increased the amount of detail reported by both truth-
tellers and liars. Truth-tellers used the model statement to get an idea of the types of 
information they needed to provide, which increased their recall. Apparently, liars also 
felt they needed to talk more as a response to the detailed model statement.  This is, 
for investigative interviewing, an important finding because the main aim of such 
interviews is to gather information (Bull, 2010; Fisher, 2010; Meissner, Redlich, Bhatt 
& Brandon, 2012). If a technique can be implemented into the interview schedule that 
results in more details being provided by truth-tellers, it gives investigators more 
opportunity to check that their statement is correct. In the case of liars, it will increase 
the chances of them ‘slipping up’ and providing information that is incriminating.  
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Pairs of truth-tellers provided significantly more details than pairs of liars to 
the non-turn-taking questions. This is consistent with previous research that has 
frequently found number of details to be a significant cue when distinguishing 
individual truth-tellers from individual liars (DePaulo et al., 2003). This is not 
surprising because like individual truth-tellers, pairs of truth-tellers actually 
experienced the event so the recall of information is less difficult and the truth-tellers 
do not fear that any extra detail will incriminate them (Vrij, 2008). Lying pairs, on the 
other hand, are fabricating their story making it more difficult to recall. They are also 
fearful of saying something that will incriminate them.  
Pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars provided a similar number of details 
when answering the turn-taking interview questions (rejecting Hypothesis 4). Since 
number of details successfully discriminated between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of 
liars in the non-turn-taking questions but not in the turn-taking questions this suggests 
that forced turn-taking makes the cue ‘number of details’ less reliable. However, this 
should not be problematic. First, since ‘number of details’ remained a cue to deceit in 
the non-turn-taking questions, investigators can introduce forced turn-taking in 
conjunction with non-turn-taking, so that in the non-turn-taking questions the 
investigators focus on detail and in the forced turn-taking questions they focus on the 
turn-taking dependent variables. Second, it could be argued that there will be a 
cognitive overload for an investigator to focus on the three turn-taking dependent 
variables as well as on the total number of details in the forced turn-taking questions, 
making examining the number of details perhaps redundant when turn-taking is 
implemented.  
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3.6 Experiment 2b: Discriminating Between Truths and Lies 
 The fact that collective interviewing reveals new cues to deceit that have not 
yet been identified does not automatically mean that observers will be able to 
discriminate better between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars when they are 
informed about the turn-taking cues. This second experiment therefore investigated 
whether the turn-taking cues developed during the first experiment could be 
accurately identified so that laypersons could correctly classify pairs based upon their 
veracity. This is a relevant addition to the research, as someone could argue that the 
cues obtained in the first experiment are only relevant if observers are able to spot 
them. It is suggested that the cues – continuations, repetitions and waiting – can easily 
be recognised allowing for observers to accurately discriminate between the pairs and 
detect deceit.  Therefore, it is hypothesised that observers who are informed about 
continuations, repetitions and waiting during the turn-taking interview questions will 
be better able to discriminate between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars, 
compared to observers who only have access to the non-turn-taking interview 
questions or who have access to the turn-taking interview questions but are not 
informed about the turn-taking cues (Hypothesis 5). 
3.7 Experiment 2b: Method 
3.7.1 Participants  
A total of 90 observers with a mean age of 35.33 years (SD = 13.41) took part 
in this experiment, 40 were male and 50 were female. Of the 90 observers, 29 were 
single and 61 were in a relationship (of whom 5 were engaged and 31 were married). 
An analysis of covariance demonstrated that the relationship status of the observers 
had no effect on the experimental findings reported in the results section (see Section 
3.8). All observers who took part in this lie detection experiment were volunteers who 
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were not compensated for participating. Additionally, they had not partaken as part of 
any couple in experiment 2a.  
3.7.2 Design 
This study used a 3 x 2 between-subjects design with Condition (non-turn-
taking versus turn-taking control versus turn-taking cues) as the first between-subjects 
factor and Veracity (truth versus lie) as the second between-subjects factor. A total of 
90 observers were randomly allocated to one of three conditions (30 observers in each 
condition). Observers read only one interview transcript consisting of three interview 
questions with responses from either one ‘real’ (truth-telling) or one ‘pretend’ (lying) 
couple. Hence, within each condition 15 observers judged a lying couple and 15 
different observers judged a truth-telling couple. Of the 46 transcripts obtained in 
Experiment 2a, one truth-telling pair and one lying pair were used as examples leaving 
44 transcripts to be judged in Experiment 2b consisting of 21 lying pairs and 23 truth-
telling pairs. Each transcript was divided into two parts: A non-turn-taking part and a 
turn-taking part. This resulted in 21 lying non-turn-taking parts, 23 truth-telling non-
turn-taking parts, 21 lying turn-taking parts, and 23 truth-telling turn-taking parts. In 
Condition 1 (non-turn-taking), observers were required to judge veracity when the 
turn-taking technique was not implemented, whereas in Conditions 2 (turn-taking 
control) and 3 (turn-taking cues) the turn-taking manipulation was implemented. For 
Condition 1 (non-turn-taking) 15 of the 21 lying transcripts and 15 of the 23 truth-
telling transcripts were randomly used. For Conditions 2 and 3 (turn-taking), 30 lying 
transcripts and 30 truth-telling transcripts were needed (60 in total) from the 21 lying 
and 23 truth-telling transcripts available (44 in total). This meant that a random 
sample of 16 turn-taking transcripts were used twice in Conditions 2 and 3, but no 
transcript was used twice in the same condition. That is, the same transcript could be 
used in Conditions 2 and 3 but never twice in Condition 2 or twice in Condition 3. 
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3.7.3 Procedure 
Observers were recruited using an opportunity sample and asked to read and 
sign an informed consent form. They first completed a few demographic details and 
were then allocated to one of the three conditions and given instructions to read 
depending on what condition they were allocated. All instructions told the observers 
about the first experiment stating that truth-telling couples and lying couples had been 
interviewed in pairs about their ‘real’ or ‘pretend’ relationship and that their task was 
to now read a transcript and judge the veracity of the pair being questioned in their 
transcript. The instructions then described specific cues the observers were to look for 
depending on their condition.  
In Condition 1 (non-turn-taking), observers were told that number of details 
often distinguishes truth-tellers from liars [an accurate fact, DePaulo et al., 2003] with 
truth-tellers providing more details than liars. They were informed of the different 
types of details that may be present and shown an example response from both a truth-
telling pair and a lying pair in which different types of details were highlighted (see 
Appendix 3.1). They were then required to read one transcript that did not include the 
turn-taking manipulation and asked to judge, based on number of details, whether they 
thought the pair being interviewed were a truth-telling couple or a lying pair.  
In Condition 2 (turn-taking control), observers were again told that number of 
details often distinguishes truth-tellers from liars, with truth-tellers providing more 
details than liars. They were informed about the turn-taking manipulation and of the 
different types of details that may be present. They were then shown an example 
response from both a truth-telling pair and a lying pair when turn-taking was 
implemented into the interview schedule, and the different types of details were again 
highlighted (see Appendix 3.2). They were then required to read one transcript with 
the turn-taking manipulation present. Observers were once again asked to judge, based 
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on number of details, whether they thought the pair being interviewed were a truth-
telling couple or a lying pair. This instruction meant that the observers in Conditions 1 
and 2 were asked to judge detail globally and subjectively, rather than objectively 
through counting every single detail. Research has demonstrated that observers can 
make accurate subjective judgements of the number of details that appear in a 
statement (Vrij, Evans, Akehurst & Mann, 2004).  
In Condition 3 (turn-taking cues), observers were informed about the turn-
taking manipulation and instructed to look out for three turn-taking cues; 
continuations, repetitions and waiting. Each of the cues were defined and the 
observers were informed that continuations tend to occur more often amongst truth-
telling pairs whereas repetitions and waiting tend to occur more often amongst lying 
pairs. They were provided with an example response from both a truth-telling pair and 
a lying pair when turn-taking was implemented into the interview schedule. Each of 
the three cues were highlighted in the examples (see Appendix 3.3). They were then 
asked to read one transcript that included the turn-taking manipulation and asked to 
judge, based on the three turn-taking cues, whether they thought the pair being 
interviewed were a truth-telling couple or a lying pair. Each of the turn-taking cues 
were not explicitly stated within the transcripts that the observers were asked to read; 
instead, observers merely used the definitions of the cues they were provided with to 
identify whether the cues were present in their transcript. Waiting was illustrated on 
the transcripts by utterances such as “erm” and “umm” or by “…” (which was 
indicative of a pause of three seconds or longer). 
In all conditions observers were asked to report what cues they had used to 
make their veracity judgement. This was an open-ended question recorded 
qualitatively. Participation took approximately 15 minutes. 
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Interview transcripts were chosen as the materials of this lie detection study (as 
opposed to video clips) so that the observers focused only on the verbal content of 
what the pairs were saying as opposed to the nonverbal content and how the pair 
behaved. By focusing on the text/speech only, the pure effect and the potential of the 
turn-taking manipulation could be observed without the observers being influenced by 
other factors. 
The cues reported to have been used by the 90 observers were coded and 
computed per condition. A total of 13 different cues were mentioned by the observers; 
number of details, unnecessary details, continuations, repetitions, waiting, 
consistency, plausibility, feelings, equality, lack of memory, cross-checking of 
information, own relationship beliefs, and natural interactions. Each cue could only be 
mentioned once by each observer. To measure the reliability of the coding, a second 
rater coded the cues reported by 24 observers (eight observers from each condition). 
An inter-rater reliability analysis, using the Kappa statistic, revealed high agreement 
between the two raters in allocating the cues to the 13 categories (κ = .68, p < .001). 
Manipulation checks were conducted to explore what cues observers were using in 
each of the three conditions. Additionally, both truth accuracy (truth transcripts) and 
lie accuracy (deceptive transcripts) were measured for all 90 observers by giving the 
observer a 1 if their veracity judgement was correct and a 0 if their veracity judgement 
was incorrect. 
3.8 Experiment 2b: Results 
3.8.1 Manipulation check: What cues do observers use to make their veracity 
judgement?  
To explore what cues the observers were using to make their veracity 
judgement, a MANOVA was conducted with Condition (non-turn-taking versus turn-
taking control versus turn-taking cues) as the only factor and each of the 13 cues as 
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the dependent variables. The MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate main 
effect for Condition, Wilks’ λ = .28, F(26, 150) = 5.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .47. 
Additionally, significant univariate main effects for Condition were obtained for six of 
the 13 cues (see Table 3.3).  
Tukey post-hoc tests revealed significant differences between Condition 1 
(non-turn-taking) and Condition 3 (turn-taking cues) for four of the six significant 
cues; number of details, continuations, repetitions, and waiting. Significant differences 
were also found between Condition 2 (turn-taking control) and Condition 3 (turn-
taking cues) for all six of the significant cues. There were no significant differences 
between Condition 1 (non-turn-taking) and Condition 2 (turn-taking control) in terms 
of the cues used (see Table 3.3). Observers reported to have used the appropriate cues 
(as instructed) in each of the conditions. That is, observers in Conditions 1 and 2 used 
number of details as their cue to judging veracity significantly more than those in 
Condition 3, whereas the observers in Condition 3 used continuations, repetitions and 
waiting as their cues to judging veracity significantly more than those in Conditions 1 
and 2.  
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Table 3.3 
Cues used by observers that significantly differed across the three conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Only means (in rows) with different superscript differ significantly from each other (p < .05) 
 Condition 1 
(non-turn-
taking) 
Condition 2 
(turn-taking 
control) 
Condition 3 
(turn-taking 
cues) 
F P ηp
2 
 M SD M SD M SD    
Details .97
b
 .18 .83
b
 .38 .40
a
 .50 18.52 <.001 .30 
Unnecessary details .03
ab
 .18 .00
a
 .00 .17
b
 .38 3.96 .023 .08 
Continuations .00
a
 .00 .20
a
 .41 .60
b
 .50 20.30 <.001 .32 
Repetitions .00
a
 .00 .03
a
 .18 .50
b
 .51 24.09 <.001 .36 
Waiting .17
a
 .38 .07
a
 .25 .63
b
 .50 18.37 <.001 .30 
Consistency .13
ab
 .35 .10
a
 .31 .37
b
 .49 4.20 .018 .09 
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3.8.2 Hypothesis Testing: Lie detection experiment  
The overall accuracy rate was 57.8% across all three conditions (truth accuracy 
= 60.0%, lie accuracy = 55.6%). A 3 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted 
with Condition (non-turn-taking versus turn-taking control versus turn-taking cues) as 
the first between-subjects factor, Veracity (truth versus lie) as the second between-
subjects factor, and accuracy rate as the dependent variable.  The ANOVA revealed a 
significant univariate main effect for Condition, F(2, 84) = 3.38, p = .039, ηp
2 
= .08. 
There was no significant main effect for Veracity, F(1, 84) = .19, p = .668, ηp
2 
< .01, 
nor was there a significant Condition X Veracity interaction effect, F(2, 84) = .33, p = 
.724, ηp
2 
= .01. Observers in ‘Condition 1 non-turn-taking’ obtained an accuracy rate 
of 46.7% (truth accuracy = 53.3%, lie accuracy = 40.0%), observers in ‘Condition 2 
turn-taking control’ obtained an accuracy rate of 50% (truth accuracy = 53.3%, lie 
accuracy = 46.7%), and observers in ‘Condition 3 turn-taking cues’ obtained an 
accuracy rate of 76.7% (truth accuracy = 73.3%, lie accuracy = 80.0%). The total 
accuracy rate in Condition 3 (M = .77, SD = .43, 95% CI [.59, .94]) was significantly 
higher than the total accuracy rate in Condition 1 (M = .47, SD = .51, 95% CI [.29, 
.64]),  F(1, 56) = 5.97, p = .018, ηp
2
 = .10, d = .64, and the total  accuracy rate in  
Condition 2, (M = .50, SD = .51, 95% CI [.33, .68]),  F(1, 56) = 4.67, p = .035, ηp
2
 = 
.07, d = .57. The difference in total accuracy rate between Conditions 1 and 2 was not 
significant, F(1, 56) = .06, p = .803, ηp
2
 < .01, d = .06. These findings support 
Hypothesis 5. 
3.9 Experiment 2b: Discussion 
 Experiment 2b demonstrated that asking participants to use the turn-taking 
cues to detect deception facilitated their ability to discriminate between pairs of truth-
tellers and pairs of liars. Participants who were given a transcript involving the turn-
taking manipulation and instructed to look for the three turn-taking cues 
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(continuations, repetitions, waiting) were better at distinguishing between truth-telling 
pairs and lying pairs than those participants who were not given the turn-taking 
manipulation or were given the turn-taking manipulation but not informed of the three 
turn-taking cues (Hypothesis 5). In fact, the accuracy rate for both truths (73.3%) and 
lies (80%) were very high for the observers who were informed about the turn-taking 
cues and amongst the highest accuracy rates ever found in verbal lie detection 
research (see Vrij, 2008 for overviews of such research).  
These high accuracy rates reflect the clear potential of forced turn-taking on 
the ability to distinguish between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars. 
Demonstrating its true potential is necessary, but this is only a first step. The next 
logical step would be to examine what accuracy rates could be achieved in real-life 
interviews. Until then, caution should be used when interpreting the high accuracy 
levels, because it cannot be said for sure whether similar accuracy rates will be 
obtained in such real-life interviews. Perhaps real-life interviews will enable 
investigators to discriminate between lies and truths even better than when interview 
transcripts are used, because a strong, yet unidentified, diagnostic cue to deceit could 
emerge in such settings in addition to the cues examined in the present experiment. 
Alternatively, the real-time interviews will create noise and will lead to lower 
accuracy rates, either through the interpretation of non-diagnostic nonverbal cues or 
because the observers will use their own first impression of the pair to judge whether 
they are a real or pretend couple (Ambardy & Skowronski, 2008; Carney, Colvin & 
Hall, 2007).  
3.10 Experiments 2a & 2b: General Discussion 
The use of a collective interviewing approach was examined to detect 
deception, with a turn-taking manipulation being implemented within the interview to 
increase cognitive load. It was found that turn-taking elicited novel and detectable 
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cues to deceit that significantly discriminated between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs 
of liars. These cues were continuations, repetitions and waiting, and each achieved 
impressive accuracy levels.  
3.10.1 Additional forced turn-taking manipulations 
The forced turn-taking technique used in the present study clearly elicited new 
cues that were indicative of deceit in pairs of interviewees. However, there are 
implications for further manipulations using the forced turn-taking technique. First, 
more than two interviewees could be interviewed at the same time and the turn-taking 
implemented amongst all group members. The same findings as were found here 
could reasonably be expected because such a situation will not change the underlying 
principle of forced turn-taking. Second, interviewees could be informed that forced 
turn-taking is going to take place and how this affects the variables identified in the 
present study and/or the strategies employed by truth-tellers and liars could be 
examined. In terms of strategy, the problem liars have is that they do not know which 
questions will be asked. However, to ‘beat’ the forced turn-taking manipulation, they 
should come up with a strategy that also works when questions are asked that they 
have not expected. It is thought that this will be a challenging task. Third, instructions 
could be implemented into the turn-taking manipulation, for example, by telling the 
pairs or groups that they must not repeat information when asked to swap and/or that 
they must swap as quickly as possible. This should further enhance the cognitive load 
that liars experience when confronted with forced turn-taking.  
3.10.2 Additional collective interview settings and manipulations 
Future studies should consider alternative settings in which collective 
interviewing could be implemented. For example, house to house enquiries, police 
‘stop and search’ scenarios, insurance claims, road border control, and security 
checkpoints. It is believed that the findings of the present study could be applied to 
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other environments because the theoretical rationale upon which the findings are 
based (i.e., cognitive load) will remain the same regardless of the setting in which two 
or more people are being interviewed together. Additionally, it would be interesting to 
explore the effect that the turn-taking manipulation has when multiple witnesses are 
interviewed together at the same time, as opposed to multiple suspects.  
To emphasise, it is not suggested that collective interviewing should replace 
individual interviewing. Instead, it is suggested that it be employed as a ‘new’ or 
‘additional’ approach to individual interviewing. Therefore, the collective interview 
could be used in isolation whereby if the group raises suspicion in a collective 
interview, investigators take the required actions they would normally take after 
interviewing individuals who raise suspicion (e.g. calling for assistance, collecting 
further evidence). Alternatively, collective interviewing could act as an initial 
screening process to determine whether suspects then need to be interviewed 
individually. Collective interviewing is not just limited to pairs; it can also be applied 
when interviewing more than two suspects.  
The present study assumed equal status between the pairs. In real life, 
situations occur in which one member has a higher status with a greater degree of 
responsibility and esteem than the other member. Future studies should consider pairs 
or groups with varying degrees of status to explore how this influences collective 
interview situations. In addition, in real-life it could be that an alibi witness backs up 
the story of a suspect, by pretending to be with the suspect at a given time when this 
was not the case. In this example, the alibi witness can be truthful about their 
activities, whilst the suspect has to completely lie about their activities. Importantly, 
although suspect-alibi situations may have an effect on natural turn-taking, it is not 
foreseen that it will influence forced turn-taking, as in the latter situation, the pair 
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members can no longer control which pair member provides which piece of 
information.  
3.10.3 Methodological considerations 
 Two methodological issues deserve further discussion. First, with hindsight it 
is perhaps unfortunate that the status of the truth-teller’s relationship was not 
documented. That is, the degree to which the truth-tellers were intimate, friendly, 
trusting, and important to one another was not recorded as it was with the lying pairs 
in the study. Truth-telling couples are likely to differ on these four ‘closeness’ 
variables depending on how they feel within their relationship and on the stage they 
are at within their relationship (e.g. engagement vs. marriage; children vs. no 
children); therefore it could be that intimacy, friendliness, trustfulness, and importance 
influence truth-tellers’ ability to continue each other’s train of thought when forced to 
turn-take. Had the truth-tellers been asked more about their relationship at the time of 
the experiment then degree of intimacy, friendliness, trustfulness, and importance 
could have been used as control variables strengthening the findings obtained. 
Nevertheless, the length of the relationship (which is perhaps, to some extent, an 
indicator of relationship stage) was recorded, and analyses of relationship length 
demonstrated that this was not associated with the truth-telling pair’s ability to take 
turns. In addition, although relationship-closeness was not measured in truth-tellers, it 
was measured in liars but did not correlate with any of the turn-taking dependent 
variables, implying that relationship-closeness is not associated with a pair’s ability to 
take turns. 
Second, the truth-telling pairs always told a story about their real romantic 
relationship, whereas the lying pairs always told a false story about a fictitious 
romantic relationship. This means that not only did veracity differ between the two 
conditions, but so did relationship status. Therefore, it may well be that the findings 
Chapter 3 
91 
 
obtained were due to truth-telling pairs having more experience of communicating 
shared events with one another. Despite this, the lying pairs were friends who were 
closer to one another and more familiar with one another than required to meet the 
study criteria (see Section 3.4.6). This strengthens the findings obtained. Furthermore, 
neither the friendship-closeness nor the friendship length of the lying pairs were 
associated with turn-taking. Hence, it would seem that it is veracity that influences 
turn-taking ability, not relationship status. Using pairs of individual liars who were 
friends and familiar with one another makes the study more applicable to real-life 
whereby pairs pretending to be in a relationship, e.g. during immigration interviews, 
are likely to be known to each other, and not complete strangers.  
3.10.4 Policy implication 
The main aim for immigration agencies is to distinguish between genuine 
couples and fake couples. Given the high number of marriages that involve a non-
EEA national believed to be a sham (4,000-10,000 per year in the UK; Home Office, 
2013), and the connection that sham marriages have with organised crime groups and 
increased criminality, it is important to reduce the chances of these occurring. In 2013, 
the Home Office identified the need for increased interviewing of immigration 
applicants to help “root out abuse of British visas and improve the integrity of our 
immigration system” (pp. 48). When the genuineness of a relationship is being 
investigated, documentary evidence is examined, the couple are interviewed in-depth 
and/or a home visit will occur. It is during the investigative stages that techniques 
need to be implemented in order to detect potential sham relationships and prevent 
them from occurring. Collective interviewing and the implementation of forced turn-
taking is one method that could increase the detection accuracy of genuine and fake 
relationships, and this is important because it will help with the identification of sham 
relationships and with the possible prosecution of those who may be involved in 
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criminal activity (including organised crime, trafficking, perjury, facilitating or 
conspiring to illegal immigration).  
3.10.5 Theoretical implications  
The present study fills a gap within the deception literature whereby group 
deceit has been ignored. Specifically, this research provides support for previous 
collective interviewing studies into deception (e.g. Driskell et al., 2012; Jundi, Vrij, 
Hope et al., 2013; Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 2012) and shows the 
potential for exploring the social indicators of deception as well as the individual 
indicators.  
Additionally, a collective approach fits well with the research in the memory 
literature which focuses on collective memory and collaborative recall (e.g. Barnier & 
Sutton, 2008; Blumen, Rajaram & Henkel, 2013; Harris, Paterson & Kemp, 2008). Of 
particular relevance to the current study is that of transactive memory theory, which 
postulates that people who are actually in a close relationship (truth-tellers) share 
remembering (Wegner, 1987), thus knowing one another’s memory expertise, that is, 
each person in the pair knows what they are to remember as well as what the other 
person in their pair is to remember (Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003). Consequently, 
encoding, storing and recalling information is more interactive and communicative 
between members of a pair that are recalling an actual shared event compared to a pair 
that are recalling a fabricated event.  These interactive and communicative behaviours 
during joint recall have been associated with the development of other cues indicative 
of truthfulness, including posing questions to one another, providing cues to one 
another, handing over remembering responsibility, and finishing each other’s 
sentences (Vernham, Vrij, Leal, Mann & Hillman, 2014
2
).  
                                                             
2
 This is the study reported in Chapter 4 of this PhD thesis.  
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3.10.6 Conclusion 
The present study demonstrated that forced turn-taking can be an efficient 
method for eliciting cues to deceit, and that these cues can only be detected within a 
collective interview setting whereby two or more individuals are interviewed together 
at the same time. Continuations when turn-taking, repetitions when turn-taking, and 
waiting when turn-taking, are important cues to deceit which are easy and quick for 
investigators (and laypersons) to notice.  
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4.1 Abstract 
Group interviewing, which as mentioned earlier in this thesis has been neglected in the 
deception literature, also coincides with collective memory research. The present 
experiment applies the transactive memory theory to a collective interviewing 
situation and explores whether signs of truthfulness emerge through measuring joint 
memory recall. Truth-tellers were real couples who had been in a relationship for at 
least one year and cohabiting. Lying pairs were friends who pretended to be in a 
relationship for at least one year and cohabiting. All couples were interviewed in their 
pairs about their ‘real’ or ‘fictitious’ relationships. It was found that truth-telling pairs 
posed questions to one another, provided cues to one another, handed over 
remembering responsibility, and finished each other’s sentences significantly more 
than lying pairs, supporting the idea that real couples have a transactive memory 
system, unlike pretend couples. Implications for a collective interview approach that 
considers memory within deception detection are discussed. 
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4.2 Introduction 
Cognitive psychology, specifically memory research, has developed over the 
years through the exploration of not only individual memory, but also collaborative 
learning, collaborative remembering, and joint recall (e.g. Barnier & Sutton, 2008; 
Blumen, Rajaram & Henkel, 2013; Harris, Paterson & Kemp, 2008). Collective 
memory examines the social nature of memory by treating past experiences and events 
as memories shared with others (Barnier & Sutton, 2008; Hirst & Manier, 2008; 
Rajaram, 2011). It explores how individuals collectively recall information together 
(Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010). The research suggests that group collaboration can 
aid memory through cross-cueing (where members of the group provide cues to one 
another that increase recall) and error-pruning (where feedback from other members 
of the group create discussions that make people realise their recall errors) (Rajaram, 
2011; Ross, Blatz & Schryer, 2008).  
Deception research has primarily focused on interviewing single suspects 
despite the fact that crimes are frequently committed by pairs or multiple offenders 
(M
c
Gloin & Piquero, 2009; Van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009). Therefore, it seems 
relevant to explore how group members lie or tell the truth together. Collective 
interviewing is a new approach to lie detection that coincides with the existing 
research into collective memory by focusing on the joint recall of events when two or 
more individuals are interviewed together at the same time. Although suspects are 
typically separated from their group members immediately within police interview 
settings and interviewed individually (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004), there are 
alternative situations whereby it would be more suitable, timely and convenient to 
interview group members simultaneously, for example, during house to house 
enquiries, at road border controls where cars containing several people are checked, or 
at security checkpoints (e.g. airports). Importantly, collective interviewing is already 
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part of some existing procedures.  For example, in Canada, immigration officers at 
airports carry out collective interviews, and in the UK, couples are expected, at one 
potential stage, to be interviewed simultaneously in order for one to obtain British 
Citizenship.  
Four recent studies have illustrated the clear potential for using collective 
interviewing to elicit social cues to deceit, specifically communication and interaction 
cues. Vrij et al. (2012) examined verbal communication cues and found that pairs of 
truth-tellers interrupted and corrected each other more than pairs of liars, as well as 
adding more information to each other’s accounts. Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al. (2013) 
examined nonverbal communication cues and found that pairs of liars made more eye 
contact with the interviewer than pairs of truth-tellers, whereas pairs of truth-tellers 
looked more at each other than pairs of liars. Driskell, Salas and Driskell (2012) 
investigated the social indicators of deception within a transactive memory framework 
and found that pairs of truth-tellers demonstrated more synchrony in behaviour and 
exhibited more interactions (e.g. mutual eye gaze and verbal transitions) than pairs of 
liars. Finally, Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann and Hillman (2013) applied the theory of 
transactive memory to a timeline task in which pairs had to work together to illustrate 
on paper the length of time each part of their experimental task had taken. The authors 
found that truth-telling pairs, compared with lying pairs, posed more questions to one 
another during the timeline task. These four studies show that a collective approach 
can generate discrepancies between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in the way 
they communicate. 
The aim of the present experiment was to apply a collective interviewing 
approach to the setting of being interviewed simultaneously to achieve British 
Citizenship. Similar to the studies by Driskell et al. (2012) and Jundi, Vrij, Hope, et al. 
(2013), the present experiment explores differences between truth-telling and lying 
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couples within the context of transactive memory. However, the present experiment 
differs from the previous studies in some important ways. First, Driskell et al. (2012) 
focused on generic verbal transitions defining them broadly in terms of back- and 
forth-verbal exchange (i.e. the number of times an individual elaborated or responded 
immediately after their partner). Conversely, the present experiment explores the 
specific types of verbal transitions used by the pairs, focusing on the fundamental 
memory cues that emerge through collaborative recall and remembering and that may 
be an indication of truthfulness. Second, whilst Driskell et al. (2012) and Jundi, Vrij, 
Hope, et al. (2013) both measured posing questions to one another, it was thought to 
be relevant to replicate this measurement within a different context in the present 
experiment. That is, whereas Driskell et al. (2012) used a brief investigative interview 
(similar to that which might occur during initial screenings at security checkpoints) 
and Jundi, Vrij, Hope, et al. (2013) measured the number of questions posed to one 
another whilst the pair completed a timeline task, the present experiment measures the 
frequency of questions posed to one another during a lengthy immigration-type 
interview. Third, an extra factor was added to the present experiment to explore the 
influence of question type, an area that has been investigated in previous deception 
research and been shown to be important. For example, Vrij et al. (2009) found that 
asking unanticipated questions about central topics increased the discrepancies 
between pairs of liars’ statements because they had not been able to prepare answers 
to these questions. These discrepancies were not found between pairs of truth-tellers’ 
statements because they were relying purely on memory. To take the expectedness of 
the interview questions into consideration, the present experiment splits the interview 
into anticipated questions (which pairs may have planned for) and unanticipated 
interview questions (which negate the benefit of planning for the interview).  
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4.2.1 Transactive memory  
The theory of Transactive Memory is concerned with how groups (and 
individuals) process and structure information with regard to past events. The theory 
was developed to describe how people in close intimate relationships share cognition 
and ‘think together’ (Wegner, 1987). It proposes that people in close relationships 
have a specialised memory system or ‘division of labour’ for encoding, storing and 
retrieving information (Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1987). This is particularly 
relevant to the present experiment whereby ‘real’ (truth-telling) or ‘fictitious’ (lying) 
couples were the focus.  
Transactive memory theory postulates that people who are actually in a close 
relationship (truth-tellers) share remembering, also knowing each other’s memory 
expertise (i.e. each person knows what they are to remember as well as what the other 
person in the relationship is to remember) (Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003). This 
results in a transactive memory system that is greater than the total of both the 
individual memories (Wegner, Erber & Raymond, 1991; Wegner, Giuliano & Hertel, 
1985). Over time, the individuals within the pair (couple) update their transactive 
memory systems, improving them and making them more efficient. This transactive 
memory system is active at all three stages of memory formation and recall: Encoding, 
storing, and retrieving. First, when information is encoded regarding a shared 
experience, responsibility for information is divided and shared between the members 
of the pair (Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003). Second, when information is stored, each 
individual within the pair has remembering responsibilities, knowing what their role 
is, what they are to remember, and what information their partner has access to 
(Wegner et al., 1991). Third, retrieval of information is social and interactive as the 
individuals within the pair communicate considerably with one another to retrieve as 
much information as possible. The communication with one another and the 
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discussion of incoming information enhances their individual recollections. 
Hollingshead (1998) refers to the transaction memory search whereby group members 
who have experienced a past shared event make instinctive use of their transactive 
memory system to increase recall by posing questions to one another to check 
information or find out information, cuing one another to remind one another of 
further information, and handing over remembering responsibility to whoever best 
remembers that part of the event. These interactive and communicative behaviours 
between the group members help one another tap into their different memory domains 
and trigger further information, increasing recall. Consequently, it should be the truth-
telling couples in the present experiment that demonstrate the use of a transactive 
memory system, and therefore display these fundamental interactive and 
communicative behaviours during their joint recall.  
Conversely, pairs of individuals who are fabricating their relationship and 
inventing (or at least partially inventing) shared events will need to mislead or deceive 
investigators, and in order for these lying pairs to be able to do this, they will need to 
illustrate the same pattern of responses as the truth-telling pairs. This will be difficult 
for them to do without the shared memory system for encoding, storing and retrieving 
information that truth-telling pairs have. Research has shown that deceptive 
communication is characterised by the absence of social and interactive behaviours 
and that this is likely to be due to the fact that at the time of recall, deceptive pairs do 
not retrieve information from a transactive memory system, unlike truth-telling pairs 
(Driskell et al., 2012). Instead, lying pairs will rely on a combination of individual 
processes, which means that each member needs to rely on their individual cognitive 
ability to create a story that makes sense and matches with what the other individual in 
their pair is saying (Hintz, 1990). Retrieval of information in lying pairs is therefore 
an individual cognitive task which will result in lying pairs exhibiting fewer 
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interactions as they recall their fabricated story (Driskell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012), 
and only providing prepared answers to expected questions (Granhag, Strömwall & 
Jonsson, 2003; Strömwall, Granhag & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij, Mann, Leal & Granhag, 
2010). Additionally, lying pairs will focus on appearing credible when investigated 
(DePaulo, LeMay & Epstein, 1991; DePaulo et al., 2003), and due to the 
misconceptions held by people with regards to the cues that imply deceit (Vrij, 
2008a), the lying pairs in particular will avoid certain behaviours, e.g. correcting and 
interrupting one another (Vrij et al., 2012), posing questions to one another (Driskell 
et al., 2012), and admitting a lack of memory (Porter & Yuille, 1996). This again will 
make the memory cues arising from transactive memory more apparent in truth-telling 
pairs who believe the truth will shine through (‘illusion of transparency’; Gilovich, 
Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998) and are not as concerned with appearing credible, and 
hence do not avoid particular communications and interactions.  
To summarise, truth-telling pairs are likely to encode, store, and recall 
information through a transactive memory system, whereas lying pairs are likely to 
encode, store and recall information at an individual level. Consequently, two people 
recalling an actual jointly experienced event will do so in a different manner than two 
people who are attempting to recall a fabricated event. Thus, collective interviewing 
should elicit differences between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in the 
transactional information search (Hollingshead, 1998) enabling signs of truthfulness 
as a result of memory differences between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars to be 
detected. The focus of the present experiment is verbal transitions, but more 
specifically, the consideration of four different types of verbal transitions that pairs 
demonstrate when retrieving information through their transactive memory systems. 
These four verbal transitions are; posing questions to one another, providing cues to 
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one another, the handing over of remembering responsibility, and finishing each 
other’s sentences. 
4.2.2 Hypotheses 
Overall, truth-telling pairs are expected to exhibit more of each type of verbal 
transition than lying pairs when interviewed together about their ‘relationship’. Hence, 
the present experiment focuses on signs of truthfulness as opposed to signs of deceit. 
Based on the frequency of each type of verbal transition during the interview, it was 
hypothesised that truth-telling couples will pose questions to one another to check 
information or find out information more than lying pairs (Hypothesis 1), provide cues 
to one another more than lying pairs (Hypothesis 2), hand over remembering 
responsibility more than lying pairs (Hypothesis 3), and finish each other’s sentences 
more than lying pairs (Hypothesis 4). It is believed that this last measure, finishing 
each other’s sentences, will reveal truth because according to transactive memory, 
truth-telling couples will know what the other person is saying, and will say it (e.g. 
Hollingshead, 1998; Hollingshead & Brandon, 2003; Wegner et al., 1991). 
Consequently, truth-telling pairs will interrupt one another and automatically complete 
each other’s sentences, which lying pairs will not do through fear that these 
interruptions will raise suspicion and imply deceit (Vrij et al., 2012).  
Additionally, the present experiment explores the effect that the expectedness 
of the interview question has on the frequency of each of the verbal transitions. 
Previous research has revealed that asking unexpected interview questions surprises 
liars and negates the benefit of planning for the interview, requiring the liars to ‘think 
on the spot’ (Vrij et al., 2010). Consequently, more cues to deceit will emerge from 
liars’ responses to unanticipated questions compared with anticipated questions, which 
they are able to prepare for (DePaulo et al., 2003). Furthermore, pairs of liars 
interviewed individually show less overlap in their responses to unanticipated 
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questions compared with anticipated questions (Vrij et al., 2009). In contrast, truth-
tellers respond similarly to both anticipated and unanticipated questions, and when 
pairs of truth-tellers are interviewed individually they show similar amounts of 
overlap when responding to both anticipated and unanticipated questions. The 
findings above indicate the relevance of measuring the effect of expectedness of the 
interview question. However, no hypothesis regarding this issue will be formulated 
because of the uncertainty in how expectedness will affect each of the verbal 
transitions when pairs of participants are interviewed collectively.  
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited via online advertisements, the University of 
Portsmouth staff and student portals, and word of mouth. All participants were told 
prior to signing up to the study that it was an experiment investigating whether they 
could convince an interviewer that they were in a romantic relationship with their 
selected interview partner. 
A total of 92 participants (45 males and 47 females) from the University of 
Portsmouth took part in this study. The mean age was 22.64 years (SD = 5.90). Truth-
telling pairs (N = 24) were real couples who had been in a relationship for at least one 
year and cohabiting. Lying pairs (N = 22) were friends who were told only to take part 
as a pretend couple if they had never been intimate with one another and did not live 
together. The lying pairs had to be of the same sexual orientation; thus of the opposite 
sex to one another if they were both heterosexual and of the same sex if they were 
both homosexual. Of all 46 pairs who participated in this study, 45 were heterosexual 
and one was homosexual. The one homosexual pair was a female lying pair.  
 
 
Chapter 4 
110 
 
4.3.2 Design 
This experiment used a mixed design with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the 
between-subjects factor and Expectedness (anticipated interview questions versus 
unanticipated interview questions) as the within-subjects factor.  Posing questions to 
one another, providing cues to one another, handing over of remembering 
responsibility, and finishing each other’s sentences were the dependent variables (the 
four verbal transitions measured).  
4.3.3 Procedure 
Upon arrival at the Psychology Department, all pairs were asked to go for 
coffee (paid for by the researchers) for approximately 30 minutes. They were 
instructed to prepare during coffee for the interview and talk about their ‘real’ or 
‘pretend’ relationship, discussing (i) how they met, (ii) how they spend time together, 
and (iii) where they live (the interview then focused on these issues). They were also 
informed that they would be interviewed together at the same time. Therefore, if 
differences between truth-tellers and liars were to emerge, this would not be because 
the collective interview setting took the pairs by surprise. Once the pairs returned to 
the department and stated they were ready to be interviewed, they were separated to 
individually complete pre-interview questionnaires. These were completed to obtain 
an understanding of how much the pairs had prepared for the interview and whether 
the preparation discussions differed between truth-telling pairs and lying pairs. The 
pre-interview questionnaire asked participants to rate on 7-point Likert scales the 
thoroughness (ranging from [1] incomplete to [7] thorough), sufficiency (ranging from 
[1] insufficient to [7] sufficient), quality (ranging from [1] very poor to [7] very good), 
and usefulness (ranging from [1] pointless to [7] useful) of their preparation 
discussion. It also asked the participants to rate how much they discussed with their 
partner what to say during the interview (ranging from [1] not at all to [7] thoroughly).  
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A collective interview in which pairs were interviewed together in the same 
room then took place. The interview was audio- and video-recorded. All interviews 
involved one interviewer who was blind to the veracity of the couple. The interview 
schedule comprised six interview questions (see Table 4.1). The task for all couples 
was to convince the interviewer that they were a bona fide couple who had been in a 
relationship for at least one year and were now living together. Thus, real couples just 
had to tell the truth, whilst pretend couples had to describe a fabricated relationship.  
To motivate participants to perform well during the experiment, they were told 
that if they were believed by the interviewer they would each receive £5. However, if 
they were not believed they would receive no money and would be required to write a 
statement about their relationship with the other individual in their pair. To ensure that 
the experiment was ethical and fair to all participants, the experimenter told them at 
the end of the experiment that the interviewer believed they were telling the truth and 
so all participants were paid £5.  
Following the collective interview, the pair were separated to individually 
complete a post-interview questionnaire. At this stage all participants were instructed 
to be truthful about their experience of the interview and the strategies they used. In 
this questionnaire, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale from [1] 
not at all motivated to [7] extremely motivated, the extent to which they felt motivated 
to appear convincing during the interview. They were also asked to rate their 
confidence in receiving £5 and their confidence about whether or not they would have 
to write a statement (both on 7-point Likert scales from [1] none at all to [7] very 
likely). Additionally, participants were asked to rate on 7-point Likert scales (ranging 
from [1] easy to do to [7] difficult to do) the extent to which they found being 
interviewed collectively easy or difficult to do. Finally, to explore how honest 
participants reported to have been in the interview, they rated on scales from 0% to 
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100% with 10% intervals the extent to which they told the truth during the interview 
and the extent to which they lied during the interview.  
Truth-tellers were asked an additional open question about how long, in 
number of months, they had been in a romantic relationship with their interview 
partner. This relationship length variable was used in correlational analyses along with 
each of the dependent variables as a means of examining whether or not relationship 
length was associated with any of the four verbal transitions, and therefore 
confounding the effect of Veracity.   
Conversely, liars were given an additional post-interview questionnaire to 
explore whether they actually met the inclusion criteria and had not been in a previous 
intimate relationship with their interview partner. They completed this questionnaire 
on their own and in separate rooms. The first part of this questionnaire asked an open 
question about how long, in number of months, the liars had been friends with one 
another. It then measured on four different 7-point Likert scales how they rated their 
friendship with their interview partner. This included questions about friendliness 
(ranging from [1] strangers to [7] best friends), intimacy (ranging from [1] distant to 
[7] intimate), importance (ranging from [1] unimportant to [7] important) and 
trustfulness (ranging from [1] distrusting to [7] trusting). Each individual that made up 
the lying pair gave their own rating for each of the four questions. The ratings from 
the four questions were then added together to give a total friendship-closeness rating 
for each individual within each pair. The average rating for each pair was obtained 
providing an overall friendship-closeness score for each lying pair. The friendship 
length and the friendship-closeness variables were inputted into correlational analyses 
along with each of the dependent variables to determine whether friendship length or 
friendship-closeness were associated with any of the four verbal transitions, and 
therefore confounding the effect of Veracity.  
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4.3.4 Coding 
The interviews were transcribed and the transcripts were coded by a rater who 
was blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs. All four dependent 
variables (verbal transitions) were coded for all six interview questions separately and 
the total frequency that each variable occurred within the interview across the six 
questions was calculated for each pair.  
Posing questions to one another was the number of times a member of the pair 
asked their interview partner a question, usually to check information or find out 
information (e.g. “Did we watch two movies that night or just one?” or “Was I 
working that day?”).  Providing cues to one another was the number of times 
members of the pair cross-cued – that is, when one member of the pair stated 
something that reminded their interview partner of additional information (e.g. one 
member of the pair might say “We watched something but I can’t remember the name 
of it now”, and the other member of the pair might say “The thing we were watching 
was a soap called Chalkhill Lives”, which results in the first member of the pair then 
responding with a remark, such as “Oh yeah, I remember now”). An exchange such as 
the previous example would be counted as one cross-cue. The handing over of 
remembering responsibility was the number of times members of the pair passed over 
the conversation depending on who best remembers what. Participants would state 
that they do not remember the information as thoroughly as their partner so would 
automatically ask their partner to tell that part of the event (using phrases, such as 
“You remember this better than me, why don’t you explain it?” Or “Do you want to 
explain this? I know you like telling this story”). Finishing each other’s sentences was 
the number of times one member of the pair started saying something and then the 
other member of the pair interrupted and spontaneously finished off their sentence 
(e.g. one member of the pair might start saying “We went on the banana boat and...”, 
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then the second member of the pair will complete the sentence and say “...and we fell 
off into the cold water”). All four of these dependent variables were deemed 
appropriate for measuring transactive memory based on existing memory literature 
(e.g. Driskell et al., 2012; Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1987). 
A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs, 
coded 16 of the 46 transcripts for the total number of times each of the four dependent 
variables occurred. Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) were then calculated 
between the two individual raters. The inter-rater reliability between the two coders 
was very good with each of the ICCs demonstrating good agreement between the two 
raters (posing questions to one another: ICC = .95; providing cues to one another: ICC 
= .87; handing over remembering responsibility: ICC = .62; finishing each other’s 
sentences: ICC = .92). The ICC for the handing over of remembering responsibility 
variable was not as high as the other three variables because this verbal transition did 
not occur often within the dataset.  
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Table 4.1 
Expectedness score for each of the six interview questions used in this experiment. 
Interview question Expectedness 
score 
Expectedness 
category 
1. ‘Can you describe in as much detail as possible 
how and when you first met. Please give as 
much information as you can about your first 
interaction, the location you were at, and so 
on’. 
1.20 
(range = 1-3) 
Anticipated 
question 
2. ‘Can you describe in as much detail as possible 
your first date and when this was. Think about 
the location and the sights and sounds you 
experienced’. 
1.50 
(range = 1-3) 
Anticipated 
question 
3. ‘Describe your home’. 4.30 
(range = 1-7) 
Unanticipated 
question 
4. ‘Please draw the exterior of your bedroom on 
this piece of A3 paper... Now describe in as 
much detail as you can your bedroom starting 
from the left-hand wall and moving all the way 
around the outline. Please describe everything 
including furnishings, décor, etc.’ 
6.65 
(range = 5-7) 
Unanticipated 
question 
5. ‘Describe a recent memorable day that you 
spent together hour by hour (this must not be 
your wedding day if you are married)’.  
3.95 
(range = 2-7) 
Unanticipated 
question 
6. ‘Can you describe in as much detail as possible 
your last holiday or trip away together? Please 
give as much information as you can about the 
location, what you did, the sights you 
experienced, and so on’.   
2.20 
(range = 1-5) 
Anticipated 
question 
TOTAL Expectedness score 19.80 
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4.3.5 Anticipated questions: Pilot study 
A pilot study was conducted as a manipulation check to investigate how 
expected each of the six interview questions would be when participants were 
informed that they were going to be interviewed together with their partner about their 
relationship. The Expectedness of the interview questions was measured because, 
despite the experimenter thinking that a particular question would be unexpected, it 
might be that in fact, the participants would not find that question particularly 
unexpected, and may therefore have developed a pre-planned answer when given the 
opportunity to prepare for the interview. Consequently, this would have resulted in the 
Expectedness variable being weak at best, and may have affected participants’ 
responses and interactions whilst answering the questions.  
Twenty participants were recruited with a mean age of 34.00 years (SD = 
12.61): Eleven were male and nine were female. No participants from this pilot study 
took part in the main study. Each participant was given a brief summary of the present 
experiment. After reading the summary, participants were given a short questionnaire 
in which they were asked to rate on a Likert scale of 1 (anticipated) to 7 (not 
anticipated) the extent to which they would expect that each of the six interview 
questions used in the present experiment, would be asked during an interview with 
their partner regarding their relationship. Thus, the higher the score, the less the 
question was expected. Table 4.1 shows the Expectedness of each of the six interview 
questions used during this experiment. The three interview questions with the lowest 
Expectedness scores were then categorised as the anticipated interview questions 
(Expectedness scores ranged from 1.20 to 2.20), and the three interview questions 
with the highest Expectedness scores were then categorised as the unanticipated 
interview questions (Expectedness scores ranged from 3.95 to 6.65). Eight new 
variables were then computed for each pair: Total frequency for each of the four 
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dependent variables across the three anticipated questions only, and total frequency 
for each of the four dependent variables across the three unanticipated questions only. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Pre-interview questionnaire 
Five one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine if there was a significant 
difference between truth-tellers and liars in terms of how they rated their preparation 
discussion prior to being interviewed. There was no significant difference between 
truth-tellers and liars in terms of how they rated their preparation discussion in terms 
of thoroughness (F(1, 90) = .93, p = .339, ηp
2
 = .01, d = .20), sufficiency (F(1, 90) = 
.01, p = .918, ηp
2
 < .01, d = .03), and how good they found it (F(1, 90) = .96, p = .330, 
ηp
2
 = .01, d = .20). However, liars rated the preparation discussion as significantly 
more useful (M = 5.89, SD = .97, 95% CI [5.41, 6.36]) than truth-tellers (M = 4.15, SD 
= 1.99, 95% CI [3.69, 4.60]), F(1, 90) = 27.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .24, d = 1.11. Liars also 
stated that they discussed with their partner about what to say during the interview 
significantly more thoroughly (M = 5.45, SD = .90, 95% CI [5.06, 5.89]) than truth-
tellers (M = 3.86, SD = 1.62, 95% CI [3.47, 4.24]), F(1, 90) = 33.30, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.27, d = 1.21.  
4.4.2 Post-interview questionnaire: Motivation, manipulation checks, and 
collective interviewing  
The vast majority of participants indicated that they were motivated to appear 
convincing during the interview, with 80.3% of the sample scoring 5 or higher on the 
7-point Likert scale. Liars were significantly more motivated (M = 6.09, SD = .86, 
95% CI [5.60, 6.58]) than truth-tellers (M = 4.85, SD = 2.10, 95% CI [4.39, 5.32]) to 
appear convincing, F(1, 90) = 13.19, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .13, d = .77.  In terms of 
confidence, truth-tellers reported that they were more confident (M = 6.04, SD = 1.37, 
95% CI [5.61, 6.48]) than liars (M = 4.48, SD = 1.68, 95% CI [4.02, 4.93]) that they 
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would receive £5, F(1, 90) = 24.21, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .21, d = 1.02. Truth-tellers were 
also more confident (M = 2.71, SD = 1.73, 95% CI [2.26, 3.16]) than liars (M = 4.36, 
SD = 1.40, 95% CI [3.89, 4.84]) that they would not have to write a statement, F(1, 
90) = 25.26, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .22, d = 1.05. 
A one-way ANOVA further showed that liars found being interviewed 
together significantly more difficult than truth-tellers (M = 3.09, SD = 1.80, 95% CI 
[2.57, 3.62] and M = 2.10, SD = 1.70, 95% CI [1.60, 2.61], respectively), F(1, 90) = 
7.29, p = .008, ηp
2
 = .08, d = .57. 
Finally, two one-way ANOVAs showed that truth-tellers (M = 98.96%, SD = 
3.71, 95% CI [94.11, 103.80]) reported having stayed closer to the truth than liars (M 
= 51.82%, SD = 24.14, 95% CI [46.76, 56.88]), F(1, 90) = 200.27, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .69, 
d = 2.73, and liars (M = 51.14%, SD = 25.26, 95% CI [45.85, 56.42]) reported to lie 
significantly more than truth-tellers (M = .83%, SD = 3.47, 95% CI [-4.23, 5.89]), F(1, 
90) = 186.65, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .68, d = 2.79. 
4.4.3 Occurrence of cues 
 It could be argued that for a cue to become a useful indicator of truthfulness it 
should occur frequently amongst truth-tellers. That is, it could be that a cue is more 
frequently used by truth-tellers than liars, but if only a small minority of truth-tellers 
use that particular cue, then it is of limited value in lie detection as the absence of the 
cue does not provide meaningful information. Therefore, the occurrence of each of the 
transactive memory cues was measured: All 46 pairs (100% of lying pairs and 100% 
of truth-telling pairs) posed questions to one another at least twice during the 
interview; 32 out of 46 pairs (36.36% of lying pairs and 100% of truth-telling pairs) 
provided cues to one another at least once during the interview; 10 out of 46 pairs 
(4.55% of lying pairs and 37.5% of truth-telling pairs) demonstrated the handing over 
of remembering responsibility at least once during the interview; and 38 out of 46 
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pairs (63.64% of lying pairs and 100% of truth-telling pairs) finished each other’s 
sentence at least once during the interview. These percentages indicate that, perhaps 
with the exception of the handing over of remembering responsibility, the transactive 
memory cues, thought to be used by truth-telling pairs, were indeed used by the truth-
tellers in the present sample.  
4.4.4 Hypotheses testing: Transactive memory  
A 2 x 2 mixed-design MANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth versus 
lie) as the between-subjects factor, Expectedness (anticipated interview questions 
versus unanticipated interview questions) as the within-subjects factor, and (i) posing 
questions to one another, (ii) providing cues to one another, (iii) handing over of 
remembering responsibility, and (iv) finishing each other’s sentences as the dependent 
variables. The MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, 
Wilks’ λ = .42, F(4, 41) = 14.18, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .58. Significant univariate main 
effects for Veracity were obtained for all four dependent variables: Posing questions 
to one another, F(1, 44) = 6.32, p = .016, ηp
2 
= .13, d = .75; providing cues to one 
another, F(1, 44) = 16.94, p <.001, ηp
2 
= .28, d = 1.23; handing over of remembering 
responsibility, F(1, 44) = 7.51, p = .009, ηp
2 
= .15, d = .83; and finishing each other’s 
sentences,  F(1, 44) = 47.22, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .52, d = 2.05. In support of Hypotheses 1–
4, truth-telling pairs, more than lying pairs, posed questions to one another (M = 
15.83, SD = 10.62, 95% CI [12.27, 19.40]; M = 9.41, SD = 5.80, 95% CI [5.69, 
13.13]), provided cues to one another (M = 3.79, SD = 2.87, 95% CI [2.82, 4.77]; M = 
.91, SD = 1.66, 95% CI [-.11, 1.93]), handed over remembering responsibility (M = 
.63, SD = .97, 95% CI [.33, .92]; M = 0.05, SD = .21, 95% CI [-.26, .35]), and finished 
each other’s sentences (M = 5.92, SD = 2.95, 95% CI [4.95, 6.89]; M = 1.14, SD = 
1.46, 95% CI [.12, 2.15]). The MANOVA also revealed a significant multivariate 
main effect for Expectedness, Wilks’ λ = .80, F(4, 41) = 2.75, p = .041, ηp
2
 = .21, but 
Chapter 4 
120 
 
at a univariate level no significant effects for Expectedness were obtained for any of 
the dependent variables (F-values ranged from .01 to 2.77; p-values ranged from .103 
to .919). The multivariate Expectedness X Veracity interaction effect was not 
significant, Wilks’ λ = .84, F(4, 41) = 2.01, p = .110, ηp
2
 = .16, nor were any of the 
four univariate effects for the Expectedness X Veracity interaction (F-values ranged 
from .03 to 3.27; p-values ranged from .077 to .862).  
Discriminant analyses were conducted on each of the significant dependent 
variables separately to investigate the nature of their relationship with Veracity. The 
individual discriminant analyses revealed that all four dependent variables were 
individually significant predictors of Veracity (see Table 4.2). The cross-validated 
classification results reveal that finishing each other’s sentences in particular was a 
diagnostic sign of truthfulness with 87% of truth-tellers and liars classified correctly 
based on this cue.  
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Table 4.2 
Classification results for each of the four significant dependent variables (verbal transitions). 
Transactive memory variable Chi-square Wilks’ lambda  
(significance) 
Total 
percentage of 
cases correctly 
classified 
Percentage of 
truth-tellers 
correctly 
classified 
Percentage of 
liars correctly 
classified 
Posing questions to one another 5.84 .87 (.016) 65.2% 54.2% 77.3% 
Providing cues to one another 14.17 .72 (<.001) 71.7% 54.2% 90.9% 
Handing over remembering responsibility 6.86 .85 (.009) 65.2% 37.5% 95.5% 
Finishing each other’s sentences 31.71 .48 (<.001) 87.0% 83.3% 90.9% 
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4.4.5 Truth-telling pairs’ relationship status 
Pearson’s correlational analyses were conducted to test the association 
between relationship length and each of the four dependent variables. The correlations 
revealed that there were no significant associations between relationship length (M = 
41.92, SD = 44.74), and posing questions to one another, r(22) = -.19, p = .369; 
providing cues to one another, r(22) = -.34, p = .105; handing over remembering 
responsibility, r(22) = -.19, p = .371; or finishing each other’s sentences, r(22) = -.22, 
p = .307.  
4.4.6 Lying pairs’ friendship status 
Analyses from the liars’ self-reports about how friendly they actually were as a 
pair indicated that the lying pairs reported being friendlier than was desired for the 
inclusion criteria of this study. That is, they were recruited as a pair only if they stated 
they were friends who were of the same sexual orientation, who had never been 
intimate, never been in a romantic relationship, and never lived together. However, 
liars obtained a mean of 5.73 (SD = .95, 95% CI [5.44, 6.02]) for friendliness on a 
Likert scale of 1 (strangers) to 7 (best friends); a mean of 4.91 (SD = 1.25, 95% CI 
[4.53, 5.29])  for intimacy on a Likert scale of 1 (distant) to 7 (intimate); a mean of 
5.91 (SD = 1.07, 95% CI [5.58, 6.24]) for the importance of their friendship with their 
interview partner on a Likert scale of 1 (unimportant) to 7 (important); and a mean of 
6.07 (SD = 1.21, 95% CI [5.70, 6.44])  for how trusting they were of their partner on a 
Likert scale of 1 (distrusting) to 7 (trusting). Despite this, Veracity still had a 
significant effect on the frequency of each of the four verbal transitions, 
demonstrating that even when good friends lie together, signs of truthfulness still 
emerge in a collective interview situation. Furthermore, Pearson’s correlational 
analyses were conducted to test the association between friendship-closeness and each 
of the four dependent variables. The correlations revealed that there were no 
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significant associations between friendship-closeness (M = 22.61, SD = 3.27), and 
posing questions to one another, r(20) = .16, p = .492; providing cues to one another, 
r(20) = .30, p = .174; or finishing each other’s sentences, r(20) = .18, p = .419. 
However, the correlations did reveal a significant association between friendship-
closeness and the handing over of remembering responsibility, r(20) = -.55, p = .007. 
This significant finding needs to be interpreted with caution because the chances of 
making a Type I Error are increased due to multiple correlations being conducted at 
the same time.  
Pearson’s correlational analyses were also conducted to test the association 
between friendship length and each of the four dependent variables. The correlations 
revealed that there were no significant associations between friendship length (M = 
14.39, SD = 14.30), and posing questions to one another, r(20) = .20, p = .379; 
providing cues to one another, r(20) = .35, p = .116; handing over remembering 
responsibility, r(20) = -.13, p = .561; or finishing each other’s sentences, r(20) = -.15, 
p = .499. The absence of significant correlations in both truth-tellers and liars suggest 
that it is Veracity and real shared events that influenced the emergence of the 
transactive memory cues rather than the relationship status of the pairs.  
4.5 Discussion 
4.5.1 Transactive memory variables differentiate truth-tellers from liars 
Truth-telling pairs posed questions to one another to check information or find 
out information, provided cues to one another, handed over remembering 
responsibility, and finished each other’s sentences significantly more than lying pairs, 
supporting Hypotheses 1–4. The effect sizes were large (ranging from d = .75 to d = 
2.05) suggesting that each of the verbal transitions should be easily identified and 
taught to investigators (e.g. police interviewers, fraud investigators, and immigration 
officers). Additionally, the findings were not dependent upon the Expectedness of the 
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interview questions. Hence, the four verbal transitions were elicited by truth-telling 
pairs and not elicited by lying pairs regardless of whether the interview question was 
anticipated or unanticipated. This is a positive finding because it suggests that the 
signs of truthfulness measured in the present experiment will not be dependent upon 
the Expectedness of the interview question suggesting that the four verbal transitions 
are robust indicators of truthfulness. 
 The truth-telling pairs did illustrate more interactive and communicative 
behaviours in comparison to lying pairs who worked more on an individual basis in 
alignment with previous collective interviewing studies (Driskell, et al., 2012; Jundi, 
Vrij, Hope, et al., 2013; Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 2012). Although 
previous research suggests that liars plan what to say to expected questions (Vrij et al., 
2010), this study implies lying pairs do not plan how to interact or communicate with 
one another during a collective interview, which makes it more difficult for them to 
behave like truth-telling couples when answering both expected and unexpected 
interview questions. Additionally, the natural recall of shared events from the truth-
telling couples’ transactive memory system means that they unconsciously interact 
and increase their retrieval of information together (Hollingshead, 1998), which 
occurs regardless of whether the interview question is anticipated or unanticipated. 
Overall, the present experiment focused on the differences between truth-tellers and 
liars based upon memory research, and demonstrated that memory, particularly 
transactive memory, can be used as a process for eliciting signs of truthfulness that are 
not influenced by interview question type.  
4.5.2 Importance of memory in detecting deception 
It is widely acknowledged that memory plays an important role in deception 
(Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar & Meijer, 2011; Walczyk, Igou, 
Dixon & Tcholakian, 2013). Verbal veracity assessment tools, such as Reality 
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Monitoring, are very much based on memory and postulate that memories of actual 
events differ from fabrications in predictable ways, including in terms of sensory or 
affective information (Johnson & Raye, 1998). However, in deception research 
memory is often also viewed as a ‘problem’. If truth-tellers do not remember 
accurately or efficiently then their answers may sound like liars’ answers because their 
answers will be vague and less detailed (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; Walczyk et al., 
2013). If liars do not remember accurately and efficiently then their physiological 
responses may look similar to those of truth-tellers because they will not recognise the 
relevant items in a Concealed Information Polygraph Test (Verschuere et al., 2011). 
The present experiment has demonstrated that there is a good opportunity to 
differentiate truths from lies if truth-tellers do not remember clearly, because the cues 
identified in the present experiment should then arise.  
Hence, as opposed to truth-tellers sounding like liars due to providing a lack of 
detail, liars can be classified correctly because they will lack the presence of each of 
the verbal transitions. Thus, they will rarely pose questions to one another, provide 
cues to one another, hand over remembering responsibility, or finish each other’s 
sentences – memory cues that will emerge from truth-tellers. Whilst liars were 
classified with relatively high accuracy rates for all four verbal transitions, truth-tellers 
were classified with low accuracy rates for three of the four verbal transitions. These 
low accuracy rates for truth-tellers are a concern due to the risk of false-positives (i.e. 
classifying a pair as deceptive when they are in fact truthful). However, the overall 
classification accuracy rates for these three verbal transitions were high and still 
significant. Additionally, the results revealed that finishing each other’s sentences in 
particular was very successful in classifying correctly both truth-tellers (83.3%) and 
liars (90.9%).  
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Evidently, the memory cues examined herein arise in collective interviews and 
are not suitable to individual interviews. In the latter interview setting, cues such as 
spontaneous corrections, admitting lack of memory, and raising doubt about one’s 
own testimony are sometimes examined. They are part of Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis (CBCA; Köhnken, & Steller, 1988) and truth-tellers include such cues more 
often than liars do (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008b). However, it is postulated here 
that these cues are less diagnostic than the collective cues measured in the present 
experiment. For example, Vrij (2008b) reported that spontaneous corrections emerged 
as a diagnostic cue to deceit in only eight of the 26 studies (31%) in which they were 
examined. Similarly, admitting lack of memory emerged as a cue to deceit in nine out 
of 23 studies (39%) and raising doubts in four out of 20 studies (25%) examined. One 
reason is that such cues do not occur frequently in any case. Vrij (2005) reviewed 
CBCA field studies and noted that spontaneous corrections, admitting lack of 
memory, and raising doubt about one’s own testimony appeared in only a minority of 
the statements that were analysed (in 40%, 46% and 4% of the statements, 
respectively). The benefit of the transactive memory cues is that truth-tellers use them 
frequently. 
4.5.3 Practical applications  
The immigration paradigm setting used in this experiment, in which couples 
were interviewed to judge whether their relationship was real or pretend, was 
particularly good for applying transactive memory theory because transactive memory 
was developed around intimate couples. This setting is becoming increasingly relevant 
as ‘immigration’ is high up the political agenda, with many Western countries trying 
to prevent illegal immigration. Detecting lies in the type of citizenship interviews 
examined in the present experiment can serve this purpose.  
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The four verbal transitions identified from this experiment should work under 
conditions in which pairs know each other well and are being interviewed collectively 
about actual shared experiences. Other collective interview situations where these 
verbal transitions are likely to occur include couples being interviewed with the aim of 
adopting a child, interviews at road and airport border controls, and interviews where 
both members of a couple are suspects (which happens frequently in suspected 
fraudulent insurance claims such as car insurance, tax claims, damage to property, 
theft, etc). Institutions that deal with immigration, adoption, security or fraud would 
benefit from understanding social interactions and how pairs, specifically couples, 
behave together and recall information when questioned collectively. If the correct 
questions are asked and the collective interviewing technique applied then the 
transactive memory variables are likely to emerge and these will help investigators 
determine whether the individuals that form the pair (or group) require further 
questioning, either individually or again collectively.  
It could be argued that the immigration paradigm will not reveal the verbal 
transitions identified in this study if one member of the pair is more dominant than the 
other, or if a pair member notices ‘errors’ during the interview in what their partner is 
saying, but refrains from correcting them through fear that they will then not be 
believed. Recent collective interviewing studies have considered these two issues. 
First, a study by Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Hillman (2014)
1
 used a forced turn-
taking technique that took away the control from the pair of who responded to the 
interview question. This technique involved the interviewer stating which of the two 
participants was to answer the question, and then intervening every 20 seconds by 
stopping whichever of the participants was responding and asking the other participant 
                                                             
1
 This is the study reported in Chapter 3 of this PhD thesis. 
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in the pair to continue from the point at which their partner was stopped.  This 
continued until the pair had finished answering the question. This turn-taking 
technique could be applied to the current immigration scenario as a way of preventing 
dominant characters from influencing the findings. Second, a study by Vrij et al. 
(2012) demonstrated that truth-telling pairs are not afraid to correct one another, add 
information to each other’s accounts or interrupt each other, and they do actually do 
this significantly more than lying pairs. Therefore, the fear that truth-telling pairs will 
not correct ‘errors’ is not warranted.  
Future research should consider whether the verbal transitions identified 
during this experiment still emerge when close, but not intimate, friends are being 
interviewed together about past shared events (e.g., close friends who claim to have 
been to a restaurant, shopping mall, or sport venue together at the time a crime took 
place). Additionally, it would be interesting to explore whether the verbal transitions 
emerge in ‘suspect-alibi’ situations to help law enforcement with the identification of 
false alibi witnesses. The verbal transitions should emerge more distinctly if two 
individuals are actually describing a shared event that took place at the time the crime 
was being committed and to a much lesser extent if a false alibi witness is being 
provided.  
4.5.4 Methodological considerations 
Two methodological issues deserve further discussion. First, the truth-telling 
pairs always told a story about their real romantic relationship, whereas the lying pairs 
always told a false story about a fictitious romantic relationship. This means that not 
only did Veracity differ between the two conditions, but so did relationship status. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the findings obtained were due to truth-telling pairs 
having more experience of communicating shared events with one another. However, 
the relationship length of the truth-telling pairs and the friendship length of the lying 
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pairs were not associated with the occurrence of the dependent variables, and the 
friendship-closeness of the lying pairs significantly correlated with only one of the 
four dependent variables. Since this finding could reflect a Type I Error, the findings 
suggest that the friendship length and friendship-closeness of the lying pairs were not 
associated with the occurrence of the dependent variables, which suggests that it is 
Veracity that influences the four verbal transitions, not relationship status.  
Second, it would seem that some of the responses made by lying pairs were 
reflective of transactive memory processes because on occasion they did display each 
of the verbal transitions measured. Consequently, the study would have benefitted 
from the inclusion of a condition in which the lying pairs were asked to tell the truth 
as a way of determining whether they would have then exhibited the same 
communicative and interactive cues as the truth-telling pairs. This would have made it 
clearer as to whether the significantly reduced number of verbal transitions made by 
lying pairs was due to a lack of transactive memory or whether it was the consequence 
of some other phenomenon. Nevertheless, the fact that the lying pairs knew each other 
well and were probably engaging in ‘embedded lies’ (whereby they change specific 
details of a true story rather than telling a blatant lie that is entirely untruthful; Vrij et 
al., 2010) implies that the findings from the present experiment are likely to be related 
to the absence of a transactive memory system in lying pairs and the presence of one 
in truth-telling pairs.  
4.5.5 Conclusion 
The present experiment demonstrated that memory is important within 
deception research and can lead to cues indicative of truthfulness. In particular, 
differences between truth-tellers and liars can be elicited in the transactional 
information search. A collective approach fits well with the current research into 
memory and fills a gap within the deception literature whereby group deceit has been 
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largely ignored. Additionally, the present experiment demonstrates the importance of 
exploring the whole spectrum of veracity, not just identifying signs of deception but 
also signs of truthfulness. 
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5.1 Abstract 
The application of alibi witness scenarios to the detection of deception has been 
overlooked. Nevertheless, alibi witnesses are common in police investigations and 
there is the potential that the suspect lies about his or her alibi witness, and that the 
alibi witness in turn lies to protect the suspect who is frequently a loved one or friend. 
The present experiment applies the verifiability approach and the social phenomenon 
of memory to the detection of deception in alibi witness situations when pairs were 
required to complete both individual and collective statements. Truth-telling pairs 
completed a mission around a park together, whereas lying pairs were separated so 
that one individual completed the mission around the park alone and the other 
individual committed a mock crime. All pairs were questioned about their activities 
and whereabouts at the time the crime took place, first on their own then together as a 
pair. It was found that compared to lying pairs, truth-telling pairs automatically 
provided more checkable details that demonstrated they were together. Conversely, in 
comparison with truth-telling pairs, lying pairs provided more uncheckable details. 
Additionally, an interaction effect showed that the collective statements allowed truth-
telling pairs to provide significantly more checkable details that demonstrated they 
were together in comparison to the individual statements. No such effect was obtained 
for lying pairs. When the individual and collective statements were compared for 
memory consistency and distortion, liars repeated significantly more uncheckable 
details whereas truth-tellers omitted and committed more checkable details. 
Implications for using both individual and collective statements when applying the 
verifiability approach and the social phenomenon of memory to alibi witness 
situations are discussed. 
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5.2 Introduction 
When a crime is committed it is often the case that suspects provide an alibi 
witness in the hope that the police will then be able to verify their story (Nahari & 
Vrij, 2014). An alibi witness (often referred to as a person corroborator) is defined as 
someone who can provide an account of the whereabouts of a suspect at a location 
other than the crime scene at the time the crime took place (Burke, Turtle & Olsen, 
2007; Dahl & Price, 2012). Alibi witnesses are frequently used by defendants in court. 
For example, Burke and Turtle (2003) reviewed 175 Canadian and American criminal 
court cases and found that in 86% of Canadian cases and 68% of American cases, alibi 
witnesses were provided by the defendant. Of course, one problem with interpreting 
alibi witness evidence is that it can sometimes be false. Given that 61% of people 
believe they could find a false alibi witness to corroborate their story (Culhane, Hosch 
& Kehn, 2008), and that 82% of people report that they would lie for a romantic 
partner, and 68% report that they would lie for their oldest/best friend (Hosch, 
Culhane, Jolly, Chavez & Shaw, 2011), false alibis are likely to be common.  
A real life example in which a false alibi witness misled a UK police 
investigation is the case known as the ‘Soham Murders’ whereby Ian Huntley 
murdered two young girls, Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman. When Huntley was first 
questioned, his then girlfriend, Maxine Carr, provided him with an alibi claiming that 
she was with him at the time the two young girls went missing and were murdered. 
Consequently, due to her statements, the police investigators believed for a while that 
Huntley was innocent. However, it turned out that Carr was in fact lying and was 
actually with her parents in Grimsby at the time the crime took place. Huntley was 
then found guilty of murder and Carr was convicted for perverting the course of 
justice and providing a false alibi.  
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Despite investigators often having to determine whether the alibi witness is 
true or false (a process known as alibi discrimination; Culhane et al., 2013), little 
deception research has explored investigations involving an alibi witness and how one 
can tell whether the alibi witness is true or false. Therefore, the current study applies 
the verifiability approach of deception detection to a situation whereby the suspect had 
an alibi witness. A better understanding of how to recognise false alibi witnesses 
would significantly benefit police investigations and consequently the Criminal 
Justice System (CJS) (Burke et al., 2007).  
5.2.1 Verifiability approach  
 Cues to deceit are typically faint and unreliable and as a result the ability to 
distinguish truths from lies is a difficult task (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; DePaulo et al., 
2003). Verbal cues are deemed more diagnostic of deceit than nonverbal cues (Vrij, 
2008) and therefore much of the deception literature has focused on developing verbal 
techniques that enhance the detection of deception, e.g. Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis (CBCA; Raskin & Esplin, 1991; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) and Reality 
Monitoring (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981; Sporer, 1997). The Verifiability Approach, 
which was developed by Nahari, Vrij and Fisher (2014a) is a new verbal method for 
facilitating lie detection. This approach is based on two assumptions that result in a 
dilemma for liars. First, research has frequently demonstrated that more detailed 
accounts signify truthfulness (see Vrij, 2008 for a review) and as a result liars want to 
provide numerous details in order to make an honest impression (Nahari, Vrij & 
Fisher, 2012). Second, whilst liars want to provide many details to appear truthful, 
they simultaneously are motivated to avoid mentioning details that can be checked and 
result in the investigator uncovering their lies (Nahari et al., 2012). This therefore 
leads to liars employing a strategy that minimises their chances of being caught by 
providing many details, but focusing on details that cannot be checked (e.g. “I could 
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see the leaves falling off the trees in the strong winds”), and do not include details that 
can be checked (e.g. “As I entered the park at 9:15am, I bumped into my friend, 
George, from Rugby”). If this assumption is correct then liars should report fewer 
verifiable details in their account than truth-tellers, and this has been found to be the 
case (Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2014a, 2014b). However, these studies focused on 
individual truth-tellers and individual liars, whereas the current study applies the 
verifiability approach to pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars.  
Nahari and Vrij (2014) applied the verifiability approach to pairs by 
considering the case of alibi witnesses. In their study, truth-telling pairs completed 
activities together, whereas lying pairs were separated so that one liar did the activities 
alone and the other liar completed a surveillance mission alone. All pairs then had to 
convince an investigator that they had both completed the activities together. The 
statements provided by all pairs were then coded for verifiable details and it was 
found that 88% of the pairs could be correctly classified by the verifiability approach. 
 Similar to Nahari and Vrij (2014), the current study also applies the 
verifiability approach to situations that involve alibi witnesses. However, the current 
study adds to the work of Nahari and Vrij (2014) in several ways: First, in the study 
by Nahari and Vrij (2014) participants were told that the investigator was going to 
check their statement for verifiable details, therefore liars would be even less likely to 
provide verifiable details since this knowledge will make them aware that to provide 
such details will increase the likelihood that they would get caught in their lies. In the 
current study, participants were not provided with any information about what the 
investigator was looking for. Hence, any findings that emerge from the current study 
in support of the verifiability approach are indicative of truth-tellers instinctively 
providing more checkable details than liars. Second, unlike Nahari and Vrij (2014) 
whereby the activities completed by the participants purposefully included those that 
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could be verified (e.g. participants were required to ask a question to the guard located 
at the main entrance of the campus), the activities set up in the current study did not 
include those that could be verified (i.e. participants were not required to speak to 
someone as one of their tasks). Consequently, checkable details were coded separately 
to the activities they were instructed to do by the experimenter. Third, the participants 
in Nahari and Vrij (2014) only had to write collective statements, whereas the 
participants of the current study were required to write both an individual and a 
collective statement. This allowed for any differences in the number of verifiable 
details to be examined between the two types of statement. Fourth, the current study 
had three categories of verifiable details: (1) Checkable details that demonstrate the 
pair were together, (2) Checkable details that do not necessarily demonstrate the pair 
were together, and (3) Uncheckable details. Nahari and Vrij (2014) only measured 
checkable details that demonstrated the pair were together. This division of verifiable 
details into three categories is important because; (i) the first category allows for the 
replication of the findings obtained by Nahari and Vrij (2014); (ii) the second category 
is more applicable to alibi witness research because it allows the experimenter to take 
into account the fact that even lying alibi witnesses might provide checkable details 
that demonstrate they were in the park, but not necessarily that their partner was; and 
(iii) the third category allows for the examination of whether liars compensate for the 
lack of reporting verifiable details by reporting more unverifiable details. Finally, the 
current study also applies the verifiability approach to the social phenomenon of 
human memory by measuring repetitions, omission errors, commission errors and 
contradictions from the individual statements to the collective statement in terms of 
the three categories of verifiable details. This allows for the current study to 
investigate whether an understanding of the verifiability approach and memory 
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together could further aid the detection of deception and therefore reveal new cues to 
deceit. 
5.2.2 Memory 
 Remembering often occurs in the company of others and therefore social 
contexts are an important component of how the information is remembered and later 
recalled (Harris, Barnier & Sutton, 2012; Harris, Barnier, Sutton & Keil, 2010). 
Transactive memory suggests that remembering is shared amongst all members of the 
group and therefore recalling events with others is beneficial because it is more 
interactive and communicative (Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1987). When groups 
recall a truly experienced shared event, recall is greater because the members of the 
group pose questions to one another, remind one another of further details, correct 
each other, and add information to each other’s accounts (Driskell, Salas & Driskell, 
2012; Vernham, Vrij, Leal, Mann & Hillman, 2014
1
; Vrij et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
collective memory suggests that group collaboration can aid memory through cross-
cueing (where members of the group provide cues to one another that increase recall) 
and error-pruning (where feedback from other members of the group create 
discussions that make people realise their recall errors)  (Rajaram, 2011; Rajaram & 
Pereira-Pasarin, 2010; Ross, Blatz & Schryer, 2008). However, human memory is 
highly susceptible to misinformation from a variety of sources, particularly other 
people (Loftus, 2005) and as a result group collaboration can also result in ‘memory 
conformity’ (Gabbert, Memon & Allan, 2003), which can reduce the accuracy of 
memory recall.  
Reconstructive memory theory (Bartlett, 1932) states that memory is subject to 
distortions, such as omission errors (the leaving out of information) and commission 
                                                             
1
 This is the study reported in Chapter 4 of this PhD thesis. 
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errors (the adding in of new information) due to its reconstructive nature. Therefore, 
when truth-tellers are asked to report previously said information, they do not recall 
the information word for word (unless instructed to do so; Gauld & Stephenson, 
1967), but instead recreate details of the story by changing, adding, and removing 
information (Baddeley, 1990). This theory of reconstructive memory is supported by 
the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis’ (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), which proposes 
that whilst liars will attempt to repeat what they have previously said, truth-tellers will 
try to reconstruct what they actually experienced. Consequently, liars will appear as 
consistent, if not more consistent, than truth-tellers (Vrij, Mann, Leal & Granhag, 
2010). This contradicts the stereotypical belief that consistency implies truthfulness 
(see ‘consistency heuristic’ literature; Granhag & Strömwall, 2000), and clarifies that 
investigators need to be cautious when interpreting consistent statements as truthful 
and inconsistent statements as deceitful and therefore incriminating. In the current 
study both individual and collective statements were included in order to determine 
the consistency and distortion occurring across statements between truth-tellers and 
liars when the verifiability approach is applied. Although the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct 
hypothesis’ (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) was originally developed to measure the 
consistency between two statements from the same interviewee (within-subjects), 
there is no reason to believe that it cannot also be used to measure consistency 
between an individual statement and a collective statement whereby the same 
individual is still contributing. This is because the same principles of the hypothesis 
will still apply.   
5.2.3 Strategies 
 Research into the differing strategies employed by truth-tellers and liars gives 
an insight into the types of cues that may arise when the verifiability approach is 
applied. Previous research has shown that truth-tellers employ a ‘tell it all’ strategy 
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believing that the ‘truth shines through’ (‘illusion of transparency’; Gilovich, Savitsky 
& Medvec, 1998). Consequently, they recall information exactly as they remember it 
and because they have ‘nothing to hide’ this leads to them automatically providing 
details that can be checked. However, because they are providing a large amount of 
details overall, they also provide a significant amount of details that cannot be 
checked (Nahari et al., 2014a). When truth-tellers are questioned in pairs, they provide 
even more information because they work as a team, reminding each other of further 
details, questioning each other, and adding more information to each other’s accounts 
(Driskell et al., 2012; Vrij et al., 2012). 
 Liars apply a ‘keep it simple’ strategy to avoid raising suspicion, but because 
they also want to give the impression that they are telling the truth, they provide as 
many details as possible, but only details that the investigator cannot use to disprove 
their story (Nahari et al., 2012).  When questioned together liars do not interact or 
communicate as much as truth-tellers (Vernham et al., 2014) and in all likelihood no 
more information is recalled than if they had just been questioned individually.  
5.2.4 Hypotheses 
The overall aim of the current study is to apply the verifiability approach to 
alibi witness situations whilst also taking memory components into account. In light 
of previous research that applies the verifiability approach to distinguish between liars 
and truth-tellers  (e.g. Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b), it is 
hypothesised that truth-telling pairs will provide significantly more checkable details 
that demonstrate the pair were together in both the individual and collective 
statements compared with lying pairs (Hypothesis 1). However, although, like lying 
pairs, truth-telling pairs are expected to provide a large number of uncheckable details, 
it is predicted that when the overall number of checkable and uncheckable details are 
taken into account, lying pairs will provide significantly more uncheckable details 
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than truth-telling pairs (Hypothesis 2). No significant difference is expected between 
pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in terms of checkable details that do not 
demonstrate the pair were actually together because both truth-telling pairs and lying 
pairs will have had at least one member of the pair complete the non-criminal 
activities. 
When considering the individual versus collective statements and the types of 
verifiable details that pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars provide, it is hypothesised 
that, compared to the individual statements, truth-telling pairs will provide 
significantly more checkable details that demonstrate they were together in the 
collective statement because joint recall is occurring, whereas this pattern will emerge 
significantly less for lying pairs because they are not actually recalling shared 
memories (Hypothesis 3). It is not anticipated that there will be any significant 
differences between the individual and collective statements in terms of checkable 
details that do not demonstrate the pair were together or between the individual and 
collective statements in terms of uncheckable details for both truth-tellers and liars. 
This is because when working together the truth-tellers will be thinking in terms of 
shared memories that reflect information about things they did together and as a result 
only more checkable details that demonstrate they were together will emerge in the 
collective statement. Liars, however, will purely be recalling the same details as they 
previously did in their individual statements.  
Finally, when reconstructive memory theory (Bartlett, 1932) and the ‘repeat 
versus reconstruct’ hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) are applied, it is 
hypothesised that lying pairs will repeat significantly more uncheckable details 
between the individual and collective statements compared to truth-telling pairs 
(Hypothesis 4); whereas truth-telling pairs will exhibit more memory distortions by 
omitting and committing significantly more checkable details that demonstrate they 
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were together between the individual and collective statements, compared to lying 
pairs (Hypothesis 5). 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants 
A total of 120 participants (30 truth-telling pairs and 30 lying pairs) from a UK 
University took part in this study. However, one lying pair was excluded as they did 
not correctly follow the instructions of the study (i.e. the ‘suspect’ wrote about 
committing the crime in their statement instead of lying and saying they were at the 
park with their friend when the crime was committed). The mean age of the remaining 
118 participants was 24.38 years (SD = 10.48), 34 were male and 84 were female.  
To ensure that any findings obtained in the current study were the result of 
Veracity and not the result of participants in one condition knowing the park better 
than participants in the other condition, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to 
compare whether there was a significant difference between truth-tellers and liars in 
regard to their knowledge of the park. No significant difference was found (p = .638). 
Additionally, to ensure that any findings obtained were not confounded by the level of 
friendship of each pair, a one-way MANOVA was conducted on the participants’ self-
report data about how friendly they were with their study partner. The MANOVA 
indicated that there were no significant differences between truth-telling pairs and 
lying pairs with regard to how they rated their friendship on four 7-point Likert scales 
which measured labelling (ranging from [1] strangers to [7] best friends), closeness 
(ranging from [1] distant to [7] intimate), importance (ranging from [1] unimportant to 
[7] important), and trustworthiness (ranging from [1] distrusting to [7] trusting) 
(means for truth-tellers ranged from 5.83 to 6.63; means for liars ranged from 5.55 to 
6.40; p-values ranged from .086 to .218). 
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5.3.2 Design 
This experiment used a mixed design with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the 
first between-subjects factor, Status (suspect versus alibi witness) as the second 
between-subjects factor, and Statement (individual versus collective) as the only 
within-subjects factor. Checkable details (pair together), checkable details (other), 
and uncheckable details were the three main dependent variables. Additionally, 
consistency and memory distortions were measured by comparing each individual 
statement with the collective statement. Therefore, additional dependent variables 
included repetitions, contradictions, omission errors and commission errors and each 
of these variables were broken down into three verifiable categories; (i) checkable 
details (pair together), (ii) checkable details (other), and (iii) uncheckable details, 
resulting in 12 dependent variables. 
5.3.3 Procedure 
Participants were recruited via online advertisements, the university staff and 
student portals, and word of mouth. All participants were told prior to signing up to 
the study that it was an experiment investigating the interactions occurring between 
friends and therefore they were required to sign up in pairs. 
Upon arrival at the Psychology department, all pairs of friends were required 
to read and sign an informed consent form and were randomly assigned to one of the 
two veracity conditions. They were told by the experimenter that they were going to 
complete a task together (truth-telling pairs) or complete separate tasks (lying pairs).  
Truth-telling pairs were sent on a mission around a nearby park together. The 
park has many features, such as a children’s play area, an animal enclosure, and 
several war monuments. Truth-telling pairs were provided with instructions of what to 
do on their mission around the park, a map with directions of how to get there, a map 
of the park itself, and a task sheet asking seven questions about different areas of the 
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park. Their mission was to go around the park and work together as a pair to answer 
the seven questions on the task sheet in the order in which they were asked. Despite 
the experimenter requesting participants to answer the questions in a specific order, 
approximately 17% of participants mentioned that they did not follow the tasks in 
chronological order because they accidentally came across an answer to a later 
question first. The maps provided could be used to help them locate the answers they 
required. Questions on the task sheet included “How many slides are there in the 
children’s play area?”, “Name five animals that live within the enclosure at the centre 
of the park”, and “What is the date on which the Chinese bell monument was 
captured?” Pairs were instructed to stay together at all times, working together to 
answer each of the questions. The questions could only be answered correctly if the 
pair actually went to the specific places within the park, providing some ground truth 
that the truth-telling pairs did do the entire mission. Although it could be that 
participants searched on the internet for the answers (e.g., using their mobile phone), 
they would only have been able to find answers to three of the seven questions. When 
asked, no participants admitted to having used the internet to obtain any of the 
answers. On completion of the tasks, the pairs returned to the Psychology department. 
They were told to follow the directions provided to enter the park, but could return 
back to the Psychology department from the park via any route they wished (the park 
has five exit points). On returning to the Psychology department, they handed the 
experimenter the task sheet which enabled the experimenter to check that they had 
completed each of the tasks. When back at the department, the experimenter informed 
the pair that a crime had taken place and that one of them matched the description 
provided of the person who was seen leaving the office in which the crime had 
occurred (the pair member chosen to match the description was picked at random by 
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the experimenter). Therefore, this individual became the ‘suspect’ and his or her 
friend became the ‘true alibi witness’.   
Lying pairs were separated and randomly assigned a mission. One individual 
was instructed to do exactly what the truth-telling pairs were asked to do, but on his or 
her own rather than with his or her friend. The other individual was instructed to 
commit a crime on his or her own. S/he was given a key and required to follow 
directions to a locked office in the Psychology department. S/he was to unlock the 
office, steal £20 from a purse on the desk within the office, lock the office and return 
to the experimenter with the £20. The £20 was returned to the experimenter following 
completion of the study. S/he was to do this as quickly as possible and without being 
seen. When both individuals had completed their tasks, they were reunited as a pair, 
and informed that a crime had been reported and that the individual who had actually 
completed the crime matched the description provided of the person who was seen 
leaving the office in which the crime occurred. Therefore, this individual became the 
‘suspect’ and his or her friend was instructed be a ‘false alibi witness’. 
The task of all pairs was to convince an investigator that they were together at 
all times when the crime was committed. They were instructed to state that they had 
been completing a mission around the park together at the time the money was stolen. 
Therefore, truth-telling pairs (both the ‘suspect’ and the ‘true alibi witness’) were 
required to tell the truth about their whereabouts and activities at the time of the crime. 
The lying pairs on the other hand were required to lie, with the suspect having to lie 
entirely about his or her whereabouts and activities, claiming that s/he was with the 
‘false alibi witness’, whereas his or her friend (the ‘false alibi witness’) had to tell the 
truth about his or her whereabouts and activities but lie about being alone when 
completing the mission – That is, s/he had to say that s/he completed the mission 
together with his or her friend (the ‘suspect’).   
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All pairs were given as much time as they wanted to prepare for questioning 
and ‘get their story straight’. They were told to focus on discussing how they were 
going to prove their own innocence or the innocence of their partner. All pairs were 
informed prior to their preparation talks that they would be required to write a 
statement on their own and then a second statement together as a pair. Therefore, if 
differences between truth-tellers and liars were to emerge, this would not be because 
the individual or collective statements took the pairs by surprise.  
Once the pairs stated they were ready to be questioned, they were separated 
and individually completed pre-questioning questionnaires. These were completed to 
get an understanding of the degree to which pairs had prepared for questioning and 
whether the preparation discussions differed between truth-telling pairs and lying 
pairs. The pre-questioning questionnaire asked participants to rate on 7-point Likert 
scales the thoroughness (ranging from [1] incomplete to [7] thorough), sufficiency 
(ranging from [1] insufficient to [7] sufficient), quality (ranging from [1] very poor to 
[7] very good), and usefulness (ranging from [1] pointless to [7] useful) of their 
preparation discussion. It also asked the participants to rate how much they discussed 
with their partner about what to say during the interview (ranging from [1] not at all to 
[7] thoroughly).  
Subsequently, each member of the pair separately typed up individual 
statements on a laptop answering the following question: ‘Describe in as much detail 
as possible what you were doing at the time the crime took place. Think about your 
whereabouts, your activities, the people you were with, what you saw, what you 
heard, how you felt etc.’ The statement system was set up on the laptop to look like 
the statement was being sent to an investigator. That is, all participants were 
manipulated to believe that the investigator was receiving their statements once 
complete. Once both members of the pair had completed their individual statements, 
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they were put together to write a collective statement answering the same question. 
The pairs could speak freely to one another and could choose who typed up the 
statement. They were reminded throughout the writing of their statements that they 
were to convince an investigator that they were together the whole time around the 
park at the time the crime occurred. They were led to believe that the investigator was 
receiving their written statements (both individual and then collective) once they 
clicked submit.  
The participants were not primed with any information the investigator would 
be looking for in their statements, therefore they were not told that the investigator 
would be specifically examining their statements for details that could be verified. To 
motivate participants to perform well during the experiment, they were told that if 
they were believed by the investigator they would each receive £10. However, if they 
were not believed they would receive no money and would be required to write a 
further statement about their whereabouts and activities at the time the crime took 
place. To ensure that the experiment was ethical and equal for all participants, the 
experimenter told them at the end of the experiment that the investigator believed they 
were telling the truth, and so all participants were paid £10.  
Following participation, a post-questioning questionnaire was completed 
individually and at this stage all participants were instructed to be truthful about their 
experience of writing the statements and the strategies they had employed. In this 
questionnaire, participants were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale from [1] not at 
all motivated to [7] extremely motivated, the extent to which they felt motivated to 
appear convincing during questioning. They were also asked to rate their confidence 
in receiving £10 and their confidence about whether or not they would have to write a 
further statement (both on 7-point Likert scales from [1] none at all to [7] very likely). 
Additionally, participants were asked to rate on 7-point Likert scales (ranging from [1] 
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easy to do to [7] difficult to do) the extent to which they found writing their individual 
statement and the collective statement easy or difficult to do. Finally, to explore how 
honest participants were in their statements, they rated on scales from 0% to 100% 
with 10% intervals the extent to which they had told the truth during the individual 
statement and then the collective statement.  
In the post-questioning questionnaire, all participants were asked to report any 
strategies they employed when completing both the individual and collective 
statements. This was to determine whether they reported consciously writing or 
avoiding details that could be verified. Additionally, in order to make sure there were 
no significant confounding differences between the truth-telling pairs and lying pairs, 
all pairs were asked about their knowledge of the park and how they perceived their 
friendship with their study partner (see Section 5.3.1).  
Once the post-questioning questionnaire was completed by both members of 
the pair, they were each given a debriefing form and the opportunity to ask the 
experimenter questions. Approximately 50% of participants asked the experimenter 
further questions, such as “Why are you conducting this study?”, “What do you hope 
to find out from this study?”, and “Is it possible to obtain a copy of the results of this 
study?”  
5.3.4 Coding the verifiability of the statements 
The statements were coded by a rater who was blind to the hypotheses and 
veracity status of the pairs. The three main dependent variables (checkable details 
(pair together), checkable details (other), uncheckable details) were coded for each of 
the individual statements and the collective statement separately. The two individual 
statements of each pair were then compared and duplicates of checkable or 
uncheckable details were removed allowing for one total score from the two 
individual statements to be calculated for each variable. This meant that each pair 
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obtained two total frequency scores for each of the three verifiable variables, one 
score from the individual statements and one score from the collective statement. 
Consequently, suspects and alibis were not compared within these analyses (however 
this comparison was made in other analyses). 
Checkable details (pair together) was the number of details provided by the 
participant(s) that could be checked and demonstrated the pair were together at the 
time of the crime (e.g. “We bumped into our tutor Anne and spoke to her for a bit” or 
“There was CCTV in Guildhall square that would have picked us up”).   
Checkable details (other) was the number of details provided by the 
participant(s) that could be checked but did not necessarily demonstrate that the pair 
were together at the time of the crime. For example, providing details that support one 
member of the pair was at the park but not necessarily the other (e.g. “The park 
warden was feeding the animals whilst I was there…He saw me writing down the 
animals on my answer sheet” or “I saw a park warden and he asked me what I was 
doing”).  
Uncheckable details was the number of details provided by the participant(s) 
that could not be checked (e.g. “We spent two whole minutes staring at the guinea 
pigs before moving on” or “There were no children in the play area when we walked 
past”).  
Each type of detail was converted into a percentage by dividing each type of 
verifiable detail by the total number of all three types of verifiable details. For 
example: Percentage of checkable details (pair together) = total checkable details (pair 
together) / {total checkable details (pair together) + total checkable details (other) + 
total uncheckable details}. A relative measurement was used in the analyses as 
opposed to the total numbers because practitioners typically prefer such measurements 
plus the author wanted to take into account the overall number of details being 
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provided within the statement because truth-telling pairs did provide significantly 
more details overall in their statements compared to lying pairs (p = .002).  
A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs, 
coded the individual and collective statements collected from 16 pairs for the total 
number of times each of the three verifiable variables occurred. Intra-class correlation 
coefficients (ICCs) were then calculated between the two individual raters. The inter-
rater reliability between the two coders was very good for both the individual and 
collective statements with each of the ICCs demonstrating strong agreement between 
the two raters (checkable details (pair together): ICCs = .82 and .91; checkable details 
(other): ICCs = .88 and .89; and uncheckable details: ICCs = .90 and .82).  
5.3.5 Coding for consistency and memory distortions 
The collective statement was compared with each of the individual statements 
provided by each pair, and coded by a rater who was blind to the hypotheses and 
veracity status of the pairs. They were compared and coded in terms of two 
consistency variables (repetitions and contradictions) and two memory distortions 
(omission errors and commission errors), and each of the four variables were broken 
down into the three verifiable categories resulting in six consistency variables and six 
memory distortions in total. 
Repetitions were the total number of details provided in both the collective 
statement and in the individual statement. Contradictions were the total number of 
details provided in the collective statement that conflicted with details provided in the 
individual statement. Omission errors were the total number of details provided in the 
individual statement, but were then not included in the collective statement. 
Commission errors were the total number of details provided in the collective 
statement that were not previously included in the individual statement.  All four 
variables were divided into three type of details: Those details that can be checked and 
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demonstrate the pair were together at the time of the crime (checkable details (pair 
together)); those details that can be checked but do not necessarily demonstrate the 
pair were together at the time of the crime (checkable details (other)); and those 
details that cannot be checked (uncheckable details). 
To summarise, this meant that each individual of each pair obtained 12 
frequency scores in total: Three for repetitions, three for contradictions, three for 
omission errors and three for commission errors. Consequently, as well as truth-tellers 
and liars being compared in the analyses, suspects and alibis were also compared 
within these analyses. 
A second coder, also blind to the hypotheses and veracity status of the pairs, 
coded 16 of the 46 transcripts for the total number of times each of the 12 dependent 
variables occurred. Intra-class correlation coefficients (ICCs) were then calculated 
between the two individual raters. The inter-rater reliability between the two coders 
was very good with each of the ICCs demonstrating good agreement between the two 
raters (see Table 5.1). However, the ICCs for the contradiction variables could not be 
calculated because contradictions did not occur often within the data and therefore 
there was very little variation (i.e. the majority of the data recorded for contradictions 
was zero). As a result, agreement between raters for the three contradiction variables 
was measured using percentages. The percentages showed very good agreement 
between raters
2
 (see Table 5.1).  
 
 
 
                                                             
2
 Initially, contradictions were measured and coded. However, they did not occur 
often enough to be included in the analyses. Therefore, the three types of verifiable 
details in terms of contradictions were not analysed in the results section (Section 5.4). 
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Table 5.1 
The intra-class correlation coefficients (or percentage of agreement) for each of the 
consistency variables and the memory distortion variables.  
Type of 
variable 
 Verifiable category ICC Percentage 
Consistency  Repetitions  
Repetitions 
Repetitions 
Contradictions 
Contradictions 
Contradictions 
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
Uncheckable 
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
Uncheckable 
.92 
.84 
.90 
 
 
 
96.9% 
96.9% 
93.8% 
Memory 
distortions 
Omission errors 
Omission errors 
Omission errors 
Commission errors 
Commission errors 
Commission errors 
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
Uncheckable 
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
Uncheckable 
.90 
.83 
.91 
.87 
.81 
.88 
 
 
 
 
5.3.6 Coding of strategies 
The strategies participants reported to have employed during the writing of 
their statements were coded in terms of whether they mentioned trying to include 
details that could be verified. Therefore, if participants mentioned providing details 
that could be checked, e.g. “I purposefully included details in my statements that the 
investigator would be able to check” or “I focused on including details in my 
statement that the investigator could use to prove I was telling the truth”, then they 
were given a score of 1 for the checkable details category. If they did not mention 
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such a strategy, they were given a score of 0. Similarly, if participants mentioned 
providing details that could not be checked, e.g. “I provided details, such as my 
feelings, because then my partner wouldn’t mention these even if they were with me 
and the investigator cannot prove whether I had those feelings or not” or “I 
intentionally provided general details about the park that would be true regardless of 
when I went there”, then they were given a score of 1 for the uncheckable details 
category. If they did not mention such a strategy, they were given a score of 0. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Pre-questioning questionnaire 
Preparation time was offered to all participants. However, only 12 truth-telling 
pairs compared to all 29 lying pairs chose to prepare prior to writing their statements. 
A 2 (Veracity: truth vs. lie) x 2 (Status: suspect vs. alibi) between-subjects 
MANOVA was conducted to examine if there were any significant differences 
between truth-tellers and liars in terms of (i) how they rated their preparation 
discussion prior to writing their statements and (ii) how much they discussed with 
their partner what to include in their written statements. The MANOVA revealed a 
significant multivariate main effect for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .74, F(5, 62) = 4.39, p = 
.002, ηp
2
 = .26, but no significant multivariate main effect was obtained for Status, 
Wilks’ λ = .97, F(5, 62) = .46, p = .808, ηp
2
 = .04, or the Veracity X Status interaction, 
Wilks’ λ = .94, F(5, 62) = .73, p = .604, ηp
2
 = .06. Significant univariate main effects 
for Veracity were obtained with liars rating the preparation discussion as significantly 
more useful and more sufficient than truth-tellers.  Liars also reported discussing with 
their partner about what to write in their statements significantly more thoroughly than 
truth-tellers. No significant differences were found between truth-tellers and liars in 
terms of how they rated their preparation discussion for thoroughness or quality (see 
Table 5.2). 
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Table 5.2 
Veracity main effects obtained from the pre- and post-questioning questionnaires. 
Variable Truth-tellers  
Mean (SD) 95% CI 
Liars 
Mean (SD) 95%CI 
F p  d 
Pre-questioning questionnaire  
Usefulness 
Sufficiency 
Thoroughness 
Quality 
Discussion 
 
4.92 (2.15) 4.23 – 5.60 
4.75 (2.09) 4.00 – 5.50  
5.33 (2.35) 4.59 – 6.08 
5.25 (2.26) 4.55 – 5.95  
4.42 (2.19) 3.59 – 5.24 
 
6.19 (.87) 5.88 – 6.50 
5.60 (1.06) 5.26 – 5.94 
5.65 (.95) 5.32 – 6.00 
5.81 (.85) 5.49 – 6.13  
5.53 (1.22) 5.16 – 5.91  
 
11.40 
4.30 
.61 
2.14 
6.10 
 
.001*** 
.042* 
.437 
.148 
.016* 
 
.77 
.51 
.18 
.33 
.63 
Post-questioning questionnaire 
Motivation 
Confidence: £10 
Confidence: Writing statement 
Difficulty: Individual statement 
Difficulty: Collective statement 
Truthfulness: Individual statement 
Truthfulness: Collective statement 
 
5.27 (1.70) 4.92 – 5.61  
6.37 (.74) 6.09 – 6.65  
2.37 (1.38) 2.00 – 2.73 
2.58 (1.71) 2.13 – 3.03 
2.38 (1.44) 1.97 – 2.80 
100% (.00) 97.68 – 102.32 
100% (.00) 96.23 – 103.77 
 
6.16 (.87) 5.80 – 6.51 
4.93 (1.37) 4.64 – 5.22 
3.71 (1.50) 3.33 – 4.08 
3.33 (1.79) 2.87 – 3.78  
3.55 (1.79) 3.13 – 3.98 
38.45% (39.86) 36.09 – 40.81 
34.14% (33.93) 30.31 – 37.97 
 
12.64 
50.04 
25.75 
5.30 
15.14 
1359.04 
590.03 
 
.001*** 
<.001**** 
<.001**** 
.023* 
<.001**** 
<.001**** 
<.001**** 
 
.66 
1.31 
.93 
.43 
.72 
2.18 
2.75 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005; ****p < .001 
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5.4.2 Post-questioning questionnaire: Motivation, manipulation checks, and 
writing statements 
The vast majority of participants indicated that they were motivated to appear 
convincing during the interview, with 85.6% of the sample scoring 5 or higher on the 
7-point Likert scale.  
A 2 (Veracity: truth vs. lie) x 2 (Status: suspect vs. alibi) between-subjects 
MANOVA was conducted to investigate whether there were any significant 
differences between truth-tellers and liars in terms of motivation, confidence, how 
difficult they found writing the individual and collective statements, and how much 
they told the truth on both the individual and collective statements. The MANOVA 
revealed significant multivariate main effects for Veracity, Wilks’ λ = .07, F(7, 108) = 
214.09, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .93, Status, Wilks’ λ = .18, F(7, 108) = 72.57, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.83, and the Veracity X Status interaction, Wilks’ λ = .17, F(7, 108) = 76.78, p < .001, 
ηp
2
 = .83. As shown in Table 5.2, significant univariate main effects for Veracity were 
obtained with liars reporting significantly more motivation to appear convincing than 
truth-tellers. In terms of confidence, truth-tellers reported that they were more 
confident than liars that they would receive £10 and not have to write a further 
statement. Furthermore, liars found writing both the individual statement and the 
collective statement significantly more difficult than truth-tellers. Finally, on both the 
individual statement and collective statement, truth-tellers reported staying closer to 
the truth than liars (see Table 5.2).  
Significant univariate main effects for Status were also obtained with the alibi 
witnesses telling the truth significantly more on the individual (M = 88.14%, SD = 
17.17, 95% CI [85.59, 90.27]) and collective statements (M = 80.68%, SD = 25.11, 
95% CI [76.55, 84.14]) compared to the suspects (M = 51.36%, SD = 50.05, 95% CI 
[48.18, 52.86], M = 54.58%, SD = 48.58, 95% CI [50.00, 57.59], respectively) (F-
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values ranged from 95.89 to 502.13; all p-values = < .001). All other univariate main 
effects for Status were not significant (F-values ranged from .53 to 1.15; p-values 
ranged from .287 to .469). Additionally, there were only significant univariate effects 
for the Status X Veracity interaction for the extent to which the pair told the truth on 
both the individual and collective statements (F-values ranged from 95.89 to 502.13; 
all p-values = < .001). A simple main effects analysis demonstrated that in the 
individual statements of the lying pairs, the alibi witnesses stayed significantly closer 
to the truth (M = 75.86%, SD = 17.43, 95% CI [72.53, 79.20]) than the suspects (M = 
1.03%, SD = 5.57, 95% CI [-2.30, 4.37]), F(1, 114) = 987.52, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .90, d = 
5.78. A similar pattern was obtained for the collective statements with the alibi 
witnesses of the lying pairs staying significantly closer to the truth (M = 60.69%, SD = 
22.19, 95% CI [55.27, 66.11]) than the suspects (M = 7.59%, SD = 19.76, 95% CI 
[2.17, 13.00]), F(1, 114) = 188.59, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .62, d = 2.53. No significant effect 
of Status was found with regard to the extent that the truth-tellers stayed close to the 
truth in the individual and collective statements (all p-values = 1.00).  
5.4.3 Hypotheses testing: Percentage of (un)verifiable details  
Three two-way mixed ANOVAs were conducted. The first 2 x 2 mixed design 
ANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth versus lie) as the between-subjects 
factor, Statement (individual versus collective) as the within-subjects factor, and 
percentage of checkable details (pair together) as the dependent variable. The 
ANOVA revealed that truth-telling pairs provided a significantly higher percentage of 
checkable details (pair together) (M = .32, SD = .14, 95% CI [.29, .38]) than lying 
pairs (M = .15, SD = .11, 95% CI [.10, .20]), F(1, 57) = 28.25, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .33, d = 
1.38. Furthermore, a significantly higher percentage of checkable details (pair 
together) were provided in the collective statement (M = .28, SD = .23, 95% CI [.23, 
.33]) compared to the individual statement (M = .20, SD = .15, 95% CI [.17, .24]), 
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F(1, 57) = 10.32, p = .002, ηp
2 
= .15, d = .41. A significant Statement X Veracity 
interaction effect was obtained for checkable details (pair together), F(1, 57) = 7.20, p 
= .010, ηp
2 
= .11. A simple main effects analysis demonstrated that the collective 
statement led to a significantly higher percentage of checkable details (pair together) 
(M = .41, SD = .22, 95% CI [.34, .48]) than the individual statements (M = .27, SD = 
.16, 95% CI [.21, .31]) for pairs of truth-tellers, Wilks’ λ = .76, F (1, 57) = 17.67, p < 
.001, ηp
2
 = .24, d = .73, but no difference was found between the individual statements 
(M = .14, SD = .11, 95% CI [.09, .19]) and the collective statement (M = .16, SD = 
.15, 95% CI [.09, .23]) for pairs of liars, Wilks’ λ = .99, F(1, 57) = .14, p = .712,      
ηp
2
 < .01, d = .15. These findings provide support for Hypotheses 1 and 3. 
The second 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth 
versus lie) as the between-subjects factor, Statement (individual versus collective) as 
the within-subjects factor, and percentage of checkable details (other) as the 
dependent variable. The ANOVA revealed that there was no significant difference 
between truth-telling pairs (M = .32, SD = .10, 95% CI [.25, .37]) and lying pairs (M = 
.26, SD = .22, 95% CI [.19, .31]) in terms of the percentage of checkable details 
(other) provided, F(1, 57) = 2.44, p = .124, ηp
2 
= .04, d = .42. There was also no 
significant difference between the individual and collective statements in terms of 
percentage of checkable details (other) (p = .082) nor was there a significant 
Statement X Veracity interaction effect (p = .536).  
The third 2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth 
versus lie) as the between-subjects factor, Statement (individual versus collective) as 
the within-subjects factor, and percentage of uncheckable details as the dependent 
variable. The ANOVA revealed that lying pairs provided a significantly higher 
percentage of uncheckable details (M = .59, SD = .20, 95% CI [.52, .65]) compared to 
truth-telling pairs (M = .36, SD = .10, 95% CI [.29, .42]), F(1, 57) = 26.12, p < .001, 
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ηp
2 
= .31, d = 1.29. There was no significant difference between the individual and 
collective statements in terms of percentage of uncheckable details (p = .087) nor was 
there a significant Statement X Veracity interaction effect (p = .217). These findings 
support Hypothesis 2.  
Discriminant analyses were conducted on each of the significant dependent 
variables separately to investigate the nature of their relationship with Veracity in the 
individual and collective statements. The individual discriminant analyses revealed 
that checkable details (pair together) and uncheckable details were individually 
significant predictors of Veracity in the individual statements and also in the collective 
statements (see Table 5.3). The cross-validated classification results support the first 
ANOVA above by demonstrating that checkable details (pair together) was a better 
predictor of Veracity in the collective statement compared to the individual 
statements. In fact,  the cross-validated classification results obtained from the 
discriminant analyses reveal that checkable details (pair together) and uncheckable 
details were better predictors of Veracity in the collective statement compared to the 
individual statements, with 78% and 86.4% of truth-tellers and liars being classified 
correctly based on these variables (see Table 5.3). 
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Table 5.3 
Classification results of Veracity for each of the significant dependent variables in the individual and the collective statements. 
Statement  Type of verifiable detail 
(percentages) 
Chi-square Wilks’ lambda  
(p-value) 
Total percentage  
of cases correctly 
classified 
Percentage of 
truth-tellers 
correctly 
classified 
Percentage of 
liars correctly 
classified 
Individual Checkable details (pair together) 10.30 .83 (.001) 62.7% 60.0% 65.5% 
 Uncheckable details  20.22 .70 (<.001) 79.7% 76.7% 82.8% 
Collective Checkable details (pair together) 21.37 .69 (<.001) 78.0% 73.3% 82.8% 
 Uncheckable details  16.37 .75 (<.001) 86.4% 93.3% 79.3% 
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5.4.4 Hypotheses testing: Applying the verifiability approach to memory 
consistency and memory distortions 
A 2 x 2 between-subjects MANOVA was conducted with Veracity (truth 
versus lie) as the first between-subjects factor, Status (suspect versus alibi) as the 
second between-subjects factor, and total number of repetitions, total number of 
omission errors and total number of commission errors each divided into checkable 
details (pair together), checkable details (other) and uncheckable details as the 
dependent variables. The MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate main effect 
for Veracity only, Wilks’ λ = .45, F(9, 106) = 14.64, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .55. Significant 
univariate main effects for Veracity were obtained for two of the consistency variables 
and four of the memory distortion variables. Truth-tellers repeated significantly more 
checkable details (pair together) in comparison to liars, whereas liars repeated 
significantly more uncheckable details compared to truth-tellers. Additionally, truth-
tellers omitted and committed more errors in terms of both checkable details (pair 
together) and checkable details (other) (see Table 5.4). These findings support 
Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
No significant univariate main effects for Status were found (F-values ranged 
from .07 to 2.80; p-values ranged from .097 to .793) nor were there any significant 
univariate Veracity X Status interaction effects (F-values ranged from .05 to 3.87; p-
values ranged from .052 to .832). 
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Table 5.4 
Veracity main effects obtained for the consistency and memory distortion variables. 
Type of variable Truth-tellers  
Mean (SD) 95% CI 
Liars 
Mean (SD) 95% CI 
F  p d 
Consistency Repetitions:  
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
Uncheckable  
 
1.92 (2.27) 1.45 – 2.38 
1.38 (1.68) .98 – 1.79 
1.25 (1.61) .77 – 1.73 
 
.90 (1.15) .42 – 1.37 
1.22 (1.44) .81 – 1.63 
2.50 (2.11) 2.01 – 2.99 
 
9.22 
.30 
12.91 
 
.003** 
.585 
<.001*** 
 
.57 
.10 
.67 
Memory Distortion Omission Errors: 
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
Uncheckable 
 
1.35 (1.54) 1.03 – 1.67 
2.30 (2.62) 1.78 – 2.82 
2.88 (3.25) 2.06 – 3.71 
 
.59 (.80) .26 – .91  
1.24 (1.27) .71 – 1.77 
3.60 (3.29) 2.76 – 4.45 
 
11.20 
8.01 
1.46 
 
.001** 
.005* 
.299 
 
.62 
.51 
.22 
Memory Distortion Commission Errors: 
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
Uncheckable 
 
3.02 (2.38) 2.56 – 3.47 
2.25 (2.83) 1.70 – 2.80 
2.72 (2.99) 2.07 – 3.37 
 
.45 (.71) -.02 – .91 
.71 (.96) .15 – 1.27 
2.19 (1.91) 1.53 – 2.85 
 
61.15 
15.27 
1.27 
 
<.001*** 
<.001*** 
.262 
 
1.46 
.73 
.21 
*p < .01; **p < .005; ***p < .001 
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Discriminant analyses were separately conducted on each of the two 
significant consistency variables and the four significant memory distortion variables 
to investigate the nature of their relationship with Veracity. The individual 
discriminant analyses revealed that all six variables were individually significant 
predictors of Veracity (see Table 5.5). The cross-validated classification results reveal 
that overall the memory distortion variables were better predictors of Veracity than the 
consistency variables. Commission errors: checkable details (pair together) in 
particular was a diagnostic cue to deceit with 80.5% of truth-tellers and liars classified 
correctly based on this variable (see Table 5.5). The findings that commission errors: 
checkable details (pair together) is a particularly significant predictor of Veracity 
supports the previous discriminant analysis (see Table 5.3), which demonstrated that 
checkable details (pair together) was a better predictor of Veracity in the collective 
statements compared to the individual statements, because it shows that a significant 
number of checkable details (pair together) were added in-between the individual and 
collective statements.  
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Table 5.5 
Classification results of Veracity for each of the significant consistency variables and memory distortion variables. 
Type of variable Chi-
square 
Wilks’ lambda  
(significance) 
Total percentage of 
cases correctly 
classified 
Percentage of 
truth-tellers 
correctly classified 
Percentage of 
liars correctly 
classified 
Consistency Repetitions:  
Checkable (pair together) 
Uncheckable  
 
8.97 
12.37 
 
.93 (.003) 
.90 (<.001) 
 
61.0% 
66.1% 
 
46.7% 
73.3% 
 
75.9% 
58.6% 
Memory Distortion Omission Errors: 
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
 
10.79 
7.43 
 
.91 (.001) 
.94 (.006) 
 
57.6% 
58.5% 
 
60.0% 
51.7% 
 
55.2% 
65.5% 
Memory Distortion Commission Errors: 
Checkable (pair together) 
Checkable (other) 
 
49.53 
14.49 
 
.65 (<.001) 
.88 (<.001) 
 
80.5% 
63.6% 
 
73.3% 
45.0% 
 
87.9% 
82.8% 
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5.4.5 Strategies used by truth-tellers and liars 
All pairs were questioned about the strategies they used during the writing of 
their individual and collective statements. Only 8.33% of truth-tellers reported 
employing a strategy when writing their individual statements, compared to 75.86% of 
liars, and only 16.67% of truth-tellers reported employing a strategy when writing 
their collective statements, compared to 68.97% of liars. 
To investigate whether truth-tellers were intentionally mentioning checkable 
details and whether liars were intentionally mentioning uncheckable details, the 
strategies reported to have been used by each of the groups were explored. None of 
the truth-tellers or the liars in the current study referred to using checkable details as 
part of their strategy to prove their innocence. That is, truth-tellers were automatically 
providing details that could be checked within their statements. However, whilst not 
explicitly referring to uncheckable details as part of their strategy, 15.52% of liars did 
refer to including details that their partner would not mention even if they had been 
present with them in the park, e.g. internal feelings, such as feeling happy, and 
24.14% of liars referred to including general details that would apply regardless of 
when they attended the park, e.g. seeing children in the play area. Truth-tellers never 
reported such strategies. This suggests that liars were, to some extent, thinking about 
how to include details that could not be checked. 
5.5 Discussion 
The overall aim of the current study was to apply the verifiability approach 
and the social phenomenon of human memory to the detection of deception in alibi 
witness situations. In support of Hypothesis 1, truth-telling pairs, compared to lying 
pairs, included a higher percentage of checkable details that demonstrated the pair 
were together in both the individual and collective statements. The fact that truth-
telling pairs provided more checkable details that demonstrated they were together 
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supports previous studies which applied the verifiability approach to the detection of 
deception (e.g. Nahari & Vrij 2014; Nahari et al., 2014a, 2014b). Furthermore, and in 
support of Hypothesis 2, lying pairs, compared to truth-telling pairs, included a higher 
percentage of uncheckable details in both their individual and collective statements. 
This finding adds to the current literature that is emerging around the verifiability 
approach by identifying that lying pairs provide significantly more uncheckable 
details than truth-telling pairs. Based on the strategies that liars reported to have 
employed in the study by Nahari et al. (2012), this finding was expected: Liars do 
want to give an honest impression by providing a high number of details, but they also 
want to avoid providing details to the investigator that reveal their lies. Consequently, 
they provide a lot of details, but focus on those that cannot be verified. As expected, 
no differences were found between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars in terms of 
the percentage of checkable details they included that did not necessarily demonstrate 
the pair were together. This last finding can be explained by the fact that lying pairs 
did have one person complete the mission around the park meaning that they could 
provide some checkable details but only those that could demonstrate one member of 
the pair was in the park, not both. Providing checkable details that demonstrated one 
member of the pair was in the park was also something that each of the truth-tellers 
could do.  
The only significant difference between the individual and collective 
statements in terms of checkable or uncheckable details was the percentage of 
checkable details that demonstrated the pair were together, which increased between 
the individual and collective statements, but only for truth-telling pairs. Thus, 
providing support for Hypothesis 3. 
Based on the differences in the percentages of checkable details that 
demonstrate the pair were together and the differences in the percentages of 
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uncheckable details, the cross-validated classification results revealed that checkable 
details (pair together) and uncheckable details were better predictors of veracity in the 
collective statement, with 78% and 86.4% of truth-tellers and liars being classified 
correctly based on these variables, compared to the individual statement where only 
62.7% and 79.7%, of truth-tellers and liars were classified correctly. This suggests that 
the collective statement can enhance the differences between truth-tellers and liars by 
making it easier for truth-tellers to demonstrate they were together and provide shared 
verifiable details. However, given that both checkable details that demonstrate the pair 
were together and uncheckable details were significant predictors of veracity, 
regardless of statement type, demonstrates the high utility and applicability of the 
verifiability approach to both individual and collective statements. 
The cross-validated classification result obtained in the current study for total 
checkable details that demonstrated the pair were together in the collective statement 
(78% overall accuracy) was slightly less than the figure obtained in the study by 
Nahari and Vrij (2014) (88% overall accuracy). This difference in the accuracy rates is 
likely to be because participants in the current study were not instructed to include 
verifiable details in their statements, whereas the participants in the study by Nahari 
and Vrij (2014) were. Although the accuracy rates of the current study are still high 
and show that just by instructing pairs to prove their own or their friend’s innocence 
automatically leads to truth-telling pairs providing checkable details that demonstrate 
they were together, it does suggest that the accuracy rates and differences between 
truth-tellers and liars could be enhanced by informing them that the investigator will 
be reading their statements to look for those details that can be checked. Informing 
participants to think about verifiable details will encourage truth-tellers to provide 
more, but not liars, making the difference between the two groups more pronounced 
(Nahari et al., 2014b). This idea can be empirically tested in future studies by having 
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an experimental design whereby the experimenter implements ‘informing participants 
to include verifiable details’ versus ‘not informing participants to include verifiable 
details’ as a factor. 
Finally, the cross-validated classification results do conflict with the findings 
obtained by Nahari et al. (2014a) because they could not classify truth-tellers and liars 
above chance level based on unverifiable details alone; whereas the present study did. 
This difference may be due to Nahari et al. (2014a) having a lack of statistical power 
(sample size was only 38 participants), or because their study used individual 
participants as opposed to the current study which used pairs of participants. Again, 
this idea can be empirically tested in the future by implementing individuals versus 
pairs as a factor in the experimental design. 
In support of Hypothesis 4, liars repeated significantly more uncheckable 
details between the individual and collective statements compared to truth-tellers. 
Additionally, and in support of Hypothesis 5, truth-tellers, in comparison to liars, 
exhibited more memory distortions by omitting and committing significantly more 
checkable details demonstrating that they were with their partner between the 
individual and collective statements. The findings that liars repeat whereas truth-
tellers reconstruct by exhibiting more omission and commission errors supports 
reconstructive memory theory (Bartlett, 1932) and the ‘repeat versus reconstruct’ 
hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). That is, truth-tellers reconstruct the 
information they recall over time, whereas liars repeat information over time. These 
findings further demonstrate that although the ‘repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis’ 
(Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) was originally developed to measure the consistency 
between two statements from the same interviewee (within-subjects), it can also 
measure consistency between an individual statement and a collective statement 
whereby the same individual is still contributing. Truth-tellers recall information 
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exactly as they remember it and because they have ‘nothing to hide’ this leads to them 
automatically providing details that can be checked and demonstrate they were 
together, but because they are also reconstructing the information, they make more 
errors in-between the statements and these errors reflect those types of details that can 
be checked. Collective recall is more challenging for lying pairs than truth-telling 
pairs because they did not actually share the event they are attempting to recall. 
Instead, they are merely repeating information they have previously pre-planned 
together (Strömwall, Granhag & Jonsson, 2003; Vrij et al., 2010). Since they are 
employing a ‘keep it simple’ strategy and not wanting to provide details that the 
investigator can use to disprove their story (Nahari et al., 2012), their repetitions 
reflect details that cannot be checked. The current study demonstrated that the truth-
tellers were not consciously employing a strategy to include more checkable details, 
whereas some of the liars reported, to some extent, intentionally including 
unverifiable details.  
The cross-validated classification results revealed that Commission errors: 
checkable details (pair together) in particular was very successful in classifying both 
truth-tellers (73.3%) and liars (87.9%) correctly (80.5% overall accuracy). This 
demonstrates the benefit of including both an individual and a collective statement 
within the investigation, as a comparison of the two types of statement enable new 
cues to deceit to emerge. The findings also support the idea that working together 
gives the pair the opportunity to provide a more convincing alibi in which they can 
share their memories and provide even more checkable details that demonstrate they 
were together than if they were working alone on individual statements.   
5.5.1 Limitation of the verifiability approach 
The current study demonstrates that applying the verifiability approach to the 
detection of deception does make the task of lying especially difficult. However, it 
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must be noted that the approach cannot be used all the time, e.g., for; (i) non-recent 
cases, such as historical child sexual abuse, whereby there is very rarely any details 
that can be verified, and (ii) truth-tellers (innocent people) who cannot provide 
verifiable details. Innocent people may not have an alibi witness (e.g. the “alone at 
home” alibi), or they may not remember exactly where they were or what they were 
doing at the time of the crime. Nevertheless, a person’s location can be traced by their 
mobile phone, social networking accounts, etc. People are increasingly possessing and 
using such devices and technologies; thus the “alone at home” poor alibi is becoming 
increasingly rare (Vrij & Nahari, 2014). As a result, even if there is no alibi witness, it 
is unlikely that someone will go a long period of time without using their phone or 
social networking sites, and consequently activities using such technologies can be 
traced. Hence, details can be verified to some extent (just not necessarily in the case of 
historical crimes).  
5.5.2 Practical implications 
The verifiability approach can act as an alternative verbal technique to lie 
detection and has many advantages over CBCA and RM. For example, CBCA and 
RM state that liars lack the imagination to create details that give an honest impression 
(Sporer, 2004). The verifiability approach should remain effective even if liars have a 
rich imagination because, unless the ‘imagined’ details can be verified, they will not 
sound convincing to an investigator applying such an approach (Nahari et al., 2014a). 
Additionally, liars might realise that CBCA and RM investigators are measuring 
credibility and as a result include details that sound more convincing. For example, 
liars may learn that including a number of cognitive and motivational factors, such as 
‘details of interactions’, ‘unusual details’, ‘admitting lack of memory’, or ‘details 
involving self-deprecation’ are indicative of genuine experiences according to CBCA 
and therefore by preparing a statement that includes a high number of such details, the 
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liars know they are more likely to be believed. However, these types of details will 
have no merit with the verifiability approach unless they can be proven to be true.  
Although the current study was a laboratory study with a mock crime, the 
verifiability approach is likely to be stronger in real life. First, practitioners prefer 
relative measures, e.g. percentages or ratios, as they control for individual differences 
in verbal responses (Nahari et al., 2014a), and when such measures are used for the 
verifiability approach high classification rates are obtained. Second, the verifiability 
approach exploits the differing strategies used by truth-tellers and liars (truth-tellers 
are automatically able and more willing to provide details that can be checked, 
whereas liars are not) and this can be applied even if the investigator does not have 
much evidence. Therefore, this approach complements other investigative techniques 
that exploit the strategies employed by truth-tellers and liars, such as the strategic use 
of evidence (SUE; Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall & Kronkvist, 2006).  
5.5.3 Conclusion 
 The current study adds to the validity of the verifiability approach, 
demonstrating that it can be applied to alibi witness situations. Truth-telling pairs 
provide significantly more checkable details that demonstrate they were together, 
whereas lying pairs provide significantly more uncheckable details. This is the case 
even when the pairs are not informed that the investigator will be applying the 
verifiability approach to their statements.  
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6.1 General Discussion Outline 
This general discussion first summarises the main findings of the thesis, 
highlighting the social indictors of deceit that emerged when a collective interviewing 
approach was applied to deception detection (see Section 6.2). A summary table of the 
variables measured within each chapter is provided (see Table 6.1). Next, the 
theoretical implications are discussed focusing on deception theory, memory theory 
and group processes (see Section 6.3), followed by the practical implications which 
focus on sham marriages, alibi witness situations, and the utility of security equipment 
(see Section 6.4). The methodological issues are then considered (see Section 6.5). 
Ideas for further research are suggested throughout, but an overview of future research 
is also provided (see Section 6.6), before the thesis is concluded (see Section 6.7). 
6.2 Overview of Main Findings 
Deception detection research has primarily focused on interviewing 
individuals despite the fact that crimes are frequently committed by pairs of, or groups 
of, offenders. The deception occurring within groups and the novel cues to deceit that 
may arise from interviewing groups has been ignored within the deception literature, 
and therefore the main aim of this thesis was to examine collective interviewing as a 
technique to improve the detection of deception. Collective interviewing involves 
interviewing multiple interviewees simultaneously. The studies conducted within this 
thesis focused on pairs of interviewees and explored: (a) the potential of using a 
collective interviewing approach to aid the detection of deception and elicit new cues 
to deceit; (b) whether lie catchers would be able to easily recognise and learn the new 
cues arising from employing a collective approach; and (c) whether collective 
interviewing could be applied to real-life contexts and therefore benefit professionals 
involved in citizen security. 
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 Chapter 2 examines the application of a collective interviewing approach to a 
police-style interview setting whereby pairs of friends were interviewed together. The 
interview protocol involved repeated questioning of both general and spatial interview 
questions. Overall, truth-telling pairs provided significantly more details than lying 
pairs, which supports previous research that applies an individual interviewing 
approach (e.g. DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Granhag & Porter, 2010). 
However, no significant differences were found between pairs of truth-tellers and 
pairs of liars with regard to repetitions, omission errors, commission errors, 
contradictions and dominance on both the general and spatial interview questions. 
This was unexpected because the lack of differences between pairs of truth-tellers and 
pairs of liars across questioning conflicts with memory theories, such as reconstructive 
memory (Bartlett, 1932), and  previous deception literature, such as the ‘repeat vs. 
reconstruct’ hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). The lack of findings obtained 
in this experiment could be a consequence of the interview protocol used not eliciting 
the necessary differences in veracity between pairs. Therefore, the experiments in the 
remaining chapters of this thesis introduced different interview styles, measured 
dependent variables better associated with group recall, and imposed cognitive load (a 
technique known to magnify the differences between individual truth-tellers and 
individual liars; Vrij, Fisher, Mann & Leal, 2008). 
 Chapter 3 constitutes two experiments whereby cognitive load was imposed in 
a collective interviewing situation by implementing a forced turn-taking technique. 
The first experiment within this chapter applied collective interviewing to an 
immigration-style interview whereby couples were interviewed together about their 
real or fictitious relationship. The experiment demonstrated that the forced turn-taking 
technique elicited key differences between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars. That 
is, truth-telling pairs continued on from one another when forced to turn-take 
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significantly more than lying pairs, whereas lying pairs waited and repeated 
previously said information when forced to turn-take significantly more than truth-
telling pairs. The second experiment within this chapter then shows that these three 
cues – continuations, repetitions, waiting – were easy for lie catchers to detect and 
therefore the accuracy rates obtained for categorising pairs based on veracity were 
high, and in fact amongst the highest obtained in verbal lie detection research. This 
chapter therefore demonstrates that imposing cognitive load in a collective interview 
setting can elicit key differences between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars. 
Chapter 4 leads on from the first experiment in Chapter 3, using the same 
methodology and collective interviewing context (i.e. an immigration-style interview). 
In this chapter, the theory of transactive memory (Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1987) 
is applied and it was revealed that truth-telling pairs posed questions to one another, 
provided cues to one another, handed over remembering responsibility, and finished 
each other’s sentences significantly more than lying pairs. This chapter emphasises the 
importance of joint memory recall in the detection of deception.  
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss a study whereby the pairs were of equal status (i.e. 
they were both trying to prove their innocence and had the same task). Therefore, 
Chapter 4 applies a collective approach to alibi witness situations whereby the pair 
members had differing responsibility and status (i.e. one individual was trying to 
prove his or her own innocence whilst the other individual in the pair was trying to 
prove the innocence of his or her friend). The experiment in Chapter 4 applies the 
verifiability approach (Nahari, Vrij & Fisher, 2014) and the social phenomenon of 
memory (e.g. Baddeley, 1990; Bartlett, 1932; Rajaram, 2011) to the detection of 
deceit in alibi witness scenarios. It was revealed that truth-telling pairs provided 
significantly more details that could be checked compared to lying pairs who provided 
significantly more uncheckable details. The collective statement prompted 
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significantly more checkable details that demonstrated the pair were together, than the 
individual statement, for truth-telling pairs only. Additionally, truth-tellers repeated, 
omitted and committed significantly more checkable details between the individual 
and collective statements, whereas liars only repeated significantly more uncheckable 
details. This chapter contributes further to the verifiability approach and how it can 
facilitate lie detection. Additionally, it shows how such an approach can be used as an 
alternative to other verbal lie detection techniques, such as Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) and Reality Monitoring (RM; Johnson & 
Raye, 1981; Sporer, 2004).  
To summarise, collective interviewing can elicit cues to deceit that are unique 
to interviewing two or more interviewees together at the same time. In particular, 
imposing cognitive load, applying memory theories, and using the verifiability 
approach can all aid the detection of deception in collective interviewing contexts. 
Table 6.1 provides an overview of the current PhD thesis and the cues measured when 
a collective interviewing approach was applied to the detection of deception. 
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Table 6.1 
Overview of the deception cues measured in the current PhD thesis when a collective interviewing approach was implemented. 
Chapter 
Deception cue 
Truth-tellers  
Mean (SD)  
Liars 
Mean (SD)  
F p d 
Chapter 2 
General repetitions  
General omission errors 
General commission errors 
General contradictions 
Spatial repetitions  
Spatial omission errors 
Spatial commission errors 
Spatial contradictions 
 
16.02 (7.74) 
98.96 (67.13) 
32.64 (18.83) 
1.14 (1.68) 
7.79 (5.96) 
28.60 (19.84) 
16.55 (11.13) 
.33 (.58) 
 
9.00 (5.35) 
51.66 (27.67) 
25.45 (21.20) 
.36 (.66) 
5.68 (3.39) 
17.59 (13.21) 
8.77 (5.57) 
.18 (.50) 
 
2.55 
.13 
2.42 
1.24 
2.99 
.03 
2.18 
1.31 
 
.118 
.718 
.128 
.272 
.091 
.872 
.148 
.260 
 
1.06 
.92 
.36 
.61 
.44 
.65 
.88 
.28 
Chapter 3 
Number of swaps 
Continuations per swap 
Repetitions per swap 
Waiting per swap 
 
8.83 (8.00)  
.70 (.35) 
.13 (.14) 
.33 (.27) 
 
9.05 (5.78) 
.43 (.19) 
.52 (.21) 
.71 (.24) 
 
.01 
10.42 
56.95 
24.82 
 
.919 
.002*** 
<.001**** 
<.001**** 
 
.03 
.96 
2.19 
1.49 
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*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .005; ****p < .001 
Chapter 4 
Posing questions to one another 
Providing cues to one another 
Handing over remembering responsibility 
Finishing each other’s sentences 
 
15.83 (10.62) 
3.79 (2.87) 
.63 (.97) 
5.92 (2.95) 
 
9.41 (5.80) 
.91 (1.66) 
.05 (.21) 
1.14 (1.46) 
 
6.32 
16.94 
7.51 
47.22 
 
.016* 
<.001**** 
.009** 
<.001**** 
 
.75 
1.23 
.83 
2.05 
Chapter 5 
Percentage of checkable details (pair together) 
Percentage of checkable details (other) 
Percentage of uncheckable details 
Repetitions: Checkable details (pair together) 
Repetitions: Checkable details (other) 
Repetitions: Uncheckable 
Omission errors: Checkable details (pair together) 
Omission errors: Checkable details (other) 
Omission errors: Uncheckable 
Commission errors: Checkable details (pair together) 
Commission errors: Checkable details (other) 
Commission errors: Uncheckable 
 
.32 (.14) 
.32 (.10) 
.36 (.10) 
1.92 (2.27) 
1.38 (1.68) 
1.25 (1.61) 
1.35 (1.54) 
2.30 (2.62) 
2.88 (3.25) 
3.02 (2.38) 
2.25 (2.83) 
2.72 (2.99) 
 
.15 (.11) 
.26 (.22) 
.59 (.20) 
.90 (1.15) 
1.22 (1.44) 
2.50 (2.11) 
.59 (.80) 
1.24 (1.27) 
3.60 (3.29) 
.45 (.71) 
.71 (.96) 
2.19 (1.91) 
 
28.25 
2.44 
26.12 
9.22 
.30 
12.91 
11.20 
8.01 
1.46 
61.15 
15.27 
1.27 
 
<.001**** 
.124 
<.001**** 
.003*** 
.585 
<.001**** 
.001*** 
.005** 
.299 
<.001**** 
<.001**** 
.262 
 
1.38 
.42 
1.29 
.57 
.10 
.67 
.62 
.51 
.22 
1.46 
.73 
.21 
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6.3 Theoretical Implications 
The main theoretical implications of the findings obtained in this thesis are in 
the areas of deception, memory, and group dynamics. 
6.3.1 Deception theory 
6.3.1.1 Group deceit. Individuals have very much been the focus of lie 
detection research. However, with serious threats to security, and with crimes often 
involving networks or organisations, it is important to develop new techniques that 
enable a distinction to be made between groups of truth-tellers and groups of liars. 
This PhD thesis provides support for previous collective interviewing studies into 
deception (e.g. Driskell, Salas & Driskell, 2012; Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann & Hillman, 
2013; Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al., 2013; Vrij et al., 2012) and shows the potential for 
exploring the social indicators of deceit emerging from groups, as well as the 
individual indicators. Therefore, group interviewing can elicit novel verbal cues, such 
as posing questions to one another and finishing each other’s sentences, which cannot 
emerge during individual interviewing. 
6.3.1.2 Cognitive load. Previous deception research with single suspects has 
shown that ‘imposing cognitive load’ elicits and magnifies the verbal and nonverbal 
cues to deceit (Vrij et al., 2008) because lying is often more mentally taxing than 
truth-telling (Zuckerman, DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1981). Chapter 3 supports the 
cognitive approach theory by showing that implementing a forced turn-taking 
technique as a means of imposing cognitive load makes the task of giving an honest 
impression difficult for lying pairs, but not truth-telling pairs, and as a result new cues 
to deceit emerge that reflect this increased cognitive load. This chapter therefore 
contributes to the growing body of research into the cognitive load approach of 
examining deception (Vrij et al., 2008; Zuckerman, et al., 1981): Not only does 
‘imposing cognitive load’ elicit and magnify the verbal cues to deceit in individual 
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interviewees, but it can also be employed when interviewing pairs. Future research 
should explore alternative techniques for imposing cognitive load when applying a 
collective interviewing approach. For example, adding instructions to the turn-taking 
manipulation and stating that the group members are to switch turns as quickly as 
possible without repeating previous information, or split up sensory details, for 
example, asking one member of the pair to describe visual details of an event, then ask 
the other individual to describe the auditory details, etc. Alternatively, one member of 
the pair could be instructed to recall the story in reverse order whilst the other member 
of the pair recalls the story in chronological order. This could be completed at the 
same time to determine whether they can work inwards to meet in the middle, whilst 
also making their story appear coherent and plausible.  
6.3.1.3 Cue-based approach. This PhD thesis is very much based on the cue-
based approach towards deception detection (see DePaulo et al., 2003 for an overview 
of the cues to deception). This approach focuses on identifying behaviours that 
significantly distinguish between truth-tellers and liars. Examples of such an approach 
include; the four-factor theory of deception consisting of arousal, affects, cognitions 
and attempts to control behaviour (Zuckerman, et al., 1981); Interpersonal Deception 
Theory (Buller & Burgoon, 1996); and cognitive load theory (Vrij et al., 2010). 
Although the cue-based approach continues to be explored within the deception 
detection literature and is becoming increasingly popular amongst lie detection 
researchers as they attempt to develop new techniques that magnify deception cues 
and exploit the strategies used by liars, this approach has not been unchallenged by 
critics. Levine and McCornack (2014), for example, believe that the cue-based 
approach to lie detection should be abandoned because they believe that focusing on 
such an approach will not ever identify reliable cues to deceit and will also never 
obtain accuracy rates any better than chance. I believe this not to be true. Instead, I 
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believe that the cue-based approach is only redundant when referring to the passive 
observation of cues. As shown by the studies completed throughout this PhD thesis, 
when cues are actively measured through the use of appropriate questioning and 
interview techniques, novel and unique cues to deceit, such as communication cues, 
can emerge and these can result in high accuracy rates.  
6.3.2 Importance of memory 
It is widely acknowledged that memory plays an important role in deception 
(Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar & Meijer, 2011; Walczyk, Igou, 
Dixon & Tcholakian, 2013), and that the act of remembering is, at least in part, 
influenced by social dynamics (Halbwachs, 1992; Hirst & Rajaram, 2014). Overall, 
the memory literature tends to focus on individual memory, neglecting the importance 
of collective memory whereby groups of individuals share, remember, and recall 
memories together (also referred to as social memory or collaborative remembering). 
This is despite the fact that the social context of memory has been extensively studied 
for decades (e.g. Barnier & Sutton, 2008; Bartlett, 1932; Blumen, Rajaram & Henkel, 
2013; Edwards & Middleton, 1987; Rajaram, 2011). Nevertheless, recent studies are 
now emphasising the benefits of collective memory. For example, Pociask and 
Rajaram (2014) found that participants were more likely to solve assigned problems 
associated with material they had studied if they were working collaboratively, 
compared to individually. Additionally, Blumen and Stern (2011) demonstrated that 
there are two cognitive processes that aid collaborative recall; re-exposure (hearing 
another group member recall information that they themselves had forgotten) and 
cross-cuing (hearing another group member recall information that reminds them of 
additional information). These cognitive processes cannot occur when recall occurs 
individually. As our understanding of collective memory improves, perhaps a clearer 
understanding of the deception occurring within groups could be better identified. 
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That is, if more is known about how group members share and recall information 
together, more strategies could be employed by investigators to disrupt this 
collaborative remembering so that more cues to deceit emerge.  
This thesis applies three memory theories: Collective memory (see all 
Chapters); Reconstructive memory (see Chapters 2 and 5); and Transactive memory 
(see Chapter 4). With the exception of Chapter 2, all experimental chapters (Chapters 
3, 4, 5) demonstrate the usefulness of collective memory (i.e. collaborative recall) in 
magnifying the discrepancies between pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars, and 
generating new cues to deceit. Each study shows the different communicative and 
interactive behaviours that occur through joint recall when the information being 
recalled reflects actual shared events, compared to the lack of communicative and 
interactive behaviours that occur when joint recall is of a fabricated event (see Table 
6.1).  
In terms of reconstructive memory theory (Bartlett, 1932), Chapter 2 does not 
provide support for this theory, whereas Chapter 5 does. The truth-telling participants 
recruited in Chapter 5 did make significantly more omission and commission errors 
resulting in their statements changing over time, whereas the lying participants purely 
focused on repeating information. However, it is important to note that the d-values 
obtained in Chapter 2 were substantial for some variables (e.g. d = 1.06 for general 
repetitions), yet the effects not significant. Therefore, there appears to have been a 
lack of power in Chapter 2. Consequently, if the d-values were interpreted and relied 
upon, as opposed to the p-values, then the findings obtained in Chapter 2 would 
actually support the findings of Chapter 5 as well as the reconstructive memory theory 
(Bartlett, 1932).  
Nevertheless, there are numerous other reasons as to why the findings of 
Chapter 2 may not have concurred with the findings of Chapter 5.  First, the 
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participants in Chapter 2 were not informed that they were going to be interviewed 
together, whereas the participants in Chapter 5 were, and therefore the participants’ 
preparation and strategies are likely to have differed between studies. Individual 
interviewing is more common and more widely experienced; therefore the participants 
in Chapter 2 had probably assumed that this was how they were going to be 
interviewed. Second, the interview protocol used in Chapter 2 did not provide the 
appropriate manipulations for eliciting cues that differentiated between pairs of truth-
tellers and pairs of liars, but instead focused on an interview protocol appropriate for 
individual truth-tellers and individual liars. Consequently, the interview protocol may 
have been less applicable to pairs than it has been found to be for individuals. Finally, 
Chapter 5 applies the verifiability approach to reconstructive memory, whereas 
Chapter 2 does not, and therefore different categories of repetitions, omission errors, 
commission errors, and contradictions were used in Chapter 5 compared to Chapter 2. 
The breakdown of each of the variables may have therefore created new cues that 
were more predictive of veracity than when they were all examined together and not 
divided into further categories. 
In terms of transactive memory theory (Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1987), 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that there are good opportunities to differentiate truths from 
lies if truth-tellers do not remember clearly, because signs of truthfulness emerge from 
the existence of a transactive memory system (e.g., posing questions to one another, 
providing cues to one another, handing over of remembering responsibility, and 
finishing each other’s sentences). Hence, as opposed to truth-tellers sounding like liars 
due to providing a lack of detail, liars can be classified correctly because they will 
lack the presence of each of these cues.  
Overall, it is clear that an understanding of memory theory and joint recall can 
aid the detection of deception when a collective interviewing approach is applied, 
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allowing for new and unique cues to emerge that do not arise during individual recall. 
Therefore, future studies that apply a collective interviewing approach should always 
consider memory and the effects of joint recall on social cues to deceit. 
6.3.3 Group dynamics 
 When applying a collective approach it is important to think about the group 
dynamics and how each of the members bond and work together (referred to as group 
formation; Arrow, McGrath & Berdahl, 2000).  Groups often form a structure with 
each member having a different role and being of a different status. Roles facilitate 
group functioning, and when these roles are inflexible or clouded, this can be 
detrimental to the group (Gersick & Hackman, 1990). This PhD thesis, particularly 
Chapters 3 and 4, clearly shows the importance of communication cues when 
detecting deception in groups of interviewees. Group roles influence how group 
members behave and communicate within that group; thus are likely to influence the 
communication cues that arise from within that group. Group roles are not equal and 
therefore those of a higher status (i.e., leaders who are deemed to be more 
knowledgeable and able to initiate the ideas and activities adopted by the group) will 
be more valued and respected than those who are of a lower or equal status. For 
example, individuals are typically reluctant to express disagreement with their group 
leaders in a group discussion, but are more willing to express disagreement with those 
group members who are not superior to themselves (Chemers, 2001; Hollander, 1985). 
In group discussions this could result in a systematic pattern of agreeing and 
disagreeing. If this is then examined within a collective interviewing context to detect 
deceit, ‘agreement’ and ‘disagreement’ could be measured as a function of the role or 
status within the group. It is expected that low status individuals within a truth-telling 
group and low status individuals within a lying group will not differ from one another 
because their role within the group will be to agree regardless of whether they are 
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lying or telling the truth. However, it is expected that high status truth-tellers and high 
status liars will differ from one another. That is, high status individuals within a truth-
telling group will not be scared to disagree with other group members, whereas high 
status individuals within a lying group will not disagree with other group members 
through fear that this will look suspicious. Consequently, communication cues in the 
form of agreements and disagreements should theoretically differ depending on the 
veracity of the group.  
Indeed, aside from group roles and status, the degree of dependence upon a 
group could potentially influence the outcomes. For example, individualistic cultures, 
such as people from Australia and the UK, are very much independent with self-
reliance being greatly emphasised. Individuals of such cultures focus on identifying 
more with the self so that their own needs are satisfied before those of the group. 
Conversely, collectivistic cultures, such as people from Japan and Korea, are very 
much interdependent so that the wellbeing of each individual is related to the success 
of the group. Emphasis is put on group loyalty and conformity with the self-identity of 
each individual developing from the relationships and interconnectedness between all 
group members (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Hui, 1988). Participants in the studies within 
this thesis were primarily from the UK and therefore of an individualistic culture, 
which as some scholars emphasise is an issue with the vast majority of research in the 
human psychology and behaviour domain (see Henrich, Heine & Norenzayan, 2010 
for a discussion about study samples being primarily from Western, Educated, 
Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies). Consequently, the findings 
in this thesis would be likely to differ and in fact be stronger in participants from a 
collectivistic culture whereby supporting the group and masking any lies is more 
important. Hence, it is believed that interviewing groups from a collectivistic culture 
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will result in more social cues to deceit emerging than was found in the studies of this 
thesis.  
Another concept to consider is group cohesiveness which explores the 
properties of a group that effectively bind them together giving the group a sense of 
solidarity (Festinger, 1950). The more cohesive a group is, the more they appear like a 
group. One way of exploring this notion of cohesiveness during collective 
interviewing is to consider what would happen to the cohesiveness of the group if an 
investigator behaves more positively towards one specific member of the group or if 
one group member “slips up” during the interview. One would expect there to be a 
veracity effect because if the group are concealing information, then the (rest of the) 
group may perceive this individual as behaving differently to the rest and not 
satisfying the group goals or standards. The group may see this as a threat to 
cohesiveness and therefore a threat to their group’s credibility. Subsequently, they 
may respond in a way that restores the group cohesiveness. The way they 
communicate with that individual may differ to that of a group whose members are 
not concealing information, because a non-concealing group’s members are likely to 
be less concerned about their group cohesiveness during the interview. That is, groups 
that are concealing information may start to support the individual being favoured or 
who slipped up, or find a way of explaining the information that this individual has 
provided. That way the group restores solidarity and motivates all group members, 
including the favoured individual or individual who slipped up, to act on behalf of the 
group. As a result, communicative and interactive cues arising from this mutual 
support may emerge. These will not emerge from a group not concealing information 
because they will not be focusing on group cohesiveness and will be more willing to 
correct or disagree with other group members. 
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Social psychology theories, such as those mentioned above, have not yet been 
applied to deception detection. Therefore, an understanding of group structure, the 
culture or beliefs of the group, the roles that each individual has within the group, and 
the ways in which the group members communicate should be a point of focus for 
future deception detection research when a collective interviewing approach is 
applied. 
6.4 Practical Implications 
 The main practical implications for the findings obtained in this thesis are in 
the areas of detecting deception, intelligence-gathering, and investigative 
interviewing.  
6.4.1 Immigration: Sham marriages 
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate a study whereby an immigration paradigm was 
used as the setting to which collective interviewing was applied. This setting is 
becoming increasing relevant worldwide as ‘immigration’ is high up on the political 
agenda. The main aim for immigration agencies is to prevent illegal immigration and 
distinguish between genuine couples and fake couples, especially as sham marriages 
are frequently associated with organised crime groups and increased criminality. 
When investigating the genuineness of a relationship, documentary evidence is 
examined, the couple are interviewed in-depth and/or a home visit will take place, and 
it is during these investigative stages that techniques need to be implemented in order 
to detect potential sham marriages and prevent them from occurring. Collective 
interviewing (see all Chapters), the implementation of forced turn-taking (see Chapter 
3) and an understanding of transactive memory theory (see Chapter 4) are ways in 
which an investigator could increase the detection accuracy of genuine and fake 
relationships.  
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6.4.2 Police investigations: Alibi witness scenarios 
 Alibi witnesses are commonly provided by suspects to corroborate their 
whereabouts when a crime took place, and the Criminal Justice System (CJS) often 
accepts alibi witnesses as evidence during criminal investigations (Burke, Turtle & 
Olsen, 2007). When an alibi witness is advocated there are three key phases: (1) alibi 
generation whereby a suspect provides an alibi witness to back up their whereabouts 
at the time the crime took place; (2) alibi discrimination whereby investigators 
attempt to distinguish between true and false alibi witnesses; and (3) alibi evaluation 
whereby the claim put forward by the alibi witness is considered (i.e. by a jury) with 
regard to all other evidence (Culhane et al., 2013). Phase 2 is particularly relevant to 
the experiment conducted in Chapter 5, which demonstrated that both an individual 
and collective approach to the detection of deceit within alibi witness situations was 
beneficial. Therefore, individual and collective questioning, employing the 
verifiability approach, and having an understanding of the social phenomenon of 
human memory can aid the detection of deception and allow for investigators to more 
accurately differentiate true from false alibi witnesses. This could, in turn, assist those 
evaluating the evidence from alibi witnesses in phase 3. A better understanding of 
how to recognise false alibi witnesses would significantly benefit criminal 
investigations, such as the Soham murders case mentioned in Section 5.2. 
Another police investigation context whereby collective interviewing could be 
applied along with group dynamics is the use of an informant. An informant is 
someone who secretly gathers and provides information to an agency, such as the 
police, about an individual or group of individuals, usually criminals. Informants are 
used frequently in criminal investigations and often form a vital part of the 
investigative process (Brown, 2001). If an informant in a group does not want to be 
exposed to his or her fellow group members, s/he needs to identify with them (see 
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social identity theory; Hogg, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) as well as learn his or her 
role within the group. If the group members are then interviewed collectively, the 
informant needs to ensure that s/he does not communicate or behave in a manner that 
causes the other group members to become suspicious of him or her. This means s/he 
has to compare himself or herself socially to the other group members so as to reflect 
their opinions and behaviours and establish the correct or socially approved way of 
thinking and behaving (known as the social comparison theory; Festinger, 1954). This 
is a difficult task. Therefore, an understanding of how groups conceal information 
together, and most importantly how they communicate when being questioned by an 
investigator and concealing information, would be beneficial to informants working 
undercover. 
6.4.3 Additional collective interviewing settings 
The current PhD thesis has demonstrated that the collective interviewing of 
pairs could benefit both immigration and police investigations. However, future 
studies should consider alternative contexts whereby collective interviewing could be 
of benefit for distinguishing innocent groups from guilty groups. For example, police 
‘stop and search’ scenarios (e.g. possession of weapons within gangs), insurance 
claims (e.g. to detect fraud), road border control (e.g. to detect illegal immigration or 
trafficking), house-to-house enquiries (e.g. questioning whole households about their 
knowledge of a local crime), and security checkpoints (e.g. to detect drug mules or 
terrorists at airports). Additionally, whilst this thesis focuses on pairs, collective 
interviewing can also be employed when more than two interviewees require 
questioning. It should be possible to apply the findings obtained from the experiments 
conducted within this thesis to other environments than those examined, as well as to 
more than two interviewees, because the theoretical rationale on which the key 
findings of this thesis are based (e.g. cognitive load, collective memory, reconstructive 
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memory, transactive memory, and the verifiability approach) will remain the same 
regardless of the setting or number of people being interviewed together.  
 A key area in which collective interviewing could be applied is within the area 
of security equipment, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV). Truth-tellers interact 
more with each other than liars, and interaction is often associated with mutual eye 
gaze and body orientation towards each other. Consequently, it would be interesting to 
discover whether CCTV footage can spot such nonverbal communication cues. If it 
can, then this would help distinguish between truth-tellers and liars in collective 
interviews. Future studies should therefore explore whether observing groups and 
applying a collective approach enables security personnel, using CCTV, to 
discriminate truth-tellers from liars.  
6.5 Methodological Considerations 
6.5.1 Knowledge of being interviewed collectively 
In the experiment mentioned in Chapter 2 participants were not informed that 
they would be interviewed collectively whereas they were in the other experiments in 
this thesis (see Chapters 3, 4, 5). It would be interesting to know whether a lack of 
knowledge about the fact they were going to be interviewed together had an effect. 
This idea could be empirically tested in future studies by implementing an 
experimental design whereby participant in one condition are informed about being 
interviewed collectively versus another condition whereby participants are not 
informed about being interviewed collectively. Interviewees often focus on their 
nonverbal behaviours as they believe it is these that will give their lies away. 
Therefore, in the informed condition, lying pairs may develop socially shared 
deceptive strategies that will focus on how they should respond nonverbally to each 
other in order to appear convincing, e.g. looking at each other or at the interviewer. 
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Since liars focus so much on their behaviours, they may not discuss how they should 
communicate and interact together. 
6.5.2 Lack of lie detection experiments 
Four studies were conducted within this thesis, yet only one was a lie detection 
study. Lie detection studies enable the overall potential of a collective approach to be 
explored. Chapter 3 demonstrates that the three turn-taking cues were easy for lie 
catchers to recognise and therefore they could more accurately categorise pairs based 
on veracity. Future lie detection studies should examine the other cues identified in 
this thesis and whether they would be easily recognised and understood to obtain 
equally high accuracy rates. Additionally, the lie detection study conducted in Chapter 
3 used interview transcripts as the materials (as opposed to video clips). Although this 
demonstrated the pure effect and potential of the turn-taking technique within 
collective interviewing, future lie detection studies should examine the accuracy rates 
obtained from real-life interviews to increase the ecological validity of the findings.  
6.5.3 No individual interviewing comparison group 
With the exception of the experiment conducted in Chapter 5, there was no 
individual interviewing condition used as a control or comparison group. Hence, an 
experimental manipulation whereby there are two conditions: (1) groups separated and 
interviewed individually; and (2) groups kept together and interviewed 
simultaneously, would emphasise the true benefits of a collective approach and the 
different ways such an approach can aid with the detection of deception. However, the 
question is not whether collective interviewing should replace individual interviewing. 
Instead, the question is whether collective interviewing can be employed as a ‘new’ or 
‘additional’ approach to individual interviewing. Therefore, the collective interview 
could be used in isolation whereby if the group raises suspicion in a collective 
interview, investigators take the required actions they would normally take after 
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interviewing individuals who raise suspicion (e.g. calling for assistance, collecting 
further evidence). Alternatively, collective interviewing could act as an initial 
screening process to determine whether suspects then need to be interviewed 
individually. 
6.5.4 Translation of the findings to the field 
Throughout this PhD thesis, different collective interviewing settings have 
been mentioned, e.g. security checkpoints, police stop and search, and house-to-house 
enquires. However, whilst all these settings can involve collective interviewing, they 
also share the same characteristic of interest (i.e. deception), and deception in itself is 
characterised by low base rates. Therefore, although the effect sizes and hit rates 
reported throughout this PhD thesis are high, they are primarily based on discriminant 
analyses in which the upper bound estimates of the ‘true’ accuracy are reported. 
Consequently, it must be acknowledged that there will be a significant number of false 
accusations made when using this technique. Therefore, future research needs to 
examine better ways of identifying who needs to be examined so that the number of 
false accusations reduces. Despite this, the hit rates reported are a massive 
improvement within the deception detection literature showing the clear potential of 
using collective interviewing to detect deceit. 
6.6 Overview of Future Research  
There are various ideas that could be examined in further studies to help 
contribute to the collective interviewing literature within the detection of deception. 
Some of these ideas have been provided in the current chapter, but others have been 
suggested in the discussion sections of Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. To summarise, the main 
ideas for future research put forward throughout this thesis include: (1) alternative 
contexts or scenarios to which collective interviewing could be applied (e.g., 
insurance claims, the use of an informant, security equipment, house to house 
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enquiries); (2) alternative techniques for imposing cognitive load during collective 
interviewing, as well as different ways in which the turn-taking technique could be 
implemented (e.g., by giving the pairs instructions to follow); (3)  identifying what 
cues emerge when social psychology theories of group processes and differing 
cultures are applied to group deception;  (4) a novel experimental design whereby 
there are two comparison conditions (e.g.,  individual interviewing versus collective 
interviewing, informing versus not informing pairs of how they will be interviewed, or 
informing versus not informing participants of what the interviewer/investigator is 
measuring); (5) additional lie detection studies that can be applied to the real world 
and identify whether social indicators of deceit can be easily recognised by lie 
catchers; (6) an examination of the nonverbal behaviours that may arise from 
collective interviewing; and (7) an investigation of what cues arise when more than 
two interviewees are interviewed together at the same time, and whether the theories 
and techniques applied throughout this thesis also apply to the questioning of more 
than two interviewees. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Previous research has neglected the social indicators of deception. The aim of 
this thesis is to apply collective interviewing to deception detection by interviewing 
pairs of truth-tellers and pairs of liars simultaneously. This thesis demonstrates that a 
collective interviewing approach can elicit novel cues to deceit that can be easily 
measured and recognised. It implies that memory and the effects of joint recall need to 
be understood if the approach is to be applied constructively.  
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Appendix 2.1: Averages and Totals Calculations 
 
Pairs of participants were labelled as left participant and right participant. All of the 
following calculations were conducted first for the general interview questions, then 
for the spatial interview questions.  
 
Initial details 
All details provided in the initial interview questions were first added together for 
each coder and each member of the pair separately. Therefore, a total number of initial 
details for each participant and from each coder was obtained. 
 
Average initial details from left participant = (Total initial details provided by the left 
participant: Coder 1 + Total initial details provided by the left participant: Coder 2) / 
2. 
 
Average initial details from right participant = (Total initial details provided by the 
right participant: Coder 1 + Total initial details provided by the right participant: 
Coder 2) / 2. 
 
Total initial details = Average initial details provided by the left participant + 
Average initial details provided by the right participant. 
 
Average initial details = Total initial details / 2. 
 
Replicate details 
All details provided in the replicate interview questions were first added together for 
each coder and each member of the pair separately. Therefore, a total number of 
replicate details for each participant and from each coder was obtained. 
 
Average replicate details from left participant = (Total replicate details provided by 
the left participant: Coder 1 + Total replicate details provided by the left participant: 
Coder 2) / 2. 
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Average replicate details from right participant = (Total replicate details provided by 
the right participant: Coder 1 + Total replicate details provided by the right 
participant: Coder 2) / 2. 
 
Total replicate details = Average replicate details provided by the left participant + 
Average replicate details provided by the right participant. 
 
Average replicate details = Total replicate details / 2. 
 
Repetitions 
Average repetitions made by left participant of the left participant = (Repetitions of 
the left participant by the left participant: Coder 1 + Repetitions of the left participant 
by the left participant: Coder 2) / 2. 
 
Average repetitions made by right participant of the right participant = (Repetitions 
of the right participant by the right participant: Coder 1 + Repetitions of the right 
participant by the right participant: Coder 2) / 2. 
 
Total repetitions of themselves = Average repetitions of the left participant by the left 
participant + Average repetitions of the right participant by the right participant. 
 
Average repetitions of themselves = Total repetitions of themselves / 2. 
 
Average repetitions made by left participant of the right participant = (Repetitions of 
the right participant by the left participant: Coder 1 + Repetitions of the right 
participant by the left participant: Coder 2) / 2. 
 
Average repetitions made by right participant of the left participant = (Repetitions of 
the left participant by the right participant: Coder 1 + Repetitions of the left participant 
by the right participant: Coder 2) / 2. 
 
Total repetitions of other participant in pair = Average repetitions of the right 
participant by the left participant + Average repetitions of the left participant by the 
right participant. 
 212 
 
Average repetitions of other participant in pair = Total repetitions of other 
participant in pair / 2. 
 
Overall number of repetitions from both the left and right participants = Total 
repetitions of themselves + Total repetitions of other participant in pair. 
 
Contradictions 
Total contradictions of themselves = Agreed number of contradictions by the left 
participant of the left participant + Agreed number of contradictions by the right 
participant of the right participant. 
 
Total contradictions of other participant in the pair = Agreed number of 
contradictions by the left participant of the right participant + Agreed number of 
contradictions by the right participant of the left participant. 
 
Overall number of contradictions from both the left and right participants = Total 
contradictions of themselves + Total contradictions of other participant in the pair. 
 
Omission Errors 
Number of omission errors made by left participant of the left participant = Average 
initial details from left participant – Average repetitions made by left participant of the 
left participant. 
 
Number of omission errors made by right participant of the right participant = 
Average initial details from right participant – Average repetitions made by right 
participant of the right participant. 
 
Total omission errors of themselves = Average omission errors made by left 
participant of the left participant + Average omission errors made by right participant 
of the right participant. 
 
Average omission errors of themselves = Total omission errors of themselves / 2. 
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Number of omission errors made by left participant of the right participant = 
Average initial details from right participant – Average repetitions made by the left 
participant of the right participant. 
 
Number of omission errors made by right participant of the left participant = 
Average initial details from left participant – Average repetitions made by the right 
participant of the left participant. 
 
Total omission errors of the other participants in their pair = Average omission 
errors made by left participant of the right participant + Average omission errors made 
by right participant of the left participant. 
 
Average omission errors of the other participants in their pair = Total omission 
errors of the other participant in pair / 2. 
 
Overall number of omission errors from both the left and right participants = Total 
omission errors of themselves + Total omission errors of the other participants in their 
pair. 
 
Commission Errors 
Number of commission errors made by left participant of the left participant = 
Average replicate details from left participant – Average repetitions made by left 
participant of the left participant.  
 
Number of commission errors made by right participant of the right participant = 
Average replicate details from right participant – Average repetitions made by right 
participant of the right participant. 
 
Total commission errors of themselves = Average commission errors made by left 
participant of the left participant + Average commission errors made by right 
participant of the right participant. 
 
Average commission errors of themselves = Total commission errors of themselves / 
2. 
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Number of commission errors made by left participant of the right participant = 
Average replicate details from left participant – Average repetitions made by the left 
participant of the right participant. 
 
Number of commission errors made by right participant of the left participant = 
Average replicate details from right participant – Average repetitions made by the 
right participant of the left participant. 
 
Total commission errors of the other participants in their pair = Average 
commission errors made by left participant of the right participant + Average 
commission errors made by right participant of the left participant. 
 
Overall number of commission errors from both the left and right participants = 
Total commission errors of themselves + Total commission errors of the other 
participants in their pair. 
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Appendix 2.2: Proportion Calculations 
 
Pairs of participants were labelled as left participant and right participant. All of the 
following calculations were conducted first for the general interview questions, then 
for the spatial interview questions.  
 
Repetitions 
Percentage of information given by the left participant in the replicate questions 
that was originally given by the left participant in the initial questions = (Average 
repetitions made by left participant of the left participant x 100) / Average Initial 
details from left participant. 
 
Percentage of information given by the right participant in the replicate questions 
that was originally given by the right participant in the initial questions = (Average 
repetitions made by right participant of the right participant x 100) / Average initial 
details from right participant. 
 
Average percentage of information repeated of themselves = (Percentage of 
information given by the left participant in the replicate questions that was originally 
given by the left participant in the initial questions + Percentage of information given 
by the right participant in the replicate questions that was originally given by the right 
participant in the initial questions) / 2. 
 
Percentage of information given by the left participant in the replicate questions 
that was originally given by the right participant in the initial questions = (Average 
repetitions made by left participant of the right participant x 100) / Average initial 
details from right participant. 
 
Percentage of information given by the right participant in the replicate questions 
that was originally given by the left participant in the initial questions = (Average 
repetitions made by right participant of the left participant x 100) / Average initial 
details from left participant. 
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Average percentage of information repeated of the other participant in their pair = 
(Percentage of information given by the left participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the right participant in the initial questions + Percentage of 
information given by the right participant in the replicate questions that was originally 
given by the left participant in the initial questions) / 2. 
 
Omission errors 
Percentage of information lost by the left participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the left participant in the initial questions = 100 – 
Percentage of information given by the left participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the left participant in the initial questions. 
 
Percentage of information lost by the right participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the right participant in the initial questions = 100 – 
Percentage of information given by the right participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the right participant in the initial questions. 
 
Average percentage of information omitted (lost) of themselves = (Percentage of 
information lost by the left participant in the replicate questions that was originally 
given by the left participant in the initial questions + Percentage of information lost by 
the right participant in the replicate questions that was originally given by the right 
participant in the initial questions) / 2. 
 
Percentage of information lost by the left participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the right participant in the initial questions = 100 - 
Percentage of information given by the left participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the right participant in the initial questions. 
 
Percentage of information lost by the right participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the left participant in the initial questions = 100 - Percentage 
of information given by the right participant in the replicate questions that was 
originally given by the left participant in the initial questions. 
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Average percentage of information omitted (lost) of the other participant in the pair 
= (Percentage of information lost by the left participant in the replicate questions that 
was originally given by the right participant in the initial questions + Percentage of 
information lost by the right participant in the replicate questions that was originally 
given by the left participant in the initial questions) / 2. 
 
Commission errors 
Percentage of new information given by the left participant in the replicate 
questions that was not originally given by left participant in the initial questions = 
100 – {(Average repetitions made by left participant of the left participant x 100) / 
Average replicate details from left participant}. 
 
Percentage of new information given by the right participant in the replicate 
questions that was not originally given by right participant in the initial questions = 
100 – {(Average repetitions made by right participant of the right participant x 100) / 
Average replicate details from right participant}. 
 
Average percentage of information committed (added) of themselves = (Percentage 
of new information given by the left participant in the replicate questions that was not 
originally given by left participant in the initial questions + Percentage of new 
information given by the right participant in the replicate questions that was not 
originally given by right participant in the initial questions) / 2. 
 
Percentage of new information given by the left participant in the replicate 
questions that was not originally given by right participant in the initial questions = 
100 – {(Average repetitions made by left participant of the right participant x 100) / 
Average replicate details from left participant}. 
 
Percentage of new information given by the right participant in the replicate 
questions that was not originally given by left participant in the initial questions = 
100 – {(Average repetitions made by right participant of the left participant x 100) / 
Average replicate details from right participant}. 
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Average percentage of information committed (added) of the other participant in 
their pair = (Percentage of new information given by the left participant in the 
replicate questions that was not originally given by right participant in the initial 
questions + Percentage of new information given by the right participant in the 
replicate questions that was not originally given by left participant in the initial 
questions) / 2. 
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Appendix 2.3: Dominance Calculations 
 
Initial interview questions 
Proportion of information provided by the left participant during the initial 
interview questions = Average initial details from left participant / Total initial details. 
 
Proportion of information provided by the right participant during the initial 
interview questions = Average initial details from right participant / Total initial 
details. 
 
Replicate interview questions 
Proportion of information provided by the left participant during the replicate 
interview questions = Average replicate details from left participant / Total replicate 
details. 
 
Proportion of information provided by the right participant during the replicate 
interview questions = Average replicate details from right participant / Total initial 
details. 
 
Equal dominance  
Negative values from the variables computed below signify more than equal 
dominance, whereas positive values signify less than equal dominance. Zero 
represents equal dominance. 
 
Dominance of left participant on the initial interview questions = 0.5 – Proportion of 
information provided by the left participant during the initial interview questions. 
 
Dominance of right participant on the initial interview questions = 0.5 – Proportion 
of information provided by the right participant during the initial interview questions. 
 
Dominance of left participant on the replicate interview questions = 0.5 – Proportion 
of information provided by the left participant during the replicate interview 
questions. 
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Dominance of right participant on the replicate interview questions = 0.5 – 
Proportion of information provided by the right participant during the replicate 
interview questions. 
 
Dominance change 
Dominance change of left participant = Proportion of information provided by the 
left participant during the initial interview questions – Proportion of information 
provided by the left participant during the replicate interview questions. 
 
Dominance change of right participant = Proportion of information provided by the 
right participant during the initial interview questions – Proportion of information 
provided by the right participant during the replicate interview questions. 
  
Overall dominance change = Dominance change of left participant x Dominance 
change of right participant. 
 
The sign of the overall dominance change is ignored, with larger numbers for overall 
dominance representing a greater change in dominance. 
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Appendix 3.1: Number of Details (Condition 1) Examples 
 
1. Truth-telling pair example (underlined information = details):  
 
Describe a recent memorable day that you spent together hour by hour. 
 
F: Umm... On the 3rd of July just gone we flew to Australia to see my family... 
Ermm... we left like the hotel at like 6 in the morning I think, coz our flight 
was at quarter to 9. Ermm so we got like one of those shuttle buses from the 
Hilton to... to... Heathrow... We flew from Heathrow... it was Heathrow 
wasn't it? 
 
M: Yeah it was Heathrow, it wasn't Gatwick. 
 
F: Terminal 4. 
 
M: Yep. 
 
F: And then we... I don't remember... I think it was gate 6 we flew from, coz I 
took a picture of it on my phone.  
 
M: Yeah... but we... I thought we'd have loads of time there, but we really 
didn't. We had about half an hour in the airport before we had to get on the 
plane.  
 
F: Which we spent buying stuff for mum (laughs). 
 
M: Yeah! And... 
 
F: Umm...what else? Then we waited there, got on the plane. The food was 
rubbish... Umm, we had to stop at Brunei... well first Dubai... on the way to 
Brunei... umm... I think it took 7 and a bit hours to get to Dubai, and then 7 
more to get to Brunei, so by that point it was probably… 
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M: We had to get off the plane, and then go through security again, even 
though we'd been through security and hadn't left the airport so there didn't 
really seem like much point... Umm... yeah. 
 
F: I don't really remember... 
 
M: Didn't we have sweet and sour noodles for dinner? 
 
F: Yeah. Sweet and sour noodles and then sweet and sour fried rice on the next 
flight which was... lovely (laughs). Umm, I can't remember what films we 
watched though, didn't we watch... that one that we really wanted to see 
with... 
 
M: Friends... 
 
F: Friends with kids or Friends with children? 
 
M: Something like that. 
 
F: Yeah. Not friends with benefits, it was a rubbish version of that with kids. 
Umm... I don't remember now... I don't remember what gate we were in 
Dubai or Brunei. 
 
M: There was a crab, I remember that, like a little... 
 
F: Oh yeah, yeah in Dubai (laughs). 
 
M: In Dubai like a crab that came and... 
 
F: An alarm clock... (laughs) oh yeah… Umm... what else? We should 
probably give some more information... 
 
M: Yeah (laughs). Umm... 
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F: We were at the back of the plane, umm in 2 seats on their own coz we didn't 
want anyone smelly sitting next to us. 
  
M: (Laughs). 
 
F: But there weren't any toilets near us so we had to like go all the way to the 
front for the toilet.  
 
M: Yeah... we were in seats 59H and 59K. 
 
F: Yeah, in one row… Umm... oh and we had that bag of Doritos that nearly 
exploded. 
 
M: Yeah because of the pressure it just kind of... 
 
F: Yeah, we took a picture of it. And you were laughing for like 10 minutes... 
Umm... we didn't sleep on that flight either because it was our time. 
 
2. Lying pair example (underlined information = details): 
 
Describe a recent memorable day that you spent together hour by hour.  
 
F: Okay... Last Thursday there was this charity thing going on and he got 
picked as well as Tara to do this um... Bush tucker trial. 
 
M: Yeah so eating creatures… 
 
F: Yeah, it was hilarious (laughs). 
 
M:  ...and weird things and she came down to support me, or so I thought… 
 
F:  (Laughs). 
 
M:  Instead she was just sitting there, drinking, laughing at me, and yeah... 
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F: Yeah, so, um... He got drunk from 4 in order to prepare for this… 
 
M:  Well I had to drink, I couldn’t… 
 
F:  So well erm, that was quite funny... I wasn’t entirely sure whether he was 
going to get in. He ate a load of bugs and all those disgusting things, I 
decided I was not like, going to get … Was not going to let him kiss me for 
the rest of that day. Definitely.  And err... after that we were both a little bit 
drunk so we decided to go to Pure. Was it Pure? 
 
M:  Yeah Pure. 
 
F:  Yeah we went to Pure. But there was only a couple of other friends… Was 
there a couple of other friends? I’m sure… 
 
M:  Yeah, Hope and Leanna came down as well… 
 
F:  Yeah, Hope and Leanna came down as well. And Hope and Leanna were 
together, so they were spending most of their time together, so it was nice 
coz we got to like dance a lot and everything… Together and it was quite 
crowded which was nice because I prefer crowded places (laughs).  
 
M:  To be honest I really enjoy going clubbing quite a lot. But she’s not really a 
clubbing kind of person… 
 
F:  Not too much. 
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Appendix 3.2: Number of Details (Condition 2) Examples 
 
1. Truth-Telling Pair Example (underlined information = details):  
 
(TT) Can you describe in as much detail as possible your first date.  
 
M: Err... we were in the Winney and Henry in Weymouth where we're from. 
Umm... 
 
F: Table at the top by the stairs (laughs). 
 
M: Yeah. Umm... Err... 
 
F: Both sat on the outside bit as well. 
 
M: Yeah. 
 
F: They had really tall chairs coz I couldn't sit on it properly coz I'm so short. 
 
M: You had Pepsi... 
 
F: Yeah coz I was driving. 
 
M: Yeah you were driving. And I had Jack Daniels and coke. 
 
If you could carry on for me. 
 
F: Umm... I think he bought me a drink. Umm... which was nice, coz all of my 
friends were going ‘ooh he really likes you’. Umm…so I was like texting 
them while he was getting drinks and stuff, saying ‘oh he's buying me a 
drink’ and they were all going ‘ah yeah I told you so!’ 
 
Okay and if you could carry on. 
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M: Umm... yeah... And then we just... sat there talking... umm... I... did Jade 
come along eventually... or not? Or was that a different time? 
 
F: Umm... 
 
And again if you could carry on. 
 
F: I think she might have done... oh we bumped into someone I think... like 
someone else that saw us and then... we only stayed there for like, a couple 
of hours, and then I felt a bit awkward so I was like ‘I'm gonna go home’, 
and he expected a lift and I didn't give him one, which I still feel guilty 
about now (laughs)… Coz that was a bit nasty. 
 
2. Lying Pair Example (underlined information = details): 
 
(TT) Can you describe in as much detail as possible how you first met.  
 
M: Uhhhh... 
 
F: (Laughs). 
 
M: I don't really remember the first time we properly met... umm... we were at 
college umm... we were in the common room I remember that much... 
umm... I think I was messing around with my best friend... umm... 
 
Okay, can I stop you there and can you carry on? 
 
F: Umm... I thought he was a bit of a dick at first soo... I didn't really spend 
much time with him, I think it was because he was messing around. Umm... 
I just obviously kind of didn't wanna get too close to him because he was 
my best friend's boyfriend and not mine… 
 
Okay I'm going to stop you there, and if you could carry on. 
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M: Ermm... (laughs) Ermm... I don't think we really had much to say to each 
other… ermm...coz she was my girlfriend's best friend and I didn't really 
know what to say to her... ermm...I think I was rather more interested in 
spending time with my girlfriend at the time...rather than talking to other 
people. 
 
Okay, and again if you can now carry on. 
 
F: Umm... I don't think it was very long when we first met, I think it was just 
like, it was in like a break between lessons so it was kind of like... just go 
and see all your friends and then you have to go... I think it used to be like 
15 minutes so... probably didn't say much to him and... just kind of thought 
‘what a dick’, and left (laughs). 
 
And if you can now carry on. 
 
M: Umm... yeah... I think that's pretty much it. 
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Appendix 3.3: Turn-Taking Cues (Condition 3) Examples 
 
1. Truth-telling pair example (italicized = continuation; underlined = 
repetition; bold = waiting): 
 
(TT) Can you describe in as much detail as possible your last holiday or trip 
away together?  
 
F: Ermm... we went to Australia for 10 weeks to see my family, Buck, my 
mum, dad, brother, sister and like my uncle and his family. Um... we 
stayed with them the whole time in Mornington which is near Melbourne. 
Umm... we didn't really do much coz we didn't have much money, umm so 
we just helped.... 
 
And if you could carry on. 
 
M: Umm... yeah, err we helped out around the house and umm, looked after 
her little sister, umm, we... I walked the dogs quite a lot as well umm... 
and... 
 
If you can carry on for me please. 
 
F: And the first Sunday we were there it was my little sisters first birthday 
party that they waited... coz they waited to have the party for us to get 
there. Umm... and we went... that was like in a little... just a little play barn 
place. Umm... and then we also went to Melbourne on the train on the 
Sunday. 
 
I'm gonna interrupt you there...and if you can carry on. 
 
 
 
 
 229 
 
M: Yeah, we went to Melbourne which was really good ...we got concession 
tickets on like the public transport coz there wasn't enough room in the car 
for us and Mia to go... and it was only 6 dollars 50 for like zone 1 and 2 
which was like the bus and the train to the city all day so I thought that 
was pretty good. Umm... and while we were there we ended up walking to 
this weird museum of like film and games. 
 
Sorry if I can stop you there and if you can carry on. 
 
F: Umm... that was called like... ACMI I think and it was in Federation 
Square just opposite the train station and it had loads of weird exhibitions 
of old tellies and all of that... and then a... an Asian woman gave my little 
sister a balloon coz she was trying to grab it off her... (laughs) 
 
Swap again please. 
 
M: Yeah, and then we went down toward the train station where we got off 
and there was a dulux dog there, like a really big fluffy dulux dog... umm 
and Mia just went mental, like flapping her arms up and down and umm I 
managed to get quite a few paint samples, not that we needed them... 
 
2. Lying Pair Example ( italicised = continuation; underlined = repetition; bold 
= waiting): 
 
(TT) Can you describe in as much detail as possible your last holiday or trip 
away together?  
 
M:  Well it wasn’t just us two it was like a group of our friends from erm... the 
same halls that we’re going to and it was just like a last minute thing, we 
just decided the night before that we were going to go to Southsea for a 
barbeque coz the weather was alright and things like that so erm… We 
woke up quite early and erm me and her ended up going to Tesco’s, we 
just bought a load of meat, different types of meat and a lot of alcohol, and 
then… 
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Okay can I swap you now? 
 
F:  Yeah err... yeah loads of meat and alcohol (laughs)... and it was... we it 
was erm... we went off with the others then even though we ended up 
leaving quite late despite the fact that we got to Tescos quite early because 
everyone else hadn’t got prepared so we had to wait quite a while but 
when we did go erm, was that the day? Yeah, that was the time we also 
went to the fair afterwards but anyway first of all when we were at the 
park, that was really nice we played a bit of football, even though I’m 
awful at that. 
 
I’m sorry can I swap you again now please? 
 
M:  Yeah so… we played football and we just like chilling, we were eating, 
drinking, socialising, laughing, it was just, it was like a really good time 
coz erm we... we... all of us as a group we don’t really go out as much, like 
obviously me and her we see each other all the time but the rest we don’t 
really get to see that much so err... 
 
Can I swap you again? 
 
F:  So it was really nice, we could play more team things and… And erm we 
played rounders… Was it rounders? Which was also quite embarrassing 
on my part, and erm, and then after that, was it? I’m sure it was you who 
was also lobbing around bits of meat from the barbeque and hitting them 
with the rackets which was disgusting… 
 
M:  That weren’t me...That was Callum. 
 
F:  That was Callum? Oh okay fine that’s alright then, you’re off the hook 
with that (laughs) coz that was gross and it landed on my top. And 
erm…then we went to the fair... 
 
Okay can you swap now please?  
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M:  Err… Yeah so after that we just went to the, to the fair, like to the... like 
where the arcades are and things like that err we spent a bit of time there 
and then really from there we kind of, we just came back here and we all 
decided to go out in the evening as well like to, like one of the places in 
Guildhall, we started off at, I think at Yates and then we made our way to 
Babylon. 
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Appendix A: Favourable Ethical Opinion (Chapters 3 and 4) 
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Appendix B: Favourable Ethical Opinion (Chapter 5) 
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Appendix C: Journal article published from Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 236 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 238 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 240 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 241 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 247 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 248 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 250 
 
Appendix D: Journal article published from Chapter 4 
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Appendix E: UPR16 Form 
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